THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF SELF-COGNITION

This highly original work explores the concept of self-awareness or self-consciousness in Buddhist thought. Within the Buddhist doctrinal system, the Sanskrit word *svasamvedana* or *svasamvitti* (self-cognition, self-awareness or self-consciousness) signifies a form of reflexive awareness. It is one of the key concepts in the Buddhist epistemological system developed by Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE) and his followers. The discussion on whether the mind knows itself also had a long history in the Buddhist schools of Mahāsāmghika, Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and early Yogācāra. The same issue was debated later among followers of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools. This work is the first to study systematically the Buddhist theory of self-cognition with an emphasis on its pre-Dignāga development. Its central thesis is that the Buddhist theory of self-cognition originated in a soteriological discussion of omniscience among the Mahāsāmghikas, and then evolved into a topic of epistemological inquiry among the Yogācārins. To illustrate this central theme, the author draws on a large body of primary sources in Chinese, Pali, Sanskrit and Tibetan, most of which are being presented to an English readership for the first time. This work makes available important resources for the study of the Buddhist philosophy of mind.

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Zhihua Yao

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PREFACE

Shortly after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, I was sent to a remote mountain region in the northwest of Beijing to be "reeducated through labor". Carrying with me only a few books, I enjoyed the chance to be able to detach myself from library, classroom and books. I lived in a local government office distant from the nearby villages. In the cool and tranquil night, I could hear dogs barking miles away. In between these living voices, there was only quiescence, so quiet that I could even hear the "noise" of my brain.

At that time, my mind would become very active. With dim light or no light at all, I tried to practice meditation. Having just graduated from college as a philosophy major, I was far more familiar with philosophers such as Descartes than with any religious traditions. Actually, what I had in mind was the kind of meditation that Descartes was doing: sitting in front of the stove, with pen and paper in hand, and letting my thought flow. One night, I felt that I got the exact experience of Descartes. Everything around me became insignificant, irrelevant and doubtful. The only thing that mattered was the flow of my thought, and my thinking. My mind became so real to me that I felt I could touch it by reaching out my hand. I could see my thoughts as clearly as pebbles in a stream. I joyfully watched my mind flowing for quite a while.

That was a decisive experience for me, not only giving me courage to face the depressive environment, but also teaching me what philosophy is really about. Philosophy is not about concepts, arguments or knowledge. It is about thinking. Thinking is the true source and only foundation for any philosophy. It is the thing that goes beyond all conceptual constructions. To philosophize is to go back to this thing itself, to be able to think and to be aware of this thinking. In this sense, philosophy becomes part of our life, and enables us to be fully aware of and to appreciate the meaning of life.

This experience of mine bears an obvious Cartesian mark, but I was not convinced that one should immediately accept the existence of self or God as the substance of thinking. In my subsequent years of graduate studies, I struggled with the Cartesian sense of substance. In a series of articles,

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I examined how the substantial self is gradually rejected among some key figures of modern Western philosophy, including Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre. The more contemporary these thinkers are, the less they think of the mind and consciousness as substantial. These thinkers also reveal a close relationship between the mind and internal time or time-consciousness. The mind and consciousness are presented more and more like what I have experienced: a flow that is aware of itself by its own power.

About the same time, I discovered Buddhism. I was first drawn by its practice of self-scrutiny and self-observation, which seemed just right for me. Later I was fascinated by its sophisticated philosophical systems, especially that of Yogācāra. While the late Han Jingqing introduced me to the foundations of Yogācāra Buddhism, the works of Iso Kern, a renowned phenomenologist who studied Yogācāra philosophy in China for many years, eventually attracted my attention to the Buddhist concept of self-cognition, an apparent counterpart of the concept of self-consciousness as developed among the German idealists and phenomenologists. Although initially inspired by the Western tradition, I soon discovered that the Yogācāra theory of self-cognition spoke more directly to my experience.

In the following decade, I prepared and trained myself in the difficult discipline of Buddhist studies in the USA. I had the good fortune to study under Professor David Eckel, who has guided me through the whole study and writing process with great patience and skill. We met frequently to read and discuss the relevant Sanskrit and Tibetan materials. The translations of many of these passages are credited to him. He also spent a lot of time to help improve my style. Professor Robert Gimello at Harvard read through the earlier draft and made a number of valuable suggestions.

During the years in Boston, I benefited from studying and exchanging ideas with many other teachers, scholars and friends. They include the late Edward Malatesta, SJ, the late Masatoshi Nagatomi, John Makransky, Robert Neville, John Berthrong, Tu Wei-ming, Brook Ziporyn, Leonard van der Kuijp, Janet Gyatso, Tulku Thondup, Yeh A-yüeh, Lin Chen-kuo, Dan Lusthaus, John Dunne, Matthew Kapstein, Katsumi Mimaki, Williams Waldron, Tom Tillemans, Gene Smith, Urs App, Kenyo Mitomo, Chris Cleary, Qin Wenjie, Tomoko Iwasawa, Wu Jiang, Andrew Wong and Suah Kim.

An earlier draft of this book was submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Boston University, to fulfill the requirement for the Ph.D. degree in the summer of 2002. The revision was done in the following two years in Hong Kong, where I had chance to discuss relevant issues with my colleagues in the University of Hong Kong, especially Venerables Dhammajoti, Jing Yin and Guang Xing, and with our distinguished guest speakers including Wang Bangwei, Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Max Deeg, Stephen Teiser, Charles Willemen and Anne Klein. Max Deeg, in particular, read through the historical sections and made a few critical remarks. The revision

also benefited from the comments and discussions of a group of students who took my course "Self-awareness: the Buddhist theory and practice" in spring 2003, especially Yu Chun-pong and Fiona Ng, who also helped to refine the diagrams in the book. Nanako Tamaki in Tokyo helped with Japanese pronunciation and with collecting many Japanese journal articles.

Part of Chapter 5 has appeared in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 32 (2004) under the title "Dignāga and Four Types of Perception". Thanks to Kluwer Academic Publishers for allowing me to include it in the current book with slight revision. I am also grateful to Dr. Eli Franco for a critical email correspondence regarding this paper.

Last but not least, I thank Xiaohong for her support, the cost of which is that she had to defer her own dissertation writing.

ABBREVIATIONS

AKBh: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu
AKVy: *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* of Yaśomitra
BBU: **Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* of Bandhuprabha *et al.*
BD: **Buddhadhātu-śāstra* of Vasubandhu
D: Derge edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka
JP: *Janakaparamopadeśa* of Harivarman
KV: *Kathāvatthu* ascribed to Tissa Moggaliputta
KVA: *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā* of Buddhaghosa
MA: *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* of Candrakīrti
MMK: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna
MV: **Mahāvibhāṣā* ascribed to 500 *arhat*s
N: Narthang edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka
NA: **Nyāyānusāra* of Saṃghabhadra
NB: *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti
NM: *Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga
NV: *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna* of Bhavya (Bhāvaviveka)
P: Peking edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka
PS: *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga
PSV: *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* of Dignāga
PTS: Pāli Text Society
PV: *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti
SAH: **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* of Dharmatrāta
SB: *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* of Vasumitra
SN: *Samayabhedoparacanacakra nikāyabhedopadarśanasaṃgraha* of
Vinītadeva
T: *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新脩大藏經
TSWS: Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series
VMS: *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Dharmapāla *et al.*
Z: *Shinsan Dai Nihon zoku zōkyō* 新纂大日本續藏經

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INTRODUCTION

While you are happy, you *know* that you are happy; while you are sad, you *know* that you are sad; while you are reading this book, you *know* that you are reading it. These are the most common experiences that we have in everyday life. It is called self-consciousness, or simply consciousness, and is often considered a specific feature that distinguishes human beings from other animals. It is one of the central issues of modern Western philosophy and has become a hot topic in the rapidly growing field of cognitive science.

Within the Buddhist doctrinal system, whether we translate the Sanskrit word *svasaṃvedana* or *svasaṃvitti* as "self-cognition", "self-awareness" or "reflexive awareness", it signifies a form of self-consciousness. This concept may sound strange to those who are familiar with the Buddhist doctrine of no-self, but the concept does not contradict this basic tenet of Buddhism. Self-cognition is not a cognition of unchangeable self but, rather, a cognition of cognition itself, or the reflexive nature of consciousness. It is one of the key concepts in the Buddhist epistemological system developed by Dignāga and his followers. The discussion on whether the mind knows itself also had a long history in the Buddhist schools of Mahāsāṃghika, Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and early Yogācāra. The same issue was debated among later followers of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Meanwhile, the Yogācāra scholar Dharmapāla expanded the concept to include a second level of reflexivity, the cognition of self-cognition. To explore these discussions and debates in their doctrinal context is an extremely important and interesting topic.

This topic, however, attracts comparatively little attention among contemporary scholars. Paul Williams's *The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence* (1998) is the only book in a Western language discussing the Buddhist view of reflexive awareness. However, his book is limited to the late Sanskrit and Tibetan materials, and follows closely the Madhyamaka line of interpretation. He picks a contemporary Tibetan scholar, Mi-pham, as the main subject. He mentions Dignāga's interpretation of self-cognition, but makes no effort to examine the origin or the early development of this concept.

There is a large group of scholars who study the Dignāga school through the works of Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti has the advantage over other authors in this school because most of his works are still extant in the original Sanskrit. But scholars in this group seem not to be interested in the issue of self-cognition. Some may see it as difficult. The recent works on Dharmakīrti by Dunne (2004), Tillemans (1999), Franco (1997) and Dreyfus (1997) only mention this concept at a preliminary level and do not examine it carefully.

Fukihara Shōshin is one of the few scholars to study the Dharmapāla line of interpretation by examining the concepts of self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition in the context of four divisions of cognition. A substantial part of his book entitled *Yuishiki no kenkyū: Sanshō to shibun* (1988) is devoted to this issue. Being a collection of the author's essays of more than forty years ago, this book relies on Xuanzang's translation of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (VMS) and on the numerous commentaries and sub-commentaries on it in China and Japan, especially a work by the medieval Japanese author Chūzan. Fukihara's book is sophisticated and detailed. However, his discussion is dominated by the later commentaries and relies too heavily on East Asian sources; and he does not attempt to make use of the Sanskrit and Tibetan materials, which makes his book a bit outdated.

My study, in contrast to those of Williams and Fukihara, examines the Buddhist theory of self-cognition with an emphasis on its pre-Dignāga development. Its central thesis is that the Buddhist theory of self-cognition originated in a soteriological discussion of omniscience among the Mahāsāṃghikas, and then evolved into a topic of epistemological inquiry among the Yogācārins. To illustrate this central theme, this book explores a large body of primary sources in Chinese, Pāli, Sanskrit and Tibetan such as the encyclopedic *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MV), Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Kathāvatthu* (KV), Harivarman's *Janakaparamopadeśa* (JP), the *Nyāyānusāra* (NA) and *Abhidharmasamaya-pradīpikā* of Saṃghabhadra, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) and *Buddhadhātu-śāstra* (BD) of Vasubandhu, the *Nyāyamukha* (NM) and *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) of Dignāga, the VMS of Dharmapāla *et al.*, and the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (MA) of Candrakīrti, many of which are being presented to English readers for the first time. Therefore, it opens great resources for the study of Buddhist philosophy of mind.

First of all, this book argues, against several eminent contemporar scholars, that self-cognition emerged as a controversial issue in the Mahāsāṃghika discussion on the omniscience of Srota-āpanna, an initial stage of Buddhist sagehood. This book examines thoroughly the textual evidences as preserved in Chinese and Tibetan that support the Mahāsāṃghika origin of self-cognition. Moreover, this book argues against another group of scholars and expounds that self-cognition is a separate type of perception for Dignāga. It reveals that the reason for their failure to acknowledge this is that they prefer to study Dignāga's thought on the basis of the Sanskrit fragments

drawn from a much later commentatorial tradition rather than the Chinese or Tibetan translations of his works. This analysis also helps to solve the age-old controversy over the interpretations of mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) among the followers of Dignāga.

If the discussion of self-cognition in Mahāsāṃghika and Yogācāra has been touched upon by some precursory works, the exploration of this doctrine in the other two schools, namely, Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, is utterly new. For the first time in modern scholarship on Buddhism, my book systematically examines the Sarvāstivāda refutation of self-cognition within its sophisticated philosophical framework. Furthermore, it discusses a Neo-Vaibhāṣika approach to the issue that develops a theory of perception akin to that of Dignāga. In discussing the Sautrāntika synthesis of the theory of self-cognition based on an early Sautrāntika work extant only in Chinese, it also sheds light on a piece of Tibetan material that scholars usually cite to support the Sautrāntika origin of self-cognition. It also discloses the Sautrāntika precedent of many aspects of Dignāga's thought.

In sum, one thread running through my investigation is the exploration of a Buddhist understanding of a basic phenomenon of the human mind: knowing that one knows. In fulfilling this general task, the book employs both historical and philosophical approaches, which are again closely linked to each other. Historical study in an Indian context is difficult, if not impossible, without relying on the internal textual evidence to build up a relative chronology for the relevant texts and authors. To distinguish different layers of the doctrinal development, in turn, requires one to have a deep understanding and appreciation of the subject matter and philosophical issues involved. I divide the book into four main chapters in accordance with the major steps of the development of the concept of self-cognition among four Buddhist schools: Mahāsāṃghika, Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra.

In the Mahāsāṃghika chapter, I trace the origin of self-cognition back to this earliest Buddhist philosophical school. I show that this doctrine originated in their discussion on the omniscience of Srota-āpanna. Particularly, they admit that this omniscience and, consequently, the self-cognition of the mind and mental activities occur in a single moment. They also accept that two minds arise and function simultaneously. The Andhakas, a later development of Mahāsāṃghika in South India, propose the same view except that they do not necessarily commit themselves to the simultaneity of omniscience or self-cognition. I conclude that this indicates that self-cognition began primarily as a soteriological concern among the Mahāsāṃghikas.

The Sarvāstivāda chapter examines the systematic refutation of self-cognition by the Vaibhāṣikas, Vasumitra, Bhadanta Dharmatrāta and Saṃghabhadra. These scholars rigorously refute the Mahāsāṃghika theory from the point of view of causality, epistemology, soteriology, the relationship of self and other, the distinction between particular and universal, and supportive similes. Despite their refutation of the Mahāsāṃghika sense of

self-cognition, which I call a *reflexive* model, the Sarvāstivādins, especially Saṃghabhadra, develop a *reflective* model of self-cognition, which sees the cognition of the cognition itself as possible only in multiple moments, but not in a single moment.

In the Sautrāntika chapter, I explore how Harivarman, an early Sautrāntika master, synthesizes the theory of self-cognition by arguing against both the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins. He discusses self-cognition in a more epistemological context, and especially in a framework of successively arising minds. He concludes that mental consciousness is endowed with the capacity of self-cognition, although not all the mind and mental activities are self-cognizant. The later Sautrāntikas further develop a series of sophisticated proofs of self-cognition using concepts of simultaneity, memory and infinite regress. By synthesizing the views of their predecessors, the Sautrāntikas shaped the basic characteristics of the way later Buddhists understood self-cognition.

The Yogācāra chapter discusses the development of self-cognition in early Yogācāra, the systematization of this concept in Dignāga, and the significance of a further layer of self-cognition, the cognition of self-cognition, as proposed by Dharmapāla. This chapter shows that Vasubandhu's theory of self-cognition bears the mark of strong Sautrāntika influence, although he started to modify it with the Yogācāra view. I argue, against several eminent contemporary scholars, that Dignāga accepts four types of perception and that self-cognition is a separate type of perception. I further deal with self-cognition's complicated relation to other types of perception and to the twofold appearance of cognition. I also outline some basic characteristics of Dharmapāla's concept of the cognition of self-cognition and the controversy over self-cognition among later Indian scholars.

I believe that this book is a pioneer in exploring the single theme of self-cognition in great detail and depth within the massive doctrinal systems of various early Buddhist schools. Without making too many exaggerated claims for its importance, I think that my study can contribute to scholarship in the following three ways.

First, it makes a direct contribution to the study of Yogācāra philosophy. A substantial part of my book deals with the pre-Dignāga Abhidharma sources, most of which are extant only in Chinese. Based on these rich materials, I demonstrate the extent to which Yogācāra was influenced by early Buddhist schools including the Mahāsāṃghikas, the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. The book also helps to clarify some exegetical issues in Dignāga, by presenting the views of Dharmapāla side by side with those of Dharmakīrti, who is better-known to the West. My study will help balance the circle of Yogācāra studies, where scholars tend to be satisfied with Sanskrit and Tibetan sources and forget the richness and importance of Chinese materials.

Second, the book also contributes to the study of Buddhism in general. The current mainstream of Buddhist studies tends to divide the discipline according to its regional distribution. This type of study has its roots in the linguistic or cultural limitations of scholars themselves. It also reflects a fascination with cultural uniqueness. To a great extent, scholars with this kind of motive have focused on rather marginal or trivial subjects. Is the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*, for instance, so essential to Tibetan Buddhism? Or is the *Ten Kings Sūtra* so important in Chinese Buddhism? The emphasis upon particularity can distort understanding of Buddhism in each cultural region. My study goes against the current trend and treats Buddhism as a unified tradition. On my view, Buddhism may be divided by schools of thought as they are developed inside the tradition, but it is seldom divided by outside circumstances. The main Buddhist schools in China, Japan or Tibet all claim loyalty to their Indian heritage.

Finally, this study is also intended to promote understanding of the human mind. Self-consciousness is often considered to be the ability that distinguishes humans from animals. In the field of cognitive science this becomes a crucial issue. The key issue for scholars in this field is whether they can eliminate the "ghost" of self-consciousness and explain it as connections of neurons. I would like to present the Buddhist theory of self-cognition in a way that will allow dialogue with contemporary sciences of the mind. For Buddhists the issue is not a conflict of faith and reason, as we see in the encounter of Christianity with science; rather, it is a methodological issue of experiential versus experimental. In other words, the issue is how properly to study one's own mind. I think Buddhism, with its long practical tradition of self-scrutiny and self-realization along with the sophisticated theory of self-cognition, can contribute significantly to the scientific study of the human mind, especially its reflexive nature.

ORIGIN: MAHĀSĀṂGHIKA

The origin of self-cognition

Scholars who have been studying the Buddhist theory of self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) usually attribute the origin of this concept to Dignāga and treat it as a distinctive contribution of Dignāga's school of Buddhist logic. These scholars find an easy way to discuss self-cognition by simply referring to two monumental works: the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) by Dignāga and the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) by his follower Dharmakīrti.[1] Both works, especially the latter, provide a detailed account of self-cognition as it is defined, established and explored in the system of Buddhist logic and epistemology. Thus, the general impression is that the origin of self-cognition is in Dignāga and his school.

As far as self-cognition in terms of *svasaṃvedana* or *svasaṃvitti* is concerned, I have to admit that Dignāga was the first to use these words in a technical sense of self-cognition or reflexive awareness. Given the fact that only a few pre-Dignāga Buddhist texts are extant in Sanskrit, I am not confident of finding *svasaṃvedana* used in this technical sense among these materials. However, we can still search for the origin of this concept in early Buddhist texts, especially the Abhidharma texts. In other words, we can examine how issues such as how the mind knows itself are treated in the pre-Dignāga Buddhist sources. Once free from the limitation of word-tracking, we shall find that many early Buddhist texts and schools have contributed to the development of the concept of self-cognition.

Jacques May is one of the few scholars to have paid attention to the origin of self-cognition. He pointed out two possible origins: Sautrāntika and Mahāsāṃghika.[2] The evidence that he relied on is found in the writings of Louis de La Vallée Poussin. On a couple of occasions La Vallée Poussin noted that the concept of *svasaṃvedana* has its source in the Sautrāntika school, as reported in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (MA).[3] The same information was reported by Yamaguchi, Lü, Katsura and Kajiyama.[4] Meanwhile, Mimaki (1979, 1980) reports that a fourteenth-century Tibetan doxographical text, the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, also labels self-cognition as a

Sautrāntika theory. It has been widely held that the concept of self-cognition was shared by the Sautrāntikas and Yogācārins. The only difference is that the former admit the existence of external objects while the latter deny it.[5] This reflects a view of scholars who primarily work on Sanskrit and Tibetan sources.

Meanwhile, La Vallée Poussin (1928–9: 129 n.a.; 1988–90: 1190, n. 112) also noted that the concept of self-cognition is related to the problem of whether an awareness can know itself. This problem is discussed in MV in a refutation of the Mahāsāmghika assertion about the possibility of self-awareness. Bareau (1955: 64), the other author cited by May when providing evidence for the Mahāsāmghika origin of self-cognition, presented the Mahāsāmghika doctrine of self-cognition according to Vasumitra. But he missed a great piece of evidence in the writing of Vinītadeva.[6] In his long article published in 1916–17, Koyanagi Ryoūkyo elaborated how self-cognition originated in Mahāsāmghika based on Kuiji's commentary on VMS.[7] This article is the best summary of the traditional East Asian Buddhist view on the issue.

On my view, the possibilities of Sautrāntika or Mahāsāmghika origin do not exclude each other. It is possible to find traces of self-cognition in both the Mahāsāmghika and Sautrāntika. Mahāsāmghika is the earliest Buddhist school established in the first schism of the *samgha*, which took place in about 268 BC. Sautrāntika, according to the study by Katō (1989), is a school established late in the fourth century AD. Given this almost 700-year gap between the two schools, we can reasonably assume that the notion of self-cognition originated in the Mahāsāmghika school, was then elaborated as a more technical category in Sautrāntika writings, and finally was systematized by Dignāga and his followers.

The Mahāsāmghika theory of self-cognition

Mahāsāmghika and its Abhidharma

Various accounts of the schisms in early Buddhism agree that Mahāsāmghika is the first school separated from the main body of the Buddhist community (*samgha*), the remainder of which is called Sthaviravāda. This happened in about 268 BC, a hundred years after the death of the Buddha.[8] In this initial schism, most of the monks who supported the Mahāsāmghika position had been associated with the *Vrjis* (*Vajjiputtaka*) of Vaiśālī in Central India. They had constituted the nucleus of the Mahāsāmghika school. Consequently, after the schism, the Mahāsāmghikas became particularly influential in Central India.[9]

There is controversy with regard to the cause of the split. Some sources report that it was because of disagreement on ten items of monastic discipline.[10] This is found in accounts of the synod in Vaiśālī in the *Cullavagga*

of the Pāli *Vinayapiṭaka* and in the Vinaya texts of the Dharmaguptaka, Sarvāstivāda, Mahīśāsaka, Mahāsāṃghika and Mūlasarvāstivāda schools. The *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*, a work of Mahāsāṃghika origin, and the *Dīpavaṃsa*, a non-canonical work, share the same information.[11] They represent a tradition of the Sthaviravādins and of the Mahāsāṃghikas, who take the schism as the solution of a conflict concerning discipline. On the other hand, a tradition of the Saṃmatīyas and of the Sarvāstivādins, as we find it in Bhavya's *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna* (NV), in Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (SB) and in MV, sees the split as being caused by the disputation on five points about Arhats proposed by Mahādeva. These points assert that an Arhat still is capable of releasing semen when tempted by gods, still is ignorant, has doubts, attains enlightenment through examination by others, and still speaks of suffering while in meditation. Compared to the earlier issues of monastic discipline, these points are focused on issues of doctrine. This reflects a view of the later Abhidharma masters, as opposed to the previous view of the Vinaya masters.

There are various possible reasons for the contradictory record. One is that they reflect the different interests of their authors or of the schools that these authors belong to. It is understandable that the Abhidharma masters would emphasize the importance of doctrinal disputation, while the Vinaya masters would be more interested in monastic discipline. Moreover, as I shall mention below, Abhidharma texts were compiled later than those of the Sūtra and Vinaya collections, and they did not come into existence until at least a hundred years after the initial split of the *saṃgha*. Given this fact, it is possible that the doctrinal disputation on the five points was a later event that contributed to a later split between Mūlasthaviravāda and Sarvāstivāda, but was shifted to become the reason for the initial split between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviravādins.[12] Another possibility is that there actually were two splits between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviravādins. The first split may have happened in the historical synod of Vaiśālī in 268 BC as is agreed by all the Vinaya texts. When this synod failed to solve the disciplinary controversies, another schism may have occurred in a synod held at Pāṭaliputra in 231 BC. The latter marks the formal schism of the Mahāsāṃghika and Sthaviravāda schools over Mahādeva's five points.

The main body of Sūtra and Vinaya were compiled in the first two synods, held respectively in 368 BC, right after the death of the Buddha, and in 268 BC, the 100th anniversary of his death. The Abhidharma texts were first compiled by the Vātsīputrīyas in 168 BC, two centuries after the Buddha's death, and they were followed by other schools.[13] According to Yijing, an eighth-century Chinese pilgrim to India, the early Buddhist schools, known as Hīnayāna schools in his time, kept a large number of canonical texts. He reported that the Mahāsāṃghika Tripiṭaka contained 300,000 *śloka*s, the Sarvāstivādins and the Sthaviravādins had the same amount of texts, and

the Saṃmatīya Tripiṭaka had 200,000 *ślokas*.[14] It is interesting to note that only these four schools were reported to have separate canonical texts. This is not because Yijing did not have information for Tripiṭakas of the other schools. Rather, he clearly stated: "Though there exist in the West [i.e., India] various sectarian schools with different origins, there are only four principal schools of continuous tradition".[15] And each of them has sub-divisions: Mahāsāmghika has seven sub-schools; Sarvāstivāda has four; Sthaviravāda three; Saṃmatīya four. Apparently, these sub-schools share Tripiṭakas with their mother-schools, which Yijing called the *Ārya* schools. But this does not exclude the possibility that some sub-schools may have possessed their own Tripiṭakas. For instance, Xuanzang, who traveled to India in the seventh century, brought back to China Tripiṭakas of seven schools, which included the schools of Dharmaguptaka, Kāśyapīya and Mahīśāsaka in addition to the above-mentioned major schools.[16]

Yijing's report was confirmed by the fourteenth-century Tibetan Buddhist historian Bu-ston. In his account of the history of Indian Buddhism, Bu-ston reported that the four major early Buddhist schools used different languages. The Mahāsāmghikas used Prākrit; the Sarvāstivādins spoke Sanskrit; the language of Sthaviravāda was Paiśāci; that of Saṃmatīya was Apabhraṃśa.[17] Evidently, different linguistic traditions contributed to the formation of the four main collections of Tripiṭaka in early Buddhist schools. The fact that these schools spoke different languages, again, is because of their different geographical distributions in the vast land of the Indian sub-continent. Some suggest that this structure of the four main branches had come into existence since 168 BC.[18]

Among the four collections of Tripiṭaka, the Sthaviravāda Tripiṭaka is still extant in Pāli. The majority of the Sarvāstivāda Tripiṭaka is lost in Sanskrit original; but, fortunately, some works survive in Chinese translations. All of the Saṃmitīya Tripiṭaka are lost except four short treatises in Chinese translations.[19] In the Mahāsāmghika Tripiṭaka, some Vinaya texts are still extant: *Mahāsāmghika-bhikṣuṇī-vinaya, Prātimokṣa-sūtra, Sphuṭārthā Śrīghanācārasaṃgrahaṭīkā, Abhisamācārika-Dharma*, and most notably the *Mahāvastu*, which is the remaining first volume of a Vinaya text of the Lokottaravāda, a sub-school of Mahāsāmghika, and gives an account of the Buddha's life until the formation of the first *saṃgha*.[20] Meanwhile, we have some Mahāsāmghika texts in Chinese translations: the *Ekottarāgama*, the *Mahāsāmghika-vinaya*, and a Sūtra commentary, the *Fen bie gong de lun* 分別功德論.[21]

The existence of the Mahāsāmghika Abhidharma is testified by Faxian, who traveled to India in the fifth century. He reported that he obtained the Mahāsāmghika Abhidharma in a temple in Pāṭaliputra.[22] Xuanzang visited a site in Kaśmīra, where, according to the legend, *Budhila composed a Mahāsāmghika treatise, *Tattvasamuccayaśāstra*.[23] In Dhanakaṭaka he studied Mahāsāmghika Abhidharma for a few months with two monks.[24]

Upon returning, he carried with him quite a few Mahāsāṃghika Abhidharma works, but did not translate any of them.[25]

Important information about the Mahāsāṃghika Abhidharma is reported in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, a work only extant in Chinese and ascribed to Nāgārjuna. In this elaborate commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, it says that there are three systems of Abhidharma. The first is the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins, which expounds the doctrinal view of existence. The second features emptiness, and refers to the emerging philosophical treatises of the Mahāyāna school. The third is the *Peṭaka* (*pi le* *毘勒), which is considered by many scholars to be the Mahāsāṃghika Abhidharma.[26] It also says that the *Peṭaka* was composed by Mahākātyāyana during the Buddha's lifetime and contains 384,000 words. The specific characteristic of the *Peṭaka* is "broadly using analogies of various things and categorizing them according to their types".[27] This analogical method makes it function as "an endless discourse".[28]

Owing to the shortage of original writings, we can only rely on secondary sources to learn the basic doctrines of the Mahāsāṃghikas. These sources include three doctrinal summaries of the early Buddhist schools written by later authors. The first is SB by the Sarvāstivāda scholar Vasumitra, who is dated to either the first century BC or the second or fourth century AD.[29] It is extant in one Tibetan and three Chinese translations. The second is NV by the Madhyamaka scholar Bhavya, also known as Bhāvaviveka, who is dated to the sixth century. The third, the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra nikāyabhedopadarśanasaṃgraha* (SN) written by the Yogācāra scholar Vinītadeva who commented extensively on works of Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti, is dated to the eighth century. The last two are only extant in their Tibetan translations. Other important sources for Mahāsāṃghika doctrines come from their opponents. One of the best of these sources is MV, an encyclopedic Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma work. This work provides rich material about Mahāsāṃghika when it refutes the Mahāsāṃghika views.

All-knowing awareness

The best-known evidence for the origin of self-cognition in Mahāsāṃghika is found in the Chapter on Awareness in MV as was noted by La Vallée Poussin (1928–9: 129 n.a.; 1988–90: 1190, n. 112) and Koyanagi (1916: 1000). Written from a Sarvāstivāda point of view, the chapter begins with a question: "Is there an awareness (*jñāna*) that knows all *dharmas*"?[30] The answer is "no". The chapter then explains that the purpose of the discussion is to refute the doctrine of self-cognition as held by the Mahāsāṃghikas. This clearly indicates that the issue of self-cognition comes up in a larger context of omniscience. Even though the relationship between these two concepts for the Mahāsāṃghikas is still unclear, this chapter shows that the Mahāsāṃghikas held both doctrines.

What is the Mahāsāmghika doctrine of omniscience? In the *Mahāvastu*, one of the few extant Mahāsāmghika texts, it says: Under the Bodhi tree, Śākyamuni Buddha awakened as "the mindful man, the steady man, the intelligent man and the wise man who was at all times and everywhere to know, attain, become aware, become fully aware. To all this, to the supreme perfect enlightenment, he awakened through wisdom associated with a single moment of mind".[31] Here the Buddha is said to attain an awareness that knows at all times and everywhere (*sarvaśo sarvatratāye jñātavyam*), but also to gain this ability through "wisdom associated with a single moment of mind" (*ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā*). Some have suggested that this has proved the existence of a Zen-like teaching of sudden enlightenment in Indian Buddhism.[32]

It is commonly accepted among various early Buddhist schools, including Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda, that the Buddha attains omniscience after his enlightenment. However, both schools reject the possibility of knowing all *dharma*s in a single moment. Now, for the Mahāsāmghikas, does the Buddha know all *dharma*s in a single moment, as he does while attaining the omniscience? According to the SB of Vasumitra, among eighteen schools of early Buddhism, Mahāsāmghika and three of its sub-schools, namely, Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravāda and Kaukkuṭika, hold that the Buddha has the ability to comprehend all *dharma*s in a single moment. On their view, the Buddha is equipped with the following supernatural qualities: transcendence (*lokottara*), lack of defilements, all of his utterances preaching his teachings, expounding all his teachings with a single utterance, all of his sayings being true, his physical body being limitless, his power (*prabhāva*) being limitless, the length of his life being limitless, never tired of enlightening the sentient beings and awakening pure faith in them, having no sleep or dream,[33] no pause in answering a question, and always in meditation. After listing these elaborated features, the text goes on to say:

> [The Buddha] comprehends all *dharma*s with a mind of a single moment and knows all *dharma*s with wisdom associated with a mind of a single moment.[34]

Similar statements are also found in Bhavya's NV and Vinītadeva's SN. In Bhavya's account of Ekavyavahārika, it is said that this school is thus named because it holds the view that "the world-honored Buddhas know all *dharma*s with a single thought and realize all *dharma*s with wisdom associated with a mind of a single moment".[35] Vinītadeva reports that the Lokottaravādins hold that "[the Buddha is] all-knowing in a single moment".[36] Here we see that their terminologies such as "a mind of a single moment", and "wisdom associated with a mind of a single moment", closely resemble or even are identical to those in the *Mahāvastu*. This indicates that omniscience of a single moment is a consistent view of the Mahāsāmghika

school. On this view, the Buddha not only instantaneously attains the enlightenment, but also knows all *dharma*s in a single moment. A crucial and specific point of the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine of omniscience is that the mind knows all *dharma*s in *a single moment*, as is pointed out by Kuiji in his commentary on SB:

> Other schools [hold] that the mind of the Buddha cannot compre-hend all *dharma*s in a moment of thought, for [the mind] itself, its associates and co-existents are not to be apprehended. Now, this [school, i.e., Mahāsāṃghika] holds that a moment of thought can apprehend the specific natures of [the mind] itself, its associates and co-existents, thus is different from other schools.[37]

By "other schools", Kuiji refers to Sarvāstivāda and others sharing its view at this point. The reason for other schools' refutation of the possibility of omniscience in a single moment is that the mind cannot know itself, its associates, or its co-existents in this same moment. Here the mind itself refers to the perceiving mind; its associates are the accompanying mental activ-ities; and its co-existents include sense organs. As we shall see in Chapter 3, the knowing of these three in a single moment is attributed respectively to schools of Mahāsāṃghika, Dharmaguptaka and Mahīśāsaka in MV. There is no evidence showing that the Mahāsāṃghikas hold that the mind knows its associates and co-existents in a single moment. Thus, I would say Kuiji is inaccurate on this point. However, he is correct in showing the close relationship between omniscience and the self-knowledge of mind in Mahāsāṃghika.

According to the Mahāsāṃghikas, not only does the mind know all *dharma*s, but also at least one of its mental activities, i.e., wisdom (*prajñā*), can know all *dharma*s. Given our limited sources on Mahāsāṃghika, we do not know how the mind and mental activities are classified in its Abhidharma system, so we are unclear whether all mental activities have the ability of omniscience and why wisdom stands out as a mental activity that knows all *dharma*s. According to Kuiji, it is the nature of wisdom to know all *dharma*s in a single moment rather than in successive moments. Still, this wisdom has to be accomplished after reaching the path of liberation.[38] This confirms the statement in the *Mahāvastu* that the Buddha attained enlightenment and became omniscient with "wisdom associated with a single moment of mind".

What enables the Buddha to know all *dharma*s instantaneously, according to the Mahāsāṃghikas, is an awareness attained after the direct realization (*abhisamayāntikajñāna*). This is what the Sarvāstivādins later call conventional awareness (*saṃvṛtijñāna*). As is said by Vasumitra: "Through the awareness [attained] after the direct realization, [one], in a single moment, exhaustively knows the four truths in their specific aspects".[39] "Specific aspects" here refers to the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, each of which has four

aspects. Four aspects of the truth of suffering are impermanence (*anitya*), suffering (*duḥkha*), emptiness (*śūnya*) and no-self (*anātman*); four aspects of the truth of origin are cause (*hetu*), origin (*samudaya*), source (*prabhava*) and condition (*pratyaya*); four aspects of the truth of cessation are cessation (*nirodha*), peace (*śānta*), excellence (*praṇīta*) and escape (*niḥsaraṇa*); and four aspects of the truth of path are path (*mārga*), correct method (*nyāya*), practice (*pratipatti*) and definitive release (*nairyāṇika*). According to the Mahāsāmghika view, after entering the stage of the direct realization (*abhisamaya*) one can realize all of these aspects simultaneously. This view is reported in AKBh by Vasubandhu as a heretical view: "At this point, other schools allege that [one] can realize the truths in a single [moment]".[40] This direct realization of the truths does not differentiate various aspects of the four truths, and thus is contrary to the Sarvāstivāda view that these aspects have to be meditated and realized one by one.

At this point, Kuiji comments that a major achievement of the awareness attained after the direct realization (*abhisamaya*) is to be able to realize the specific aspects of all *dharmas*, and thus is different from the awareness before the direct realization that can only know all *dharmas* in general. Its ability to do so in a single moment is not so much emphasized by Kuiji, for the spiritual exercise that one undertakes does not lead one from a gradual path to a sudden one; rather, it replaces a general vision with specific views. This leap overcomes the major difference between ordinary and the enlightened minds, as he says:

> Mind other than that of the Buddha can take the universal characteristic as object. In a single moment [this] mind can also take [the mind] itself as object, and comprehend all *dharmas*, though without realizing their specific [characteristics]. The Buddha, having trained his mind for a number of *kalpas*, surpasses [all other] minds in comprehending all [*dharmas*]. Therefore, the Buddha with his mind of a single moment can comprehend and realize all *dharmas* in [their] specific natures.[41]

On this account, both ordinary and the enlightened minds can know all *dharmas* in a single moment. The only difference is that the enlightened mind can know the specific characteristics of all *dharmas*, while ordinary mind can only know all *dharmas* in their universal characteristic. This is saying that, in the case of the Buddha's omniscience, he can know this tree as tree and that mountain as mountain, whereas we ordinary humans can only abstractly know all *dharmas*. For instance, when we say that "all things are impermanent" we only know a general characteristic of impermanence of these things, not everything in their specifics.

A key to understanding the Mahāsāmghika doctrine of instantaneous omniscience is that two awarenesses or minds can arise and function

simultaneously. This point is revealed in the last statement about the Buddha in Vasumitra's text: "Awareness of destruction (*kṣayajñāna*) and awareness of non-birth (*anutpādajñāna*) are always present in the world-honored Buddhas and continue to be so until their *parinirvāṇa*".[42] "Awareness of destruction" is the awareness that suffering caused by one's past *karma*s is completely eliminated; "awareness of non-birth" is the awareness that one will not be reborn in the future. According to the Mahāsāṃghika view, the Buddha who is aware of the extinction of suffering is also aware of his non-birth in the future, thus he possesses these two awarenesses at one and the same moment. This, again, is contrary to the Sarvāstivāda view that they cannot always be possessed simultaneously, as is indicated in the following statement by Vasumitra: "Not all Arhats can attain awareness of non-birth".[43] The view that two minds can arise and function simultaneously is explicitly stated by Vasumitra in the following words:

> There are [cases] where two minds arise at one and the same time; path and passion exist simultaneously; *karma* and its result act simultaneously; seed itself is sprout.[44]

Unlike the previous views shared by Mahāsāṃghika and its three sub-schools, this is a "later differentiated view", which is different from the "original common view" that different minds or consciousnesses arise respectively in different moments.[45] While it is hard to determine which school holds the later differentiated view or the original common view in Vasumitra's text, some suggest that "the later differentiated views" simply refers to "the views of the Mahāsāṃghikas differed from those of the other three schools".[46] This being a Mahāsāṃghika view is also confirmed by MV, which says: "Some, such as the Mahāsāṃghikas, allege that two minds arise simultaneously in a person (*pudgala*)".[47] However, in his account of Lokottaravāda, Vinītadeva says almost the same words: "There are [cases] where two minds function simultaneously; passion and path function simultaneously; *karma* and its result function simultaneously; seed and sprout function simultaneously".[48] It, at least, suggests that more than one school holds this view.

The basic reason for the Mahāsāṃghika view that two minds function simultaneously, as is stated in MV, is the phenomenon that "seeing, hearing and so forth can take place simultaneously".[49] To say that two minds arise in a single moment is like applying a model of "the society of mind" in cognitive science to the human mind.[50] If multiple minds are functioning at the same time, it is possible for these minds to handle multiple tasks so that at a certain point one can become omniscient. However, if only one mind is allowed to function at a given moment, one's ability to know is certainly limited. Later on, this becomes a big controversy among the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas. To them, the mind includes not only sensual activities

such as seeing and hearing, but also mental activities such as feeling and memory, and the number of mind is not limited to two.[51]

The self-cognition of the mind and mental activities

After questioning whether an awareness can know all *dharma*s, and explaining their purpose of refuting heretical views, composers of MV restate the Mahāsāmghika view of self-cognition in the following words:

> Some allege that the mind (*citta*) and mental activities (*caitta*) can apprehend themselves (*svabhāva*). [Schools] like Mahāsāmghika hold the following view: It is the nature (*svabhāva*) of awareness (*jñāna*) and so forth to apprehend, thus awareness can apprehend itself as well as others. This is like a lamp that can illuminate itself and others owing to its nature (*svabhāva*) of luminosity.[52]

From this statement we learn two basic points of the Mahāsāmghika view of self-cognition: (1) the mind and mental activities, e.g., awareness, can apprehend themselves; (2) the assertion (1) is illustrated through the simile of the lamp. The use of the similes to illustrate a doctrinal point is a typical Mahāsāmghika way of reasoning. It confirms the characteristic of the Mahāsāmghika *Peṭaka* of "using analogies of various things" as we discussed earlier. In many other later Indian texts, the defense or refutation of self-cognition is accompanied by the discussion of the simile of the lamp. This is a piece of evidence that indicates the early source of this simile in Mahāsāmghika. In this passage, a general assertion about the self-cognition of the mind (*citta*) and mental activities (*caitta*) is given first, followed by discussions of the reflexive nature of awareness (*jñāna*), which is explicitly attributed to the Mahāsāmghikas. In the later context of MV, no more discussion of the self-cognition of the mind and mental activities is found; instead the reflexive nature of awareness (*jñāna*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) is discussed extensively. Thus, we are not sure whether the general assertion about the mind and mental activities is applicable to the Mahāsāmghikas. In other words, do the Mahāsāmghikas hold the view that the mind and mental activities are self-cognizant, or that only awareness is self-cognizant?

At this point, Vasumitra gives us a definite answer. In his SB, Vasumitra uses exactly the same expression as in MV to state the doctrine of self-cognition held by Mahāsāmghika and three of its sub-schools, namely, Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravāda and Kaukkuṭika. His statement appears under a soteriological category – Srota-āpanna. Known as stream-winner, Srota-āpanna is the first of four stages of attainment toward Arhatship, in which one transcends the state of ordinary human being and enters the sagely "stream". It seems to be an important category especially for the Mahāsāmghikas, for it is not mentioned in the doctrine summaries of other

schools in Vasumitra's text. According to the Mahāsāṃghika view, doctrines with regard to the Srota-āpannas include: (1) one can stay in the stage of Srota-āpanna for a long time; (2) the Srota-āpannas can retrogress; (3) the Srota-āpannas are liable to commit all evil deeds except five deadly ones; (4) the Srota-āpannas can attain meditation (*dhyāna*);[53] (5) the Srota-āpannas' mind and mental activities know *svabhāva*. Since we have one Tibetan and three Chinese translations of Vasumitra's text, I will lay out all the four versions of the last statement:

(1) The Srota-āpannas' mental activities and mind know themselves (*qi zi* 其自) (translated anonymously between 386 and 417);
(2) The Srota-āpannas' mind and mental activities know *svabhāva* (translated by Paramārtha between 557 and 567);
(3) For all stream-winners, the mind and mental activities can apprehend *svabhāva* (translated by Xuanzang in 662);
(4) Know[ing] the *svabhāva* (*ngo bo nyid*) of (*kyi*) mind and mental activities of the stream-winners (translated by Dharmākara and Bzang skyong).[54]

Of the above four translations, the second, third and fourth agree with the passage in MV by stating the knowing of *svabhāva* (*ngo bo nyid, zi xing* 自性), while the first renders *svabhāva* as *qi zi*, literally, "itself" or "themselves". Here *qi* 其 ("its" or "their") also corresponds to the Tibetan genitive particle *kyi*, which is omitted by the other two Chinese translations. In any case, the first and earliest translation takes an interpretive reading of *svabhāva* by understanding it as referring back to the subject of the sentence, "The Srota-āpannas' mind and mental activities", and thus makes it function as a reflexive pronoun. We are made clear that here *svabhāva* is not the nature or substance of something else; rather, it is the identity of the mind and mental activities or the Srota-āpannas.

Given the rich and complicated meaning of *svabhāva*, this reading is open to question. But we do see evidence supporting this reading in the quotation from MV, where two ways of reading *svabhāva* have appeared. When talking about the *svabhāva* of awareness being apprehension or the *svabhāva* of a lamp being luminosity, we have to read *svabhāva* as "nature" or "essential characteristic". However, on the occasion of "the mind and mental activities apprehending *svabhāva*", it is justified to understand *svabhāva* as the "identity" of the mind or mental activities because this statement is later interpreted in the text in terms of "awareness apprehending *itself*" or "lamp illuminating *itself*".[55]

Now, in the case of SB, it seems reasonable to apply the same identity-reading to *svabhāva* since the two statements are quite identical. But we should not forget that in this text the statement is made under the soteriological category of Srota-āpanna, which, rather than the mind and mental activities, could be the subject of the sentence. If we take the identity-reading of

svabhāva, it would raise the question: Whose identity is it, the mind and mental activities or the Srota-āpannas? Given this problem, Masuda (1925: 24, n. 1) says that it is one of the most ambiguous sentences. We do not have its Sanskrit original, and the various translations suggest at least two possible readings. In his commentary on Xuanzang's translation of this text, Kuiji offers two options. The first is to understand *svabhāva* as referring back to the Srota-āpannas, thus it means: "All the stream-winners know their attainment of the fruition of stream-winning; to realize [this they] do not require anyone else to inform [them]".[56] If we follow this option, the sentence must be translated as: "The Srota-āpannas know [their] own identity (*svabhāva*) [of stream-winners through their] mind and mental activities".[57] On the other hand, Kuiji offers the second option: "Their mind and etc. are capable of apprehending themselves (*svabhāva*) in a single moment".[58] Here the Mahāsāmghika featured phrase "in a single moment" is added, thus we are made clear that the mind is not only capable of apprehending itself, but can also do so in a single moment. Among the four translations, Xuanzang's is the closest to this reading as he puts a particle *zhe* 者 after "the stream-winners" to separate it from the real subject of the sentence: "the mind and mental activities".

Of these two options, the first is more soteriologically oriented in the sense that it puts the sentence in the context of attaining sagely fruition, thus the mind and mental activities become tools by which the sages can know their stages of achievement.[59] The second reading, on the other hand, is more epistemologically oriented. It has the tendency to generalize the assertion about the mind and mental activities and to bracket the soteriological category of the Srota-āpannas. It is evident that the composers of MV take the second option, as is indicated by the dropping of "the Srota-āpannas" in their citation. By omitting the Srota-āpannas, they make it sound like a general assertion applicable to *all* mind and mental activities, and they criticize the Mahāsāmghikas in this sense.

Now, in the case of SB, is the assertion of self-cognition applicable to "all" mind and mental activities? If yes, why are the Srota-āpannas singled out here? On this point, Kuiji explains that minds of ordinary people (*pṛthagjana*) and of the other three sagely attainments, namely, Sakṛdāgāmin, Anāgāmin and Arhat, can also be self-cognizant. But in their cases the mind cannot see itself so clearly as that of the Srota-āpannas does, thus the Srota-āpannas are singled out to indicate this quality.[60]

Having offered the evidence from MV and SB, I have to admit that there are still some weaknesses in these cases. This is not only because of the ambiguity of the nature- or identity-reading of *svabhāva*, but also because *svasamvitti* or *svasamvedana*, the technical term for self-cognition as developed later in Dignāga's system, does not appear in these texts. At best, we can draw a conclusion from this evidence that the concept of self-cognition is espoused in Mahāsāmghika.

"Rang rig pa yin no"

The only text that I found making reference to the technical term *svasaṃvedana* (*rang rig*) and relating it to Mahāsāṃghika is Vinītadeva's SN. Preserved only in its Tibetan translation, this text gives us a brief account of various doctrines of the early Buddhist schools. Unlike Vasumitra's SB, this text does not start with the shared doctrines of Mahāsāṃghika and three of its sub-schools; rather, it begins with introducing doctrines of Lokottaravāda, a sub-school of Mahāsāṃghika. One of its doctrines reads: "*rang rig pa yin no*".[61]

This statement means literally "[it] is self-cognition", which sounds quite straightforward. However, this sentence has puzzled many contemporary scholars. To make sense of it, Teramoto and Hiramatsu, in their edition of the text, changed *pa* into *ma*, and thus made it mean exactly the opposite: "[It] is *not* self-cognition".[62] Moreover, they moved the phrase "*dgra bcom pa rnams la yang*", which is after this sentence, to the front of it. Bareau (1956: 194) secretly followed the Japanese translators in modifying the sentence and translated it as: "Même chez les Arhant: a. Il n'y a pas connaissance par soi-même (*svasaṃvedana*)." Prior to them, Rockhill also understood it as a negation of *rang rig*, though he did not change the word order.[63]

After consulting various editions of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, my conclusion is that their modifications are unjustified. This is not only because there is no textual evidence to support them, but also because their understanding of the text is flawed. On their understanding, by making it a negative statement about *rang rig*, the sentence can function as the first of the five points about Arhats discussed in what follows, and thus makes up the mysteriously missing point in their text. To do this, they had to make one more change, i.e., moving the phrase "*dgra bcom pa rnams la yang*" ("and for Arhats") to the front of this sentence, and thus put it under the category of Arhats.

However, the missing point is found in the Derge, Peking and Narthang editions of Vinītadeva's text, which reads: "*yod de bstan dgos so*".[64] Literally meaning "one needs to be conveyed [by others]", this point sounds like a denial of self-realization or self-knowledge. It seems that this is why those scholars attempted to modify the sentence "*rang rig pa yin no*" once their text missed this point. What does this point exactly mean? Does it mean a denial of self-cognition? We have a great variety of accounts of Mahādeva's five points on Arhats in Pāli, Tibetan and Chinese sources. Though basically agreeing with each other on the points of doubting (*kaṅkhā, som nyi, yi* 疑), ignorance (*aññāṇa, mi shes pa, wu zhi* 無知), utterance of the word [suffering] giving rise to the path (*vācībheda, lam sgra 'byin pa dang bcas pa, dao yin sheng gu qi* 道因聲故起), and examination by others (*paravitāraṇa, gzhan gyi yongs su rtags pa, ta ling ru* 他令入), these records are controversial in the last point. In KV II.1, this point is recorded as "offered by others"

(*parūpahāra*), which is close to Bhavya's first account: "response to others".[65] His second account, "accomplishing conveyance by others",[66] resembles Vinītadeva's account as well as the Tibetan version of Vasumitra's account, which reads: "accomplished by others".[67] Among the three Chinese translations of Vasumitra's text, the anonymous translation is the closest to Vinītadeva's and Bhavya's second account as it reads: "conveyed by others".[68] Xuanzang's translation is "tempted by others",[69] while Paramārtha gives a rather free translation: "Others make the clothes dirty".[70] On my view, this free translation is actually the closest to the truth as we find it expressed in Kātyāyanīputra's *Jñānaprasthāna*, which reads: "emitting the impure upon being tempted by gods".[71] Thus I would say that this point has nothing to do with the denial of self-cognition.

Now, we know that the words "*rang rig pa yin no*" do not belong to the group of Mahādeva's five points that follow it. Immediately before these words are statements that say, "Words are also spoken in meditation; There is also form (*gzugs*) in the mind",[72] which are omitted in Bhavya's account of the Ekavyāvahārikas. We also cannot find anything corresponding to the sentence "*rang rig pa yin no*" in Bhavya's text. However, similar statements are found in Vasumitra's account of the Mahāsāmghika and three of its sub-schools. This account reads: "There are words spoken in meditation; There is also body (*lus*) in the mind; There is also body (*lus*) in volition".[73] Between these statements and the five points on Arhats it is exactly the statement that we have discussed in the last section: "The Srota-āpannas' mind and mental activities apprehend themselves".[74] As we have discussed previously, this is an explicit statement of the Mahāsāmghika doctrine of self-cognition. Now, it is reasonable to assume that Vinītadeva is restating it by using the technical term *rang rig*. Thus the controversial sentence "*rang rig pa yin no*" should be read as: "[That the Srota-āpannas' mind and mental activities apprehend themselves] is self-cognition." The fact that he omits what we supply inside the brackets also indicates that he tends to take it as a general epistemological statement rather than as a soteriological one.

It is interesting that Vinītadeva explicitly uses the technical term *rang rig* to refer to the self-knowledge of the mind and mental activities. Given his extensive commentaries on works of Dharmakīrti and familiarity with the Yogācāra doctrine of self-cognition, it is understandable that he would use *rang rig* to restate a Lokottaravādin doctrine. At this point, we should not accuse him of imposing a later view on earlier sources. This suggests instead that Vinītadeva and his contemporaries traced the origin of self-cognition to the Lokottaravādins and to the Mahāsāmghikas.

Influence on Yogācāra

The Mahāsāmghika doctrine of self-cognition can be summarized as a general assertion about the mind and mental activities being self-cognizant and its

illustration through the simile of the lamp. This has been verified by the limited sources of Mahāsāṃghika, as we have discussed in previous sections. However, in some later Yogācāra texts, we also come across similar expressions. I see them as the Mahāsāṃghika influence on the Yogācāra doctrine of self-cognition, which is an aspect generally ignored by contemporary scholars since they only pay attention to its Sautrāntika influence.[75]

The first instance is found in Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* (NB). In this brief but clear work on Buddhist logic, Dharmakīrti begins with a definition of perception, then goes on to define each of the four types of perception. Upon reaching the third type, i.e., self-cognition (*ātmasaṃvedana*), he makes the following statement: "All mind and mental activities are self-cognizant".[76]

It is striking that Dharmakīrti says something very similar to what we see in MV and SB. The only difference is that the ambiguous "apprehending *svabhāva*" is replaced by the explicit notion of "self-cognizant" (*ātmasaṃvedana*, *rang rig pa*) and a more general assertion is emphasized by adding an "all" (*sarva*). According to Vinītadeva's commentary, the word "all" is meant to include mistaken awareness.[77] In the context of NB, this sentence stands alone as a definition of self-cognition, and no further elaboration is found. Though a simple statement, it seems important to the later tradition. For instance, it is quoted in Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*, a twelfth-century handbook of Buddhist logic, as a definition of self-cognition. This text reads: "All mind and mental activities are self-cognizant; [this is called] self-cognition".[78]

However, no similar notions are found in Dharmakīrti's other writings, even though, in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and PV, a much more elaborate and detailed account of self-cognition is given. In NB itself, neither the mind nor mental activities are further explained in the context of *pramāṇa* theory. It seems that for Dharmakīrti general concepts such as the mind or mental activities are not particularly relevant to the delicate theory of perception (*pratyakṣa*). Words like "mind" (*citta*) or "mental activities" (*caitta*) bear more of an Abhidharma heritage. I would suggest that this sentence is a direct or indirect quotation from earlier sources, most probably from the Abhidharma texts circulated around the time of Dharmakīrti.

If Dharmakīrti is citing earlier Abhidharma sources, then a link between Dharmakīrti and the Mahāsāṃghikas can probably be assumed. While it is true that Dharmakīrti does not mention the Mahāsāṃghika's favorite simile of the lamp in this text, Vinītadeva's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, one of the early commentaries of NB, uses the simile of the lamp frequently to illustrate the concept of self-cognition, and he does so in a Mahāsāṃghika style. His commentary reads:

> "All mind and mental activities are self-cognizant." All mind and mental activities means "all these mind and mental activities".

The word "all" is to include mistaken awareness (*bhrama-jñāna*). Whatever illuminates the own form (*svarūpa*) of those is [their] self-cognition. All mind and mental activities make known their own form because that is the nature of cognition (*pratīti*), just as a lamp illuminates itself because it is its nature to illuminate and the illumination of its own form does not depend on another lamp. Likewise, the mind and mental activities do not depend on another cognition when they make known their own form. Therefore, things that are established in their own right are perceptual *pramāṇa*s for themselves.[79]

Here Vinītadeva makes the connection between the simile of the lamp and the claim that the mind and mental activities are self-cognizant. Actually, in his PV, Dharmakīrti has a similar statement, which says: "Just as light is thought to illuminate itself while it is illumining because that is its nature, so also does the mind know itself".[80] In a passage from the *Tarkabhāṣā*, the simile of the lamp is also used to define self-cognition. This text says: "As a lamp illuminates itself, likewise awareness is determined to be self-cognizant because it is, different from the unconscious objects, produced by its own cause with nature of luminosity".[81] All these passages are very important in understanding the verse from Dharmakīrti's NB, for they reveal a possible context of this simple verse, and thus build a strong link between Dharmakīrti and the Mahāsāmghikas.

However, another piece of evidence shows that Dharmakīrti may not be quoting directly any Mahāsāmghika sources; instead he is citing his predecessor Dignāga as he always does. It is found in the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa* (BBU), a work attributed to Bandhuprabha *et al.* This text reads:

It is said in the treatise of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: "All mind and mental activities cognize themselves (*svabhāva*); [this] is called perception. If this were not so, then one would not be able to remember [things perceived], just as if they had never been perceived." Thus the mind and mental activities associated with four awarenesses (*jñāna*) can also respectively illuminate and know themselves. . . . All mind and mental activities, though different in their qualities, can take external things as object, meanwhile internally cognize themselves, just as the light [of a lamp] illuminates not only others but also itself. It is not like things such as a knife.[82]

This passage confirms both basic points of the Mahāsāmghika doctrine of self-cognition: the mind and mental activities knowing themselves and its illustration with the simile of the lamp. The only difference is that a Dharmakīrti featured "all" is added. What interests us particularly is its

citation from Dignāga. The second part of the citation is identical to a citation of Dignāga's memory argument for self-cognition in the VMS, which reads: "If this [self-cognition] were lacking, one would not be able to remember one's own mind and mental activities, just as one cannot remember objects that have not been perceived".[83] The original text can be found in PS: "It is unheard of to remember something without having experienced [it]".[84] This again is an auto-commentary of the verse: "Because [memory] is never of that which has never been experienced".[85]

However, the first part of the quotation, "All mind and mental activities cognize themselves; [this] is called perception," is not found in the extant Tibetan versions of PS or in any of its Sanskrit fragments.[86] Nor can it be found in any of the extant works of Dignāga. The closest match I have found is a sentence cited in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī*, a sub-commentary to Dharmottara's commentary on NB. This text says: "Therefore, it is said: 'All these mind and mental activities are self-cognizant perception (*svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*)'".[87] So we are left with a mystery whether Dignāga himself had expressed or cited a Mahāsāṃghika-like notion of self-cognition.

We can speculate a couple of possibilities. First, Bandhuprabha may be wrong in attributing this statement to Dignāga. If, however, we assume that Bandhuprabha is correct, then we have one more piece of Dignāga's fragment. It could be from the missing part of PS or other missing works of Dignāga. This fragment, at least, suggests that Dharmakīrti is closely following Dignāga when he expresses a similar notion in his NB, and that both of them bear a Mahāsāṃghika heritage because their notions strikingly resemble those of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

From the discussions of the passages in NB, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī*, *Tarkabhāṣā* and BBU, we conclude that Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their commentators were influenced by the Mahāsāṃghikas with regard to their concept of self-cognition. However, the fact that they did not explicitly acknowledge their Mahāsāṃghika heritage further complicates the problem. The actual situation could be that they were sharing a common source, or that the later thinkers such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti came up with their own innovative notions that were incidentally the same as those of the Mahāsāṃghikas. Fortunately, the Chinese commentator Kuiji provides a clue to this mystery by explicitly acknowledging the Mahāsāṃghika influence on the later Yogācāra concept of self-cognition. He says: "What the Mahāsāṃghikas hold that the mind and mental activities can grasp themselves (*svabhāva*) is the same as the Mahāyāna [view]".[88] Moreover, when criticizing early Buddhist schools, Kuiji says that Mahāsāṃghika and three of its sub-schools are exceptions because they admit self-cognition. He says:

> However, the schools of Mahāsāṃghika, Ekavyavahārika, Lokot-
> taravāda and Kaukkuṭika [hold that one] can take both one's own

mind and *dharma*s outside of the mind as object. [They] are not wrong because [they] do not agree with [other schools] on this point. Thus it is said in the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*: "For stream-winners, the mind and mental activities can apprehend themselves (*svabhāva*)".[89]

Here Kuiji also confirms my interpretation of the statement from SB in previous sections, as he understands it as "taking one's own mind as object". On this view, the Mahāsāmghikas definitely precede the Yogācārins in proposing a doctrine of self-cognition. On the other hand, Kuiji does not think that the doctrines of self-cognition in the two schools are exactly the same. He points out some major differences from the standpoint of the Dharmapāla school. He says that the Mahāsāmghikas think that the mind takes itself as object, and also takes external objects as object, and thus it is necessary to have an image of an external object in the mind. This is like the process that relates the seeing portion (*darśanabhāga*) or subject to the seen portion (*nimittabhāga*) or object in Dharmapāla's system. In the idealistic system of Dharmapāla, however, the image of external object is not admitted, so the only image that arises during the process of self-cognition is the image of cognition itself, and the object of cognition is cognition as substance (*dravya*).[90]

Throughout these sections, I use Kuiji's commentaries to explain the Indian sources. This does not mean, however, that I am uncritical of Kuiji as an authority. I am fully aware of the need to use Kuiji's commentaries with caution, since they were written later in the seventh century and in a Chinese context. In cases where he does not indicate the sources of his commentary, we can assume that they often are records of the oral teachings of his learned master Xuanzang, as is indicated by part of the title shared by Kuiji's series of commentaries: "*Recorded Explanations*" (*shu ji* 述記). However, we cannot exclude the possibility that some of them come from his own creative imagination. I use Kuiji's commentaries because in many cases they are the only extant sources we can draw upon to solve the puzzles in those Indian texts. Based on these texts, I conclude that Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their commentators were influenced by the Mahāsāmghikas when they developed the view that "all mind and mental activities are self-cognizant".

The Andhakas' arguments for self-cognition

The Andhakas

Andhaka is a collective name assigned by Buddhaghosa to the following four schools: Pubbaseliya, Aparaseliya, Rājagiriya and Siddhatthika.[91] According to Xuanzang's records, the first two of these schools had their residences in the delta of the Kistna, around Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa

in the eastern portion of present-day Andhra.[92] Inscriptions from Amarāvatī dated to the second century AD indicate that the four Andhaka schools were probably offsprings of the Caitiyavādins in this region.[93] Being a sub-school of Mahāsāṃghika, Caitiyavāda was established by a certain Mahādeva about a hundred years after the initial schism between Mahāsāṃghika and Sthaviravāda.[94]

This geographical term preferred by Buddhaghosa to refer to those Mahāsāṃghika sub-schools indicates that no other school of Buddhism was so popular as the Mahāsāṃghikas in Andhra, as is pointed out by Wayman (1978: 43) that "Andhra was the most creative site of the Mahāsāṃghika". This very soil of Andhra also nurtured some eminent Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophers, such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who are all counted as "Andhra Buddhist philosophers".[95] Actually, the Andhaka period of Mahāsāṃghika was very important in contributing to the later development of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

The main sources from which we draw our information on the Andhakas are KV and the *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā* (KVA), Buddhaghosa's commentary on KV. Both works belong to the Southern tradition in contrast to the Northern one represented by accounts of Vasumitra, Bhāvaviveka and Vinītadeva, who never mentioned the Andhakas. Being one of the seven Abhidharma works in Pāli tradition, KV is ascribed to Tissa Moggaliputta, who presided over an assembly of a thousand monks in the third synod. Unlike the first two synods, this synod, held in Pāṭaliputra in the seventeenth year of Aśoka's reign (ca. 285 BC), is only mentioned in non-canonical, and, with one exception, non-Vinaya sources: *Dīpavaṃsa*, *Mahāvaṃsa*, *Mahābodhivaṃsa* and *Samantapāsādikā.*[96] According to the *Dīpavaṃsa* and *Mahāvaṃsa*, KV was written at the third synod to expel heretical teachings and to give definite Sthaviravāda conclusions concerning doctrinal disputes at the time. Examining its content carefully, however, one will realize that the present version of KV, which consists of 216 items in 23 sections, must have been composed more than a hundred years after the third synod. Hirakawa places the date of its compilation in the latter half of the second century BC.[97]

However, as suggested by Frauwallner (1972: 124), the oldest parts of KV might go back to the third century BC. From the parallel sections we find in the first part of KV and of the *Vijñānakāya*, an Abhidharma work of Sarvāstivādins who were considered the representative of the heretics in the third synod, we can determine that the most ancient parts of KV were composed at or shortly after the third synod. These parts consist of the two principal sections of the first part of KV concerning the doctrinal issues of the existence of person (*pudgala*), a view held by the Vātsīputrīyas, and the existence of the past and the future, a key point for the Sarvāstivāda pan-realism. The second part of KV that starts with the five points about Arhats ascribed to Mahādeva must also be ancient since they were fundamental

theses of the Mahāsāmghikas and attributed to the very first schism between Mahāsāmghika and Sthaviravāda.[98]

In his KVA, Buddhaghosa attributed 73 theses to the Andhakas, which made this school the best-known in the Sinhalese tradition. We find that the issue of self-cognition is discussed in two of those theses, namely, KV V.9 on awareness of the present and KV XIII.7 on enjoyment in meditation. Moreover, self-cognition is discussed in KV XVI.4 on excelling attention, attributed to two sub-schools of the Andhakas: the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas. It is interesting to notice that Buddhaghosa also attributes 28 theses to the Mahāsāmghikas themselves. But no parallel theses are found to those that we have discussed in previous sections. Based on these materials, I will explore the Andhakas' arguments for self-cognition, and examine how they develop the Mahāsāmghika theory of self-cognition.

Awareness of the present

Section V.9 of KV is in a style of dialogue between two parties. According to Buddhaghosa, this section is a conversation between the Andhaka and Theravādin, called the Sakavādin (own party) throughout his commentary to KV. Much of this style of dialogue is lost in its English translation by Shwe Zan Aung and Rhys Davis, so I am supplying a more literal translation of the passage as follows:

> Is there an awareness (ñāṇa) of the present?
> Yes.
> Does one know that awareness by the [same] awareness?
> No, that cannot truly be said. . . .
> Does one know that awareness by the [same] awareness?
> Yes.
> Does one know the awareness that awareness is known by the [same] awareness?
> No, that cannot truly be said. . . .
> Does one know the awareness that awareness is known by the [same] awareness?
> Yes.
> Is that awareness the object of the [same] awareness?
> No, that cannot truly be said. . . .
> Is that awareness the object of the [same] awareness?
> Yes.[99]

The Sakavādin brings up the topic of the section by asking: Is there an awareness of the present? The answer is "Yes" (Āmantā), which expresses a confirmation by the opponent.[100] Then the Sakavādin jumps to a totally different question: Does one know this awareness of the present by the same

awareness? As it sounds irrelevant to the topic of the section, we have to understand it by referring to Buddhaghosa's commentary. In KVA, Buddhaghosa restates the topic of the section by saying: "It is a view of the Andhakas that there is an awareness of the entire present, without distinction".[101] Notice that in his statement "entire" (*sabbasmi*) is emphasized. Since the Andhakas do not admit the reality of the past and future as do the Sarvāstivādins, the entire present for them is the entire reality. Hence it is, again, an issue of omniscient awareness. As for the phrase "without distinction" (*avisesena*), I think it refers to the human awareness that knows all *dharma*s in their general characteristics as opposed to that of the Buddha, which can know all *dharma*s in their specific characteristics and thus with distinction.[102]

Now, if there is an awareness of the entire present, in Buddhaghosa's opinion, this awareness "must take place at the present instant through itself".[103] In other words, the awareness of the entire present has to know itself as well as other objects at the same moment of the present. To achieve this goal, there are two options. The first is to suppose that there are two awarenesses. One knows the object; the other apprehends the awareness itself. It would mean that two awarenesses are functioning simultaneously. But this is denied by Buddhaghosa, as he says that "two awarenesses cannot be simultaneous".[104] The second option is to know the awareness of the present by this same awareness. This is exactly what the Sakavādin takes as he asks: "Does one know that awareness by the same awareness?"

To this question, the Andhaka answers: "*Na h'evaṃ vattabbe*". This sentence, together with the subsequent sentence, is rendered freely by Shwe Zan Aung and Rhys Davis as: "If you deny, your proposition must fall." I would rather put it literally as: "No, that cannot truly be said". It is also confirmed by Buddaghosa: "*Na h'evaṃ vattabbe* is [to show] the opponent's denial".[105] It is interesting that the Andhaka denies the possibility of the awareness of the present knowing itself when answering the question in the first instance. This is contrary to what we would expect given the close link between the Andhakas and Mahāsāṃghikas. We do not see why it is denied in the text. Nor does Buddhaghosa explain this point in his commentary. He simply confirms that: "In the first question, the opponent denies. It cannot be known by the same awareness".[106]

Then the Sakavādin asks again exactly same question: Does one know that awareness by the same awareness? A positive answer is given by the Andhaka this time. Why? Buddhaghosa explains: "To the second question, he assents, because continuity (*santati*) is concerned".[107] Here an important message is that self-awareness can be admitted if it is discussed in successive moments. It also implies that the possible reason for the denial of self-awareness in the first answer is that it is discussed in a single moment of the present. To understand this point, we have to make reference to Buddhaghosa's distinction of three kinds of present in his *Visuddhimagga*:

"Present" is of three kinds, that is to say, present by moment, present by continuity, and present by extent. Herein, what has reached arising, presence and dissolution is *present by moment*. What is included in one or two rounds of continuity is *present by continuity*. . . . What is delimited by a single existent is called *present by extent*.[108]

In light of this distinction, we can assume that what Buddhaghosa means by "continuity" must be present by continuity (*santatipaccuppanna*). In contrast to present by moment (*khaṇapaccuppanna*) and present by extent (*addhāpaccuppanna*), both signifying a singleness of given moment (*khaṇa*), or in a larger time-scale, of given lifetime (*bhava*), present by continuity admits one or two rounds of continuity, and thus contains multiple or successive moments. Buddhaghosa illustrates this concept with the following examples. When one goes to a well-lit place after sitting in the dark, it takes a while to get used to the light and to see objects clearly. Or, if one watches washermen at a distance, there will be a delay between seeing the movements of the hands of washermen and hearing the sounds of the striking. In both cases, the duration that one takes to see objects or to hear sounds is present by continuity. Moreover, Buddhaghosa distinguishes between material and immaterial continuities. The phenomena similar to the two examples are material continuities, while "the immaterial continuity consists in two or three rounds of *javana*".[109] *Javana*, usually translated as impulsion, swift perception or apperception, is one of the fourteen mental functions (*viññāṇakicca*) in Buddhaghosa's system.[110] Later, it is also discussed by Anuruddha in his *Abhidhammatthasangaha*, where not only the apperceptive cognition in successive moments but also that in a single moment is admitted for those who are in a state of higher spiritual achievement.[111] So in the Theravāda tradition apperceptive activities are explained without committing to the reality of the past and the future as do the Sarvāstivādins.

At this point, however, we should be cautious that Buddhaghosa might be imposing his view of continuity on the Andhakas. For, if the Andhakas were following the Mahāsāṃghikas to develop their theory of self-cognition, the activity of self-cognition should occur in a single moment rather than in successive moments. However, given the lack of clarity in the text of KV itself and of further evidence for the Andhaka doctrines, we have to take account of Buddhaghosa's opinion.

After the Andhaka gives a positive answer to the question regarding self-awareness, the Sakavādin raises another question: Does one know the awareness that awareness is known by the same awareness? Here the phrase "the awareness that awareness is known by the same awareness" (*tena ñāṇena taṃ ñāṇaṃ ñāṇan*) adds one more layer to the concept of self-awareness and it becomes the awareness of self-awareness. What follows is the same pattern as above. The Andhaka first denies the awareness of self-awareness by saying, "No, that cannot truly be said", then asserts it when asked again. The text

does not indicate why they make such a move, nor does Buddhaghosa explain this question. However, his suggestion of continuity may still be applicable to this passage. If this is the case, then the first question is talking about the awareness of self-awareness in a single moment, and the Andhaka denies it for the same reason as rejecting self-awareness in a single moment. When asked again, the awareness of self-awareness is admitted. This implies that in successive moments one can not only be aware of one's own awareness, but also know this awareness of self-awareness. As I shall show in Chapter 5, the cognition of self-cognition becomes an important concept for Dharmapāla. This concept is elaborated in great detail in the East Asian Yogācāra tradition, but we cannot find any reference to it in the extant Indian texts. Now, as we have seen, this Pāli passage is probably the earliest source that has discussed the issue of the awareness of self-awareness.

After discussing the awareness of self-awareness, the Sakavādin raises one more question: Is that awareness the object of the same awareness? As we might expect, the same pattern follows: the Andhaka first denies, then asserts it when asked the same question again. We can apply the same idea of successive moments to explain this. In other words, awareness cannot take itself as object in a single moment but can do so in successive moments. The key to the current discussion is whether awareness can take itself as "object" (*ārammaṇa*); for a natural response to self-awareness is that awareness must become an object of its own so as to be known by itself. But this would imply that there is no strict distinction between subject and object as they can exchange their roles. The fact that the Andhaka finally admits the possibility of awareness taking itself as object shows that, on their view, awareness can be both subject and object. Buddhaghosa seems to agree with this view when he distinguishes awareness into method and object, as we shall discuss in the next section.

Having received affirmation from the Andhaka that an awareness can take itself as object, is known by itself, and that there is the awareness of this self-awareness, the Sakavādin, for the purpose of "hindering [the opponent] from seeking a chance for pretext",[112] goes on with his argument by raising the following series of questions:

> Does one touch contact by that contact, feel feeling by that feeling, think ideation by that ideation, will volition by that volition, be conscious of consciousness by that consciousness, have initial thought by that initial thought, have sustained thought by that sustained thought, have zest by that zest, be mindful of mindfulness by that mindfulness, and understand wisdom with that wisdom?[113]

In this passage, the Sakavādin singles out ten mental activities: contact (*phassa*), feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*saññā*), volition (*cetanā*), consciousness

(*citta*), initial thought (*vitakka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), zest (*pīti*), mindfulness (*sati*) and wisdom (*paññā*). These mental activities appear in the same order in KV XVI.4 and, except volition, in KV XIII.7 when the issue of self-awareness is discussed. All of them, except consciousness (*citta*), are still part of the lists of mental activities for the Theravādins, Sarvāstivādins or Yogācārins, which contain respectively fifty-two, forty-six or fifty-one mental activities. As for consciousness, according to Guenther (1974: 31, n. 2), it is replaced by attention (*manaskāra, manasikāra*), which is also found in all these lists, because the former is a "rather ambiguous term". In KV VII.3 under the topic of "On Mental Activities", there is a list of thirteen mental activities, but only five of them are shared by this list of ten. So we cannot determine whether these ten make a complete list of mental activities for the Andhakas owing to the lack of further evidence.

The Andhaka denies the possibility of the self-knowledge of the ten mental activities. This is different from the shared view among Mahāsāmghika and some of its sub-schools that both the mind and *mental activities* are self-cognizant. Buddhaghosa explains that the denial of self-awareness of these mental activities, e.g., feeling, is because "one does not see that there can be such a feeling".[114] Can we expect a pattern of affirmation after denial reappearing, as with the last three questions? It seems improbable because some more embarrassing questions follow:

> Does one cut a sword with that sword, an axe with that axe, a knife with that knife, an adze with that adze? Does one sew a needle with that needle, handle the tip of a finger with that finger, kiss the top of the nose with that nose, handle the head with that head, and wash off excrement with that excrement, urine with that urine, saliva with that saliva, pus with that pus, blood with that blood?[115]

The Andhaka definitely denies all these absurd phenomena by saying: "No, that cannot truly be said". It is interesting to note that using similes plays an important role in this argument. These similes, especially the knife and the finger-tip, are commonly used in the Sarvāstivāda or Madhyamaka refutation of self-cognition. However, we should also notice that these similes are highly selective. For example, the lamp is not mentioned here, simply because it would support the Andhakas' position.

So far it seems that the Sakavādin has won the debate. However, the Andhaka regains his position in the following dialogue:

> Then should I say: "There is no awareness of the present"?
> Yes.
> But, when all phenomena are seen as impermanent, is not that awareness also seen as impermanent?
> Yes.

If the awareness is seen as impermanent when all phenomena are seen as impermanent, then indeed it can be said: "There is awareness of the present".[116]

Notice that the two parties have changed their roles in the dialogue: the Andhaka is asking and the Sakavādin answering. The theme is also brought back to the topic of the section: awareness of the present. This indicates that the previous discussion of self-awareness is not their central concern, and that self-awareness is still discussed in the context of omniscience. This point is confirmed by the second question of the Andhaka, where the term "all phenomena" (*sabbe saṃkhāre*) is used. It, again, confirms Buddhaghosa's interpretation of awareness of the present as awareness of the entire present. The key to understanding this argument of the Andhaka is that the awareness of the present is seen as part of "all phenomena", and that it is impermanent in the same manner as other phenomena. In this way, it is guaranteed that an awareness of all present phenomena, including awareness itself, is possible in the same present moment.

As we shall discuss in the next chapter, similar arguments are found in MV, where the Sarvāstivadins spend many words to refute them. The main points of their refutation are to distinguish between "all" all and "partial" all, to exclude the awareness itself from the "all", and to apply successive moments to the issue. In KV, the Sakavādin does not make further argument against the conclusive statement of the Andhaka, who seems finally to win the debate. Buddhaghosa, however, comments from a Theravādin point of view that "the Sakavādin assents in the sense that *that* awareness is seen as method (*nayato*) rather than as object (*ārammaṇato*). Hence the opponent's proposition, though established thus, cannot stand".[117] To Buddhaghosa, the victory still belongs to the Sakavādin, though he has no further words to say.

Attending to all at once

The distinction between method and object is crucial in understanding Buddhaghosa's critique of the Andhakas' position. In his commentary on KV XVI.4 "On Excelling Attention (*adhigayha manasikāra*)", Buddhaghosa distinguishes two aspects of attention, namely, method and object. According to him, "in the case that one or more phenomena is seen as impermanent [and then] all phenomena are [seen as] impermanent, attention is method".[118] Here attention is understood as a method by which all phenomena are seen as impermanent, rather than as an object that is part of the phenomena.

By making this distinction, Buddhaghosa is to argue against the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, who make an assertion that one can attend to all at once based on the same argument associated with "all phenomena are impermanent". First of all, they cite the following Sūtra passage for support:

When he by wisdom discerns and sees
"All phenomena are impermanent,"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
Herein lies the way to purity.

When he by wisdom discerns and sees
"All phenomena are suffering,"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
Herein lies the way to purity.

When he by wisdom discerns and sees
"All *dharma*s are no-self,"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
Herein lies the way to purity.[119]

The rationale of the argument for attending to all at once is the same as that for awareness of the present. That is, if one observes that all phenomena are impermanent, suffering or no-self, then the consciousness that attends to these phenomena, as a phenomenon, must also be observed as impermanent, suffering or no-self. The two processes occur in the same present moment, so it is possible for one to attend to all at once. Regarding this argument, the Sakavādin takes the same step to refute the opponent as he does in the last section. He asks the opponent three questions:

(1) Does one know consciousness (*citta*) by the same consciousness?
(2) Does one know the consciousness that consciousness is known by the same consciousness?
(3) Is consciousness the object of the same consciousness?

As we see, they are exactly the same questions as those in the last section, except that awareness (*ñāṇa*) is replaced by consciousness (*citta*). The Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, following the pattern of the Andhakas, first negate these questions, then assert them when asked again. The reason for this, according to Buddhaghosa, is not the issue of successive moments as we discussed previously. Instead, they are negated because "[consciousness], having been made an object, cannot be that which is capable of knowing".[120] In others word, consciousness cannot be subject and object at one and the same time. On the other hand, Buddhaghosa says: "Because we already know the characteristic of consciousness as such, thus [the opponent] asserts with regard to the question whether consciousness can be known".[121] Here "the characteristic of consciousness as such" implies that the nature of consciousness is that which is capable of knowing (*sakkā jānituṁ*) or by which one can know, i.e., method. This means that, when one sees all phenomena as impermanent, one can only view the consciousness that observes these phenomena as subject or method, and not as object.

In addition, attention has an aspect of object. In other words, it can be seen as object in some cases. Buddhaghosa says that "attending to [phenomena] of past and so forth is attention as object".[122] On this view, we attend to objects in any given moment as exclusively past, present or future, but not all at once. That is, we attend the past as past, the future as future and the present as present. This is to argue against the opponent's view that in attending to any of the past, present or future one can attend to the remaining two as such. The Sakavādin points out that this assertion commits the opponent to a collocation of two or three parallel mental processes. The opponent, i.e., the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, denies that two or three mental processes, e.g., contacts or minds, can function simultaneously.[123] Hence their former assertion fails: One cannot attend to all at once. In concluding his commentary on the section, Buddhaghosa remarks: "'All phenomena' and the rest are spoken of with reference to the consideration by way of the method, and not by way of the object at once; hence it is inconclusive".[124] This echoes the same tone of his concluding remark in the last section.

As for the issue of two minds, it is discussed on various occasions throughout KV. The Sakavādin holds a consistent position in denying the possibility of two minds functioning simultaneously. But different opponents have different opinions with regard to this issue. The Mahāsāmghikas, confirming their position as discussed in previous sections, admit this possibility when talking about non-intimation (aviññatti) as immoral in KV X.11. The Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas, two sub-schools of the Andhakas, together with the Sammatīyas, also admit it when talking about the merit increasing with utility in KV VII.5. The Pubbaseliyas and Uttarāpathakas deny the possibility respectively in KV XVIII.8 and KV XIX.1. Finally, the Andhakas deny it in KV III.2 "On the Sagely Power of the Buddha", and in KV XIII.7 "On Meditation as Enjoyment".

Among these cases, the last one is of particular interest. It is a section discussing whether one, having attained a meditative state, enjoys it or not. The Andhaka gives a positive answer. But this would imply that one has to meditate on that meditation with the same meditation. The Sakavādin raises the following question: Is a given meditation the object of that same meditation? The Andhaka first denies then asserts it when asked again. The Sakavādin argues further that, if one enjoys a meditative state, it means that there is a desire for meditation (jhānanikanti). Both of them, meditation and desire for meditation, are forms of mental activity. This raises a problem: Would it be possible for two mental processes to be going on at once? To say that it is possible, in general, is to admit that two minds function simultaneously. The Andhaka denies such a possibility, so his assertion fails.

Divergent views on the issue of two minds between the Andhakas and Mahāsāmghikas reflect their different approaches to the issue of

self-cognition. To compare their views will give us a chance to summarize Chapter 2. As we have discussed, the Mahāsāmghikas hold that the mind and mental activities are self-cognizant, and that this view can be illustrated through the simile of a lamp. Their admission of two minds functioning simultaneously implies that two mental processes may go on at the same time in the course of self-awareness. They also commit themselves to the view that omniscience occurs all at once, in a single moment. This is a unique feature of Mahāsāmghika doctrine. The Andhakas, on the other hand, only admit awareness or consciousness, i.e., the mind, to be self-cognizant; they deny that this is true of mental activities. The Andhakas do not attempt to illustrate their view with supportive examples. Instead they skillfully utilize the argument associated with "all phenomena are impermanent". This school does not necessarily commit to the collocation of two minds or to the instantaneity of self-knowledge and of the knowledge of all *dharmas*. Some of its sub-schools do so, while some do not. Given the lack of sufficient material for the study of both the Mahāsāmghikas and the Andhakas, it is impossible to assess the totality of their theories of self-cognition or their detailed differences. One thing, however, is certain. Both schools are forerunners in proposing a theory of self-cognition, and provide a source for this concept prior to the works of Dignāga.

Notes

1 See, for instance, Mookerjee 1975, Matilal 1986, and Williams 1998.
2 See May 1959: 113–14, n. 284, where he says: "L'origine de la thèse, que la pensée se connaît elle-même, est rapportée aux Sautrāntika ou aux Mahāsāmghika".
3 See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 182, n. 2: "Notre hypothèse repose sur Madhyamakāvatāra, p. [1]67.5 (corrected after May 1959: 113–14, n. 284): 'Ici quelques-uns, adoptant la thèse des Sautrāntikas, en vue d'établir la conscience de soi (*svasamvedanā*), disént: de même que la lampe . . . de méme que le mot . . .'. – Le fait de mémoire: 'j'ai vu' démontre que le 'je' se connait soi-même".
4 Yamaguchi (1951: 21) seemed to have discovered this by himself, for he does not refer to any other contemporary scholar. Lü (1991: 2396–7), in his article written in 1956, discussed the text of Candrakīrti and made reference to La Vallée Poussin. Katsura (1969: 34, n. 6) acknowledged La Vallée Poussin as the first to discover self-cognition as a main doctrine of Santrāntika. While Kajiyama (1983: 37) only referred to Yamaguchi at this point.
5 See, for instance, Lü 1991: 2396–7, Kajiyama 1983: 31–58, and Hattori 1968: 98, 101–6; 1988: 53.
6 I am referring to the statement "*rang rig pa yin no*", which will be discussed below.
7 See, especially, Koyanagi 1916: 999–1004.
8 I place the death of the Buddha in ca. 368 BC. The Theravāda tradition places the date of the Buddha's death at 543 BC, but this date is rejected by most modern scholars. We are left with two options: the long chronology, placing the Buddha's death 218 years before the consecration of Aśoka, which occurred in

the years 268–7 BC, and the short chronology which places the Buddha's death 100 years before this event. Of these two dates, according to Bechert 1991(b): 338, the first date of 486 BC is probably of secondary origin. Meanwhile, Bechert 1991(a): 236 suggests that the Buddha's death took place between ca. 400 BC and ca. 350 BC. Thus, the date 368 BC is the most reasonable one. See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 1, n. 2. Notice that the difference between these dates is approximately divided by 60. This shows that the problem with these dates is related to the 60-year cycle of the Indian calendar. See Lü 1991: 2318–24.

9 See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 54. Lamotte (1988a: 286–9) lists six possible dates for the schism as coming down from different traditions.

10 The first of the ten controversial disciplines concerns the lawfulness of keeping a provision of salt; the second concerns the lawfulness of taking food beyond the specified time; the third concerns the lawfulness of traveling to another village to eat another meal the same day; the fourth concerns the possibility of holding the dwelling-place in more than one place within the same parish; the fifth concerns the possibility of accomplishing an ecclesiastical act when the community does not have sufficient members; the sixth concerns the possibility of carrying out an improper act by following the example of others; the seventh concerns the lawfulness of drinking milk which is no longer in the state of milk and is not yet in the state of curd, and which is not the remains of the meal after having eaten; the eighth concerns the lawfulness of drinking intoxicating liquor; the ninth concerns whether it is allowed to use a mat without fringes to sit upon; the tenth concerns the question of accepting gold and silver. See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 42–3; Lamotte 1988a: 126.

11 See *Dharmaguptakavinaya* T1428: 970c; *Daśādhyāyavinaya* T1435: 452c; *Mahīśāsakavinaya* T1421: 193b; *Mahāsāṃghikavinaya* T1425: 493a; *Mūlasarvāstivādavinayakṣudrakavastu* T1451: 413c; *Dīpavaṃsa* V.16; *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* T1465: 900b. For the sectarian affiliation of the last work, see Lamotte 1988a: 283.

12 See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 47. Lü (1991: 1949–50) suggests that the disputation on the five points contributed to the later split between the Dharmaguptakas and the Caitikavādins, of which Mahādeva was the spiritual leader.

13 See Willemen *et al.* 1998: xi; Lin Chung-an 1990: 32. The latter cites Bhavya's NV to support him.

14 See T2125: 205a; Takakusu 1982: 7–9.

15 諸部流派。生起不同。西國相承。大綱唯四 T2125: 205a. See Takakusu 1982: 7.

16 See T2087: 946c.

17 See Obermiller 1931: 99–100, where Bu-ston also supplied a secondary opinion: "According to some the language of the Mahāsāṃghikas was the intermediate dialect [Paiśāci], that of the Saṃmitīya was the Prākrit, and that of the Sthaviras – the Apabhraṃśa." Galloway (1981: 210) says that the literary form of Paiśāci is Pāli. Lamotte (1988a: 564) reports that G. Grierson and S. Konow also hold that Pāli originated in Paiśāci. But Lamotte disagrees with them, for "these similarities (pointed by them), being shared with other Prākrits too, are hardly enough to establish a direct connection between Pāli and Paiśāci". Max Deeg (2004, oral communication) observes that "Bu-ston's scheme is *ex post facto* and topical".

18 See Lin Chung-an 1990: 24–44, where he contributes this distribution to the major lineages of the Buddha's disciples.

19 See Thien Chau 1999: 18–19. They are *Tridharmakaśāstra* with two translations (T1506, T1505), *Sāṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra* (T1649), *Lü er shi er ming liao lun* 律二十二明了論 of Buddhatrāta (T1461).

20 Galloway (1981: 210) suggests that the *Mahāvastu* was translated from Prākrit into Sanskrit.

21 See Hirakawa 1989–90: 25–74, where he does not mention the *Abhisamācārika-Dharma*, which was published by Taisho University in 1999.

22 See T2085: 864b; Legge 1965: 99.

23 See T2087: 888a. Lévi identified Budhila, who is mentioned in the inscription on the Lion Capital at Mathurā, with *fo di luo* 佛地羅, the author of the .*Tattvasamuccayaśāstra* (*Ji zhen lun* 集真論). See Lamotte 1988a: 491.

24 See T2053: 241b.

25 See T2087: 946c.

26 Lamotte (1988a: 191) observes that **Peṭaka* is independent from Theravāda or Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and that it is a Prajñaptivāda Abhidharma compiled in Avantī by Mahākātyāyana. Lü (1991: 2020–2) and Yinshun (1992: 16–18) are also convinced that it is the Mahāsāmghika Abhidharma, but the latter restored the Sanskrit title into **Karaṇḍa* on the basis of *kun le* 蜫勒, a more common form seen in Chinese sources. Wogihara (1911) and Mizuno (1997) identify **Peṭaka* with the *Peṭakopadesa*, a non-canonical work in Pāli, but hesitate in connecting it with the Mahāsāmghikas. Zacchetti (2002a, 2002b) recently provides concrete evidence to make a connection between **Peṭaka*, *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Yin chi ru jing* 陰持入經 (T603), a Chinese text translated by An Shigao.

27 廣比諸事以類相從 T1509: 70b.

28 論議則無窮 T1509: 192a.

29 No fewer than five Vasumitras are known in the history of Indian Buddhism. Yinshun (1992: 275) assigns Vasumitra a date of around 100 BC. He believes that Vasumitra was immediately after Kātyāyanīputra and is also convinced that Vasumitra as a master in MV was the same person who composed the *Prakaraṇapāda*, *Dhātukāya* and SB. Lamotte (1988a: 520, 529) dates Vasumitra as well as SB to the second century AD. But Willemen *et al.* (1998: xv–xvi, n. 1), following Bareau (1955: 21–5), dates SB as late as the fourth century when its first Chinese translation appeared. I think this date is far too conservative.

30 頗有一智知一切法耶 T1545: 42c.

31 The *Mahāvastu* II.391: ... *smṛtidhṛtimatā buddhimatā prajñāmatā sarvaśo sarvatratāye jñātavyam prāptavyam boddhavyam abhisaṃboddhavyam sarvam tam ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā anuttarām samyaksambodhimabhisaṃbuddhe* /. There are three other similar passages in the text, the first of which is about the previous Buddha Dīpaṃkara: I.283: ... *smṛtimena bhṛtimena matimena sarvaśo sarvatratāye jñātavyam prāptavyam boddhavyam abhisaṃboddhavyam sarvam tamekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā anuttarām samyaksambodhimabhisaṃbuddho* /; II.186: ... *smṛtimena matimena dhṛtimena dyutimena sarvaso sarvatratāye jñātavyam prāptavyam abhisaṃboddhavyam sarvam tam ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā anuttarām samyaksambodhimabhisaṃbuddhe* /; II.560: ... *smṛtimatā dhṛtimatā buddhimatā prajñāvantena arthikena cchandikena sarvaśo sarvatra yajjñātavyam boddhavyam abhisaṃboddhavyam sarvam tamekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā anuttarām samyaksambodhimabhisaṃbuddhaḥ* /. See Jones 1949–56 for the English translation.

32 See, for instance, Galloway 1981: 205.

33 According to Xuanzang's translation. The other two Chinese translations only have "no sleep". The Tibetan reads: *mnal bar yang mi mdzad do* / ("And no action of sleep") D4138: 142b. *Svapna*, the Sanskrit equivalent of *mnal pa*, though, could mean both "sleep" and "dream". According to Kuiji's commentary, the Sarvāstivādins hold that the Buddha sleeps but does not dream. See Masuda 1925: 20, n. 3, and Bareau 1955: 59–60.

34 一刹那心了一切法。 一刹那心相應般若知一切法 T2031: 15c. The Tibetan reads: *sems gcig gis chos thams cad rnam par mkhyen to / sems gyi skad cig gcig dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i shes rab gyi[s] chos thams cad yongs su mkhyen to /* D4138: 142b. Both Masuda and Bareau reconstruct "wisdom associated with a mind of a single moment" into Sanskrit as *ekakṣaṇikacittasamprayuktaprajñā*, which is slightly different from the phrase in the *Mahāvastu*: "*ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā*". See Masuda 1925: 20–1 and Bareau 1954: 240, 1955: 60.

35 *sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi[s] chos thams cad thugs gcig [gis] rnam par mkhyen cing skad cig gcig dang ldan pa'i shes rab kyis chos thams cad yongs su mkhyen to . . . /* D4239: 147b2, corrected after Teramoto and Hiramatsu 1935: 5.

36 *skad cig skad cig la thams cad mkhyen pa /* D4140: 154b. Teramoto and Hiramatsu 1935: 37 takes *zad pa* (D, N; P: *zag pa*), the first word in the next sentence, as part of this sentence, and corrects it as *'jug pa*, thus translating the sentence as "刹那刹那に一切知に入り" ("Entering all-knowing in a single moment"). Bareau (1956: 193) follows them as he puts it as: "À chaque instant il entre dans toutes les connaissances." As I shall show below, they are wrong in separating *zad pa* from the rest of its sentence.

37 餘部佛心一念不能了一切法。除其自性相應共有。今此一念亦了自性相應共有等法差別自性。故異餘宗 Z844: 579b.

38 Kuiji explains: "After reaching the paths of liberation and of Vajra, [one] can understand the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of all *dharma*s in a single moment of thought, and does not need to understand them in successive moments. This is the nature of wisdom" (至解脫道金剛道後。一念之間即能解知諸法自性。不假相續方知法盡。皆亦解知。慧自性故 Z844: 579b).

39 以一刹那現觀邊智。遍知四諦諸相差別 T2031: 15c. The Tibetan reads: *mngon par rtogs pa'i mtha' las byung ba'i ye shes gcig gis 'phags pa'i bd[e]n pa bzhi mtshan nyid mi 'dra ba rnams mkhyen to /* D4138: 143a. Similar views are mentioned by Bhavya and Vinītadeva. Bhavya reports that the Ekavyavahārikas hold that "with a single awareness (*jñāna*) [one] thoroughly understands the four truths" (*ye shes gcig gis bden pa bzhi rnams yongs su shes so /* D4139: 149a). Vinītadeva says that for the Lokottaravādins one "perceives the [four] truths instantaneously" (*bden pa ni cig car mthong ngo /* D4140: 155a). See Bareau 1956: 174, 193.

40 AKBh VI.27: *ye tarhi nikāyāntarīyāḥ satyānām ekābhisamayaṃ varṇayanti /*. La Vallée Poussin (1988–90: 1057, n. 169) remarks that this view is ascribed to the Mahāsāṃghikas by Puguang in his commentary on AKBh, but Yaśomitra attributes it to the Dharmaguptakas in his AKVy.

41 除佛餘心雖緣共相。一刹那心亦緣自性。能了一切法。然不能證了其差別。佛經多劫。陶練其心。了一切心。無過佛者。故佛一刹那心能了一切法差別自性。而能證知 Z844: 579b. Masuda (1925: 20, n. 6) is wrong in amending "mind" as "*dharmas*".

42 諸佛世尊盡智無生智恆常隨轉。乃至般涅槃 T2031: 15c. Vinītadeva reports a similar view of the Lokottaravādins: "The awarenesses of destruction and of non-birth are always present" (*zad pa dang mi skye ba'i blo rtag tu mnga' ba yin no /* D4140: 154b). This statement is misunderstood as "The awareness of non-birth is always present" ("常に無生の慧を有す") by Teramoto and Hiramatsu (1935: 37), for they take *zad pa* (destruction) as part of the last sentence, as I previously noted. So is Bareau (1956: 193) wrong in following them at this point.

43 非諸阿羅漢皆得無生智 T3031: 16a. The Tibetan reads: *dgra bcom pa thams cad kyis mi skye bar shes pa mi 'thob bo /* D4138: 144b.

44 有於一時二心俱起。道與煩惱容俱現前。業與異熟有俱時轉。種即為芽 T2031: 16a. The Tibetan reads: *dus gcig tu sems gnyis phrad do / nyon mongs pa dang lam phrad do / las dang rnam par smin pa phrad do / sa bon nyid myu gur 'gyur ro / D4138: 143b.

45 "The later differentiated view" is a translation of Xuanzang's *mo zong yi yi* 末宗 異義. The Tibetan version reads: "These are intervened doctrines" (*de dag gi bar gyi gzhung lugs ni 'di dag yin te* / D4138: 143b), which agrees most closely with the anonymous Chinese translation: "[The following] are intervened views" (中 間見者 T2032: 18c). For "the original common view", see Kuiji's commentary: "The original view holds that different consciousnesses arise respectively in different moments of thought" (本計諸識各別念生 Z844: 583b).

46 Masuda 1925: 32, n. 3. He relies on Ken'ei Koyama's sub-commentary on Kuiji's commentary in making this observation. He did not notice that more obvious evidence is found in Paramārtha's translation, where a commentary by the translator is kept: "Differentiated views are the views of Mahāsāṃghika that are different from other [three] schools" (執義異者。大眾部執義異餘之部 T2033: 21a).

47 或復有執。一補特伽羅。有二心俱生。如大眾部 T1545: 47b.

48 *sems gnyis cig car 'byung ba dang / nyon mongs pa dang lam cig car 'byung ba dang / las dang las kyi 'bras bu cig car 'byung ba dang / sa bon dang myu gu cig car 'byung ba yod do* / D4140: 155a.

49 以見聞等俱時有故 T1545: 719c.

50 See Minsky 1986.

51 In his translation of Vasumitra's text, Paramārtha uses "many minds" (*duo xin* 多心) instead of "two minds" (*er xin* 二心), which may reflect his sectarian background of Bahuśrutiyavāda. See T2033: 21a.

52 謂或有執。心心所法能了自性。如大眾部彼作是説。智等能了為自性故。能了 自他。如燈能照為自性故。能照自他 T1545: 42c. Awareness (*jñāna, zhi* 智) is generally rendered as "knowledge" in Abhidharma literature. Here I choose to translate it as "awareness", for I think it is more in a sense of activity rather than of result. Later, Dignāga argues that the result of cognition is the very act of self-cognition. Thus, I have made this point explicit by rendering *jñāna* as "awareness", which is meanwhile the "knowledge" of awareness knowing itself. See Potter 1984: 309–10 and Dunne 2004: 254, n. 47.

53 See Vasumitra's account in T2031: 15c–16a and D4138: 143a–b. Of these four points, Bhavya only mentions the fourth: "The stream-winners can attain meditation" (*rgyun tu zhugs pa ni bsam gtan thob pa yin no* / D4139: 149b). Vinītadeva mentions all, but the second means the opposite: "Neither the Srota-āpannas nor the Arhats have retrogression" (*rgyun tu zhugs pa dang dgra bcom pa las ni nyams pa med do* / D4140: 155a).

54 (1) 須陀恒心數心知其自 T2032: 18b; (2) 須颬多阿半那心及心法知有自性 T2033: 20c; (3) 諸預流者心心所法能了自性 T2031: 15c; (4) *gyun tu zhugs pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba rnams kyi ngo bo nyid shes so* / D4238: 143a.

55 For a discussion of the multiple meanings of *svabhāva*, though, in a totally different context, see Steinkneller 1971 and Dunne 2004: 153–8.

56 一切預流，皆知自得預流果證，不待尋教他言了方了 Z844: 581a. Masuda's translation (1925: 24, n. 1) raises another ambiguous reading of *zi* 自, which I think is unnecessary.

57 Wassiljew takes this option when he translates it as: "The Srota-āpannas are capable of knowing their own nature (*svabhāva*) through their *citta* and *caitasika dharmas*." See Masuda 1925: 24, n. 1.

58 彼心等一刹那頃能了自性 Z844: 581a.

59 In this case, if the Srota-āpannas already know their attainment by themselves, why do not Arhats know, as it is indicated by one of the five points of Mahādeva? Are the Srota-āpannas omniscient? For further discussion, see MV T1545: 510b23–6; 510c10–13; 511b2–6; 511: b13–20 for further discussion.

60 Kuiji explains: "Although all ordinary persons, as well as the three later fruitions, can apprehend themselves (*svabhāva*), they cannot do so as clearly as those of the first fruition, thus [the latter] is singled out" (雖諸異生能了自性。後三果等 皆悉如此。異生未明了。舉初聖果故 Z844: 581a).

61 SN D4140: 155a; P5641: 188a; N177(u): 173a.

62 Teramoto and Hiramatsu 1935: 37: "自明 (自覺 *sva-saṃvedana*) は非ず". See page 41 for their edition of the Tibetan text.

63 See Rockhill 1884: 187, n. 1: "There is no intuitive knowledge; to even arhats. . . ."

64 SN D4140: 155a3; P5641: 188a6; N177(u): 173a1.

65 *gzhan la lan gdab pa* . . . D4139: 148b. The same phrase appears in Tāranātha's account of Mahādeva's five points. See Tāranātha 1970: 80, n. 17.

66 *gzhan dag gis bstan pa bsgrub par byed do* / D4139: 149a. Bhavya's third account is simply a negation of the second: *gzhan gyis bstan cing bsgrub pa med do* / D4139: 153a.

67 *gzhan gyis nye bar bsgrub pa* . . . D4138: 141b.

68 從他饒益 T2032: 18a.

69 為餘所誘 T2031: 15c.

70 餘人染污衣 T2033: 20a.

71 天魔所嬈。漏失不淨 T1544: 956b. A commentary on this point can be found in MV T1545: 510b10–18.

72 *mnyam par gzhag pa yang tshig smra'o* / *sems la yang gzugs yod do* / D4140: 155a.

73 *mnyam par gzhag pa'i tshig brjod pa yod do* / *sems la yang lus yod do* / *yid la byed pa la yang lus yod do* / D4138: 143a. The Chinese translation is somewhat different: "There are words spoken in meditation; there is also a subdued mind and also a quarrelsome (*zheng zuo* 諍作) volition". (在等引位有發語言。亦有調 伏心。亦有諍作意。 T2031: 15c.) Here the Chinese word *zheng zuo* suggests that the original Sanskrit word could be *vigraha*, which means "quarrel", "controversy", and also "body" or "form". The Tibetan translators, in rendering it to *lus* or *gzugs* (in the case of Vinītadeva's text), must have understood it in terms of the latter, while the Chinese translators took it to mean the former, which I think makes more sense in this context.

74 One more statement is found in this place: "There is no place in *dharma*s that have been done" (*chos bzhin du byas pa rnams la skabs med do* / D4138: 143a). It is omitted in Vinītadeva's account, thus skipped at this point.

75 See, for example, Yamaguchi 1951: 21; Lü 1991: 2396–7; Katsura 1969: 34, n. 6; Kajiyama 1983: 37.

76 NB I.10: *sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanam* //. The Tibetan reads: *sems dang sems las byung pa thams cad kyi rang rig pa dang* // D4212: 231a.

77 *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* I.10: "The word 'all' is to include mistaken awareness" (*thams cad ces smos pa ni nor ba'i shes pa rnams kyang yongs su bsdus te* / D4230: 6b).

78 *Tarkabhāṣā* 22: *sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanaṃ svasaṃvedanam* /. Kajiyama (1989: 234, n. 97) notes that *svasaṃvedanam* is missing in the Tibetan translation: *sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad gyi bdag nyid yang dag par rigs pa'o* / D4264: 343a.

79 *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* I.10: *sems dang sems las byung ba'i thams cad rang rig ba zhes bya ba ni de dag thams cad kyang yin la sems dang sems las byung ba yang yin pas sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad do* // *thams cad ces smos pa ni nor ba'i shes pa rnams kyang yongs su bsdus te* / *de dag gis rang gi ngo bo rab tu gsal ba gang yin pa de ni rang gi rig pa yin no* // *'di ltar sems dang sems las byung ba*

thams cad ni rtogs par bya ba'i rang bzhin can yin pa'i phyir rang gi ngo bo rig par byed bzhin du skye ste / dper na mar me ni rab tu gsal ba'i rang bzhin can yin pa'i phyir bdag nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa bzhin du skye'i / rang gi ngo bo rab tu gsal bar bya ba la mar me gzhan la mi ltos so // de bzhin du sems dang sems las byung ba rnams kyang rang gi ngo bo rtogs par bya ba la shes pa gzhan la mi ltos pa yin te / de'i phyir rang grub pa'i ngo bo rnams ni bdag nyid la mngon sum gyi tsad ma yin no // D4230: 6b. Compare the Sanskrit reconstruction by Gangopadhyaya (1971: 107): *sarvacittacaittānām ātmasamvedanam iti / sarve ca te cittacaittāśceti sarvacittacaittāḥ / sarveti uktyā bhramajñānāny api parigrhyante / teṣām ca yat svarūpaprakāśanam tadātmasamvedanam / sarve hi cittacaittāḥ pratītisvabhāvatvāt svarūpajñāpakā bhavanti / yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśasvabhāvatvād ātmano 'pi prakāśako bhavati / svarūpaprakāśe ca pradīpāntaram nāpekṣate / tathā cittacaittā api svarūpāvabodhe jñānāntaram nāpekṣante / tataśca svasiddhabhāvāḥ svayam pratyakṣapramāṇam bhavanti //.*

80 PV III.329: *prakāśamānas tādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakaḥ / yathā prakāśo 'bhimatas tathā dhīr ātmavedinī //.*

81 *Tarkabhāṣā 23: yathā pradīpa ātmānam prakāśayati tathā jñānam api jaḍapadārthavilakṣaṇam svahetor eva prakāśasvabhāvam upajāyamānam svasamvedanam vyavasthāpyate //.*

82 集量論説。諸心心法皆證自體。名為現量。若不爾者。如不曾見不應憶念。是故四智相應心品。一一亦能照知自體。……諸心心法雖有勝劣皆能外緣。內證自體。猶如光明既能照他亦能自照。非如刀等諸法 T1530: 303a. See Keenan 1980: 569 and La Vallée Poussin 1928–9: 130 for their translations. For the Sanskrit name of Bandhuprabha, see Keenan 1980: 390, n. 2.

83 此若無者應不自憶心心所法。如不曾更境必不能憶故 T1585: 10b.

84 PS I Hc-1: *nyams su ma myong bar don dran pa ni mthong ba med de.* See Hattori 1968: 30 for his translation.

85 PS I.11d: *na hy asāv avibhāvite.* Two Tibetan translations read: (Kanakavarman) *gang phyir ma myong bar 'di med*; (Vasudhararakṣita) *ma myong bar 'di med phyir ro.* See Hattori 1968: 110, 184–5.

86 For Sanskrit fragments of PS, see Randle 1926, Hattori 1968 and Katsura 1975.

87 *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī I.10: tasmāt sarvāṇy etāni cittacaittāni svasamvedanapratyakṣāṇi-iti /.*

88 大眾部說心心所法能取自體與大乘同 T1830: 294b.

89 然大眾部・一說部・說出世部・雞胤部。亦緣自心。亦緣心外法。今非一分故無過也。故宗輪云諸預流者心心所法能了自性 T1830: 269b.

90 In his commentary on VMS, Kuiji explains: "The Mahāsāmghikas [hold] that the mind can take itself as object, which is the same as [what we say] the seeing portion (*darśanabhāga*) takes the seen portion (*nimittabhāga*) as object. Cognizing the mind itself is different, for it is not necessary for other images (*ākāra*) to arise. While cognizing the mind itself, the image is that which cognizes, and that which is cognized is the object of cognition (*ālambana*) as well as the substance (*dravya*)" (大眾部心得自緣。見分緣相與此等同。自緣體者則不如是。以緣自體不須別起行相。以能緣見者為行相。所緣見為所緣及事 T1830: 318b).

91 See KVA I.9: "The Andhakas comprise the sub-groups of the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas" (*Andhakā nāma Pubbaseliyā Aparaseliyā Rājagiriyā Siddhatthikā ti ime pacchā upannanikāyā*).

92 See Beal 1884: 221–2.

93 See the entry "Andhaka" in Malalasekera (1961–).

94 See SB T2031: 15b. Lü (1991: 1949–50) suggests that this Mahādeva was actually the Mahādeva who initiates the five points on Arhats.

95 See Hanumantha Rao 1993: 104–7.

96 See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 55.

97 See Hirakawa 1991: 287; Willemen *et al.* 1998: 58.
98 See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 57–9.
99 KV V.9:

> *Paccuppanne ñāṇaṃ atthīti?*
> *Āmantā.*
> *Tena ñāṇena taṃ ñāṇaṃ jānātīti?*
> *Na h'evaṃ vattabbe – pe –*
> *Tena ñāṇena taṃ ñāṇaṃ jānātāīti?*
> *Āmantā.*
> *Tena ñāṇena taṃ ñāṇaṃ ñāṇan ti jānātīti?*
> *Na h'evaṃ vattabbe – pe –*
> *Tena ñāṇena taṃ ñāṇaṃ ñāṇan ti jānātīti?*
> *Āmantā.*
> *Taṃ ñāṇaṃ tassa ñāṇassa ārammaṇan ti?*
> *Na h'evaṃ vattabbe – pe –*
> *Taṃ ñāṇaṃ tassa ñāṇassa ārammaṇan ti?*
> *Āmantā.*

100 See KVA I.1: "The opponent assents with '*āmantā*'" (*Paravādī* āmantā *ti paṭijānāti*).
101 KVA V.9: . . . *avisesena sabbasmiṃ paccuppanne ñāṇaṃ atthīti laddhi, seyyathāpi Andhakānaṃ* . . .
102 See previous discussion in 2.2.2.
103 KVA V.9: . . . *khaṇapaccuppanne pi tena bhavitabbaṃ.*
104 KVA V.9: . . . *dvinnaṃ ñāṇānaṃ ekato abhāvā* . . .
105 KVA I.1: Na h'evaṃ vattabbe *ti avajānanā paravādissa.*
106 KVA V.9: *Tattha paṭhamapañhe ten' eva taṃ jānituṃ na sakkā ti paṭikkhepo itarassa.*
107 KVA V.9: *Dutiyapañhe santatiṃ sandhāya paṭiññā tass' eva.*
108 *Visuddhimagga* XIII.111–14: *Paccuppannaṃ nāma tividhaṃ khaṇapaccuppannaṃ santatipaccuppannaṃ addhāpaccuppannañca / tattha uppādaṭhitibhaṅgappattaṃ khaṇapaccuppannaṃ / ekadvesantativārapariyāpannaṃ santatipaccuppannaṃ / . . . ekabhavaparicchinnaṃ pana addhāpaccuppannaṃ nāma. . . .* See Ñāṇamoli 1976: 474 for his English translation.
109 *Visuddhimagga* XIII.113: *dvetayo javanavārā arūpasantati nāmā ti vatvā. . . .*
110 See Sasaki Genjun 1958: 129; Lamotte 1988a: 597.
111 See Shwe Zan Aung and Davids 1972: 134: "Seven moments last the minor apperceptions of the mind; In Path and Abhiññā [direct awareness], the norm is one, so it's divined; Though sometimes many moments to such acts may be assigned" (*Abhidhammatthasangaha* IV.23: sattakkhattuṃ parittāni maggābhiññā sakiṃ matā avasesāni labbhanti javanāni bahūni pi).
112 KVA V.9: . . . *ādini 'ssa lesokāsanivāraṇatthaṃ vuttāni.*
113 KV V.9: *Tena phassena taṃ phassaṃ phusati, tāya vedanāya taṃ vedanaṃ vedeti, tāya saññāya taṃ saññaṃ sañjānāti, tāya cetanāya taṃ cetanaṃ ceteti, tena cittena taṃ cittaṃ cinteti, tena vitakkena taṃ vitakkaṃ vitakketi, tena vicārena taṃ vicāraṃ vicāreti, tāya pītiyā taṃ pītiṃ pīyāyati, tāya satiyā taṃ satiṃ sarati, tāya paññāya taṃ paññaṃ pajānāti?*
114 KVA XVI.4: . . . *pana tathārūpaṃ suttaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipat' eva.*
115 KV V.9: *Tena khaggena taṃ khaggaṃ chindati, tena pharasunā taṃ pharusaṃ tacchati, tāya kuṭhāriyā taṃ kuṭhāriṃ tacchati, tāya vāsiyā taṃ vāsiṃ tacchati, tāya sūciyā taṃ sūciṃ sibbeti, tena aṅgulaggena taṃ aṅgulaggaṃ parāmasati, tena nāsikaggena taṃ nāsikaggaṃ parāmasati, tena matthakena taṃ matthakaṃ*

parāmasati, tena gūthena taṃ gūthaṃ dhovati, tena muttena taṃ muttaṃ dhovati, tena kheḷena taṃ kheḷaṃ dhovati, tena pubbena taṃ pubbaṃ dhovati, tena lohitena taṃ lohitaṃ dhovatīti?

116 KV V.9:

> *Na vattabbaṃ "Paccuppanne ñāṇaṃ atthīti"?*
> *Āmantā.*
> *Nanu sabbe saṃkhāre aniccato diṭṭhe taṃ pi ñāṇaṃ aniccato diṭṭhaṃ hotīti?*
> *Āmantā.*
> *Hañci sabbe saṃkhāre aniccato diṭṭhe taṃ pi ñāṇaṃ aniccato diṭṭhaṃ hoti, tena vata re vattabbe "Paccuppanne ñāṇaṃ atthīti."*

117 KVA V.9: . . . *tattha nayato taṃ ñāṇaṃ diṭṭhaṃ hoti, na ārammaṇato ti adhippāyena paṭiññā sakavādissa. Tasmā evaṃ patiṭṭhāpitā p'assa laddhi appatiṭṭhitā va hoti.* The English translation by Law and Davids (1940) might be based on the Minayeff edition of 1889, where *nayato* reads *na sato*, thus the sentence is rendered as: "The Sakavādin assents in the sense that *that* awareness is seen neither by the conscious act of knowing, nor by the object of awareness" (Law and Davids 1940: 108). But I am following the Jayawickrama critical edition of 1979 and the Japanese translation of Satō and Satō (1933); the latter renders *nayato* as "method" (*rishu* 理趣, Satō and Satō 1933: 321).

118 KVA XVI.4: *Tattha ekasaṅkhārassāpi aniccatāya diṭṭhāya sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā ti avasesesu nayato manasikāro hoti.*

119 KV XVI.4:

> *"Sabbe saṃkhārā anicca ti" yadā paññāya passati,*
> *Atha nibbindati dukkhe esamaggo visuddhiyā.*
> *"Sabbe saṃkhārā dukkhā ti" yadā paññāya passati,*
> *Atha nibbindati dukkhe esamaggo visuddhiyā.*
> *"Sabbe dhammā anattā ti" yadā paññāya passati,*
> *Atha nibbindati dukkhe esamaggo visuddhiyā ti.*

This passage is from the *Theragathā* verses 676–8.

120 KVA XVI.4: *Itaro ārammaṇaṃ katvā na sakkā jānitun ti.* . . .

121 KVA XVI.4: *Evaṃlakkhaṇaṃ cittan ti ñātattā pana tam pi cittaṃ ñātam eva hotīti sandhāya paṭijānāti.*

122 KVA XVI.4: *Atītādīsu aññataraṃ manasikaroto ārammaṇato manasikāro hoti.* How does attention become object? Is it included in those phenomena? If yes, it is a position that the Sakavādin goes against.

123 See KV XVI.4:

> "Are two [parallel] contacts or minds collocated?
> No, that cannot truly be said. . . .
> Are three [parallel] contacts or minds collocated?
> No, that cannot truly be said. . . ."
> (*Dvinnaṃ phassānaṃ – pe – dvinnaṃ cittānaṃ samodhānaṃ hotīti?*
> *Na h'evaṃ vattabbe – pe – . . . .*
> *Tiṇṇaṃ phassānaṃ – pe – tiṇṇaṃ cittānaṃ samodhānaṃ hotīti?*
> *Na h'evaṃ vattabbe – pe –*)

124 KVA XVI.4: Sabbe saṅkhārā *ti ādivacanaṃ nayato dassanaṃ sandhāya* **vuttaṃ,** *na ekakkhaṇe ārammaṇato, tasmā asādhakan ti.*

3

REFUTATION: SARVĀSTIVĀDA

Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma

The works of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma are preserved almost exclusively in Chinese translation. There is little doubt that these works were originally written in Sanskrit, as some of their Sanskrit fragments have been found in recent decades. Geographically, these Abhidharma works were associated with two major areas: Kaśmīra, where the orthodox Vaibhāṣika was established, and Gandhāra, known to the Vaibhāṣikas as the West.

We have very little knowledge about the precise dates of these Abhidarma works except to divide them roughly into three groups in a relative chronological order. This chronological order is decided on the basis of internal textual information, such as textual cross-references and the characteristics of the format or content of each individual text. According to this method, the first and earliest group consists of seven classics in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, namely, *Saṃgītiparyāya, Dharmaskandha, Prajñaptiśāstra, Vijñānakāya, Dhātukāya, Prakaraṇapāda* and *Jñānaprasthāna*. The titles of these works show some degree of resemblance to the seven Sthaviravāda Abhidharma works, i.e., *Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅga, Dhātukathā, Puggalapaññatti, Kathāvatthu, Yamaka* and *Paṭṭhāna*, but the two sets have no real connection. Among the seven Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma classics, the last and latest one is known as "one body", compiled by Kātyāyanīputra in Central India approximately in the first century BC. The other six are known as "six limbs", the first two of which are thought to be the earliest; and their ascribed authors, Mahākauṣṭhila and Śāriputra, were possibly among the disciples of the Buddha himself.[1] Evidence shows that these seven classics were used by Sarvāstivādins in both Kaśmīra and Gandhāra, though they might have used different recensions. For instance, the *Jñānaprasthāna* that was authorized by the Kāsmīri Sarvāstivādins is an abridged version of the *Aṣṭaskandha*, a popular text in Gandhāra.[2]

The second group of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts are known as *vibhāṣās*, which are elaborate commentaries on the *Jñānaprasthāna*. Three *vibhāṣās* are available in Chinese. They are the *Vibhāṣāśāstra* translated by

Saṃghabhadra around 383, the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra translated by Buddhavarman and others between 437 and 439, and MV translated by Xuanzang between 656 and 659. Some scholars view the last two as different translations of the same original.[3] The fact that the second is significantly shorter than the third, considering the difference between 60 and 200 fascicles, is attributed to the abridgment by its translator. Other scholars, however, tend to see them as different recensions of *vibhāṣā*s transmitted among various sub-groups in two different regions. The Kāśmīri Sarvāstivādins took MV as their major work, from which they derived their name Vaibhāṣikas and through which they established themselves as the predominant Sarvāstivāda sub-group. Xuanzang and Paramārtha report that this work was composed 400 or 500 years after the Buddha's death.[4] The *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra, on the other hand, is thought to be associated with the Gāndhārī Sarvāstivādins, though convincing evidence has not yet been provided.[5] The *Vibhāṣāśāstra, the earliest and shortest *vibhāṣā*, is believed to be an early *vibhāṣā* text that was associated with a region other than Kaśmīra. Moreover, recently discovered Sanskrit fragments indicate that there might have been other *vibhāṣā* texts that are not extant today.[6]

The third and final group consists of a series of *hṛdaya* treatises. In contrast to the elaboration of the *vibhāṣā*s, these *hṛdaya* texts attempt to summarize the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma teachings in easily recited and Sūtra-like verses. The earliest *hṛdaya* text was Dharmaśreṣṭhin's *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, which is usually considered to be contemporaneous with or immediately after MV.[7] Upaśānta's *Abhidharmahṛdaya* and Dharmatrāta's *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (SAH) appeared later, and bore more influences from the Vaibhāṣikas, though they were primarily Gāndhārī works. These three *hṛdaya* treatises led to the *Abhidharmakośa*. This work of Vasubandhu is the best-known and most thoroughly studied Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma work. It is extant in its Sanskrit original, in Tibetan translation and in two Chinese translations. It was the subject of numerous commentaries in India, China, Japan and Tibet. In the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *bhāṣya*, Vasubandhu criticizes the orthodox Vaibhāṣikas from the standpoint of the Gāndhārī Sarvāstivādins and, in many cases, he adopts a Sautrāntika position. This criticism eventually provoked a reaction from Saṃghabhadra, a Kāśmīri Vaibhāṣika. In his NA and its abridgment *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā, Saṃghabhadra refutes Vasubandhu so as to restore the orthodox Vaibhāṣika position; hence he was known as a Neo-Vaibhāṣika. In doing so, he quotes all the verses of the *Abhidharmakośa* with only a few modifications, so his works can still be considered *hṛdaya* treatises. Saṃghabhadra's works mark the end of the Chinese collection of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. But in 1937 a Sanskrit manuscript was discovered that carried the tradition a step further. This text, the *Abhidharmadīpa* with auto-commentary the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, is thought to have been composed by a follower of Saṃghabhadra.

While discussing the Sarvāstivāda view on self-cognition, I mainly draw on materials from MV and Saṃghabhadra's NA, both representing an orthodox Vaibhāṣika position. Meanwhile, Vasubandhu's AKBh and Dharmatrāta's SAH also provide some views of the Gāndhārī Sarvāstivādins on this matter. Both authors confirm the views of two pioneer Gāndhārīs, i.e., Vasumitra and Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, as recorded in MV. These scholars from both sub-groups share a common agenda: they attempt to refute self-cognition, though from different angles. On this point, they differ from the Sautrāntikas, who take self-cognition as one of their major doctrines. As far as the issue of self-cognition is concerned, I see a dividing line between the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas. Therefore, I am not inclined simply to call the Gāndhārī Sarvāstivādins the Sautrāntikas as does Willemen et al.[8] On my view, the general name Sarvāstivāda can embrace the Vaibhāṣikas, the Mūlasarvāstivādins, and to some extent the Dārṣṭāntikas, but not those who were separated from the Sarvāstivāda and established themselves as independent schools such as the Sautrāntikas, the Dharmaguptakas or the Mahīśāsakas.

Awareness of single moment

In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the issue of self-cognition is first discussed in Kātyāyanīputra's *Jñānaprasthāna*, where this issue is brought up in the following dialogue on omniscience:

> [Question]: Is there an awareness that knows all *dharmas*?
> Answer: No.
> [Question]: If the [view] that all *dharmas* are no-self is produced by the awareness, what is not known by this awareness?
> Answer: It does not know itself (*svabhāva*), or *dharmas* that are associated (*samprayukta*) and co-existed (*sahabhū*) with it.[9]

The identities of the parties of this dialogue are unclear, although a few possibilities are speculated in its commentary. The dialogue might be a record of a discussion between the master and his disciple, or the opponent could be made up by the author to expose his own views. Most probably, it was an actual debate between the *yuktavādins*, the ones following reason, and the *vibhajyavādins*, those who do not agree with the Vaibhāṣikas.[10] In any case, it is safe to assume that the answer expresses a Sarvāstivāda or, more precisely, a Vaibhāṣika point of view, and that the question is put forward by a certain opponent.

On a Sarvāstivāda view, awareness (*jñāna*) cannot know all *dharmas*. Why? According to MV, it is because "'an awareness' here means 'an awareness of a single moment'".[11] As we have discussed in the last chapter, Mahāsāṃghika and three of its sub-schools, namely, Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravāda and

Kaukkuṭika, hold that awareness can know all *dharmas* in a single moment. But other schools, including Sarvāstivāda, reject such a possibility of instantaneous omniscience. For the Sarvāstivādins, the awareness cannot know all *dharmas* if it is an awareness of a single moment. To reject the possibility of instantaneous omniscience is a consistent position for the Sarvāstivādins, as is stated by Vasubandhu in his AKBh: "We [Sarvāstivādins] do not say that the Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he knows all in a single moment".[12] In his commentary to AKBh, Yaśomitra cites a Sūtra passage to explain the same view:

Revered Gautama! In a meeting house where people gather and sit, I have heard a different story about you, which says that the recluse Gautama speaks thus: "There is neither a recluse nor a brahmin who can know all or see all at one and the same time". Revered Gautama, have you spoken these words?
[The Buddha:] I, sire, remember to have spoken these words: "There is neither a recluse nor a brahmin who at one and the same time can know all or see all".[13]

The opponent in the *Jñānaprasthāna*, however, is not convinced by the view that the awareness is not capable of knowing all *dharmas* in a single moment. When one says that all *dharmas* are no-self, which is a basic tenet of Buddhism, he argues, is there anything else that is not known by our awareness at that moment? As we see, this is similar to the argument associated with "all are impermanent" that we have discussed in the last chapter. The opponent is implying that the awareness must have known all *dharmas* when it produces the view that "all *dharmas* are no-self". The Sarvāstivādins reply that at this moment the awareness, though knowing all other *dharmas*, does not know itself, its associates or co-existents. According to MV, this answer is intended to refute three views held respectively by the Mahāsāṃghikas, the Dharmaguptakas and the Mahīśāsakas. As we have discussed in the last chapter, for the Mahāsāṃghikas the mind and mental activities can apprehend themselves in a single moment. The Dharmaguptakas hold that the mind and mental activities can know their associated mental states. For instance, the awareness can be aware of a feeling. The Mahīśāsakas, on the other hand, insist that the mind and mental activities can know their co-existents (*sahabhū*), e.g., sense organ. We do not have enough evidence to show that the last two schools also committed themselves to the suddenness of knowing the associates (*saṃprayukta*) or co-existents of the mind. But the Sarvāstivāda refutation implies that they were talking about their views in the context of a single moment. The Sarvāstivādins argue against all these schools by saying that, even though it is possible for an awareness to know all other *dharmas*, it cannot know itself, its associates or co-existents at the same moment that it knows these *dharmas*.

The Sarvāstivādins, however, do not deny omniscience when it is limited to the conventional awareness (*saṃvṛtijñāna*), one of the ten awarenesses in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and when multiple moments are applied, as it is said in MV:

> If one asks whether there is an awareness, out of the ten awarenesses, that knows all *dharma*s, the answer is yes. For [the awareness] is meant to be the conventional awareness. . . . As for the conventional awareness, if asking whether it knows all *dharma*s in two moments, the answer is yes. For in the first moment this awareness knows all except itself (*svabhāva*), its associates and co-existents; in the second moment it also knows [its] previous *svabhāva*, associates and co-existents, so the answer is yes.[14]

The doctrine of ten awarenesses was first systematized by Vasumitra in his *Prakaraṇapāda* and later adopted by all Sarvāstivāda scholars. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, awareness is first divided into two main classes: the defiled and the undefiled. The defiled awareness is the conventional awareness (*saṃvṛtijñāna*), which is thus named because it conforms to worldly conventions. It takes all the conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*s as object. The undefiled awareness, again, contains two main classes: awareness of *dharma*s (*dharmajñāna*) and inferential awareness (*anvayajñāna*). The awareness of *dharma*s has the characteristics of four truths in the desire realm for its object. The inferential awareness, on the other hand, has the characteristics of four truths in the material and immaterial realms for its object. When one takes into consideration the distinction of the four truths, the two undefiled awarenesses make up four awarenesses, i.e., awareness of suffering (*duḥkhajñāna*), awareness of origin (*samudayajñāna*), awareness of extinction (*nirodhajñāna*) and awareness of path (*mārgajñāna*). These two awarenesses, fourfold, are transformed into awareness of destruction (*kṣayajñāna*) and awareness of non-birth (*anutpādajñāna*) when one attains liberation. The awareness of destruction is an awareness that suffering caused by one's past *karma*s is completely eliminated; the awareness of non-birth is an awareness that one will not be reborn in the future. Finally, there is the awareness of the minds of others (*paracittajñāna*), which can be both defiled and undefiled.

Among these ten awarenesses, the conventional awareness is peculiar in the sense that it can take all the conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*s as object. But other awarenesses can only contemplate a particular aspect of the Buddhist teaching and do not have the capability of comprehending all *dharma*s. For the conventional awareness to know all *dharma*s, it requires multiple moments. In the first moment, it knows all other *dharma*s except the awareness itself, its associates and co-existents. In the second moment, the awareness also knows the previous awareness, and the associates

or co-existents of this awareness. In this case, the self-cognition of the conventional awareness happens in the next moment of its cognizing other objects. In other words, the mind knows itself through a *reflection* of the past mind. In contrast, the Mahāsāṃghikas hold that the mind can know itself at the same time that it knows other objects because the mind is endowed with a *reflexive* nature. These two views represent two different models of self-cognition: one is reflective, while the other is reflexive. As we shall see throughout this chapter, the Sarvāstivādins, while severely refuting the reflexive model of self-cognition proposed by the Mahāsāṃghikas, actually developed their own reflective model of self-cognition.[15]

The key to understanding this reflective model of self-cognition is that the present awareness can take the previous awareness as object and still consider this previous awareness as *itself*. Those who do not agree with the Sarvāstivāda view of self-cognition attack particularly this point. How can the present mind have something in the past as its object? How is it possible that the past mind is still the "same" mind as the present one? To respond to the first question, the Sarvāstivādins enjoy a privilege because they developed a sophisticated metaphysics of time that admits the existence of the past and the future. For them, the past and the future are as real as the present. Things that pass away into the past do not really perish. Instead, they only change their status. For this reason, the Sarvāstivādins are labeled pan-realists. With regard to how the three times differ from each other, there were four major opinions represented by four Sarvāstivāda masters. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta held that the three times are different because of the trans-formation of mode (*bhāvānyathātva*); Ghoṣaka viewed their difference as a difference of characteristics (*lakṣaṇānyathātva*); Vasumitra claimed there was a difference of state (*avasthānyathātva*); Buddhadeva saw their difference as the process of reciprocity (*anyonyathātva*). Among them the third is considered the orthodox view.[16]

Once the reality of the past and the future is admitted, it is not difficult to understand that present and past minds belong to the same mind continuum. On the other hand, the mind continuum is also possible when the reality of the past and the future is not admitted. For instance, as we saw in the last chapter, Buddhaghosa also talks about the mind continuum, and even imposes it on his opponent, the Andhakas, though he would never commit himself to the pan-realism of the Sarvāstivādins. This mind continuum not only makes the reflective model of self-cognition possible, but also builds a foundation for the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of omniscience. Having rejected the instantaneous omniscience proposed by the Mahāsāṃghikas, the Sarvāstivādins explore a possible gradual model of omniscience by applying mind continuum to the knowledge of all *dharma*s. This is why the Vaibhāṣikas say that omniscience is possible when multiple moments are applied to the conventional awareness. In his AKBh, Vasubandhu says that the Buddha is not called Omniscient because he is capable of knowing everything in one

moment of thought. Instead, his omniscience designates a mind continuum that is capable of knowing everything, just as fire is capable of burning everything through a process of continuous burning. He summarizes his view in the following verse:

> The Omniscient One is like a fire that burns everything through a process (*santāna*) [of burning]. He does not know everything all at once.[17]

This very verse, however, is cited and criticized by Bandhuprabha in his BBU. From a Yogācāra point of view, he says that these are "vain words" because, for the Sarvāstivādins, "a moment of thought can only know the universal characteristic of a part of the *dharma*s".[18] Every particular moment of mind continuum can only know its present object. For the mind continuum to know all, it has to continue in the infinite future. As a result, omniscience becomes only a metaphor.[19] On his view, however, the Buddha is not only metaphorically omniscient, but also actually so, because he has attained the mirror-like awareness (*adarśajñāna*), the first of the four undefiled awarenesses in the Yogācāra system. As we see, the Yogācārins attribute the ability of omniscience to the undefiled awareness. But, in a Sarvāstivāda view, the undefiled awarenesses, from the awareness of *dharma*s to the awareness of the minds of others, do not have the capacity of omniscience because each of them can only take in a particular object. On their view, only the defiled conventional awareness knows all *dharma*s. If this is the case, however, a difficulty for the Sarvāstivādins is that they have to admit that the omniscience of the Buddha is defiled, as is pointed out in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, an early Madhyamaka work ascribed to Nāgārjuna. The text says:

> Each of the undefiled awarenesses has its own specific object and none of them can take all *dharma*s as object. Only the conventional awareness can take all *dharma*s as object. Therefore, omniscience is characterized by defilement.[20]

This Madhyamaka text does not agree that the omniscience of the Buddha is defiled. On its view, "the defiled awareness is provisional, erroneous and powerless, so it should not be able truly to have all *dharma*s as its object".[21] The awareness that truly knows all *dharma*s is the undefiled awareness of thusness (*yathābhūtajñāna*), which is the eleventh awareness in the "Mahāyāna" teaching. This Mahāyānic sense of awareness is so superior to the ten awarenesses as developed by the "Śrāvakas" that "these ten awarenesses are embraced in this awareness of thusness and they all become one awareness, i.e., the undefiled awareness, just as streams from ten directions all become one body when they reach the ocean".[22]

Despite the ideological overtones in this critique of the Śrāvakas, both the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins are trying to restore the actual power of omniscience by returning to a Mahāsāṃghika-like position. However, even taking account of the Mahāyāna criticism of the Sarvāstivādins, it is still important to acknowledge that the Sarvāstivādins hold a strong position in their criticism of the Mahāsāṃghikas. That is, omniscience and self-cognition are impossible in a single moment, but both become possible during the course of multiple moments. This is a key point for the Sarvāstivāda refutation of self-cognition throughout this chapter: The Sarvāstivādins refute self-cognition when it is treated as the awareness of a single moment. Meanwhile, they develop a reflective model of self-cognition, according to which the mind knows itself by reflecting on the previous moment in the mental continuum.

Refutation of self-awareness

The Sarvāstivādins think that neither awareness (*jñāna*) nor consciousness (*vijñāna*) can know itself in a single moment. In the case of awareness, the Vaibhāṣikas refute the self-cognition of awareness, or simply self-awareness, extensively in terms of causality and supportive similes. They also cite other Sarvāstivāda masters such as Vasumitra and Bhadanta Dharmatrāta to argue against self-awareness with regard to a series of epistemological and soteriological issues. Saṃghabhadra proposes further objections to self-awareness from a Neo-Vaibhāṣika point of view.

Causality

The Vaibhāṣikas' first objection to self-awareness has to do with causality. They argue that no awareness can be either a cause or a condition of itself. In MV, the Vaibhāṣikas elaborate a series of reasons to deny the possibility that any awareness in itself (*svabhāva*) can know itself. The text says:

> [Because] there is no causal relation. [To avoid] the fault that there is no difference between the doer and what is done, establisher and what is established, leader and what is led, producer and what is produced, possessor and what is possessed, transformer and what is transformed, perceiver and what is perceived, the one who is aware and what one is aware of, [we hold that] no [awareness] in itself (*svabhāva*) can know itself (*svabhāva*).[23]

This passage is not found in the **Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra* translated by Buddhavarman, which may suggest that it was a view peculiar to the Kāśmīri Vaibhāṣikas. The fact that it is placed at the very beginning of a series of objections to self-awareness, along with the omission of the phrase "some

say", which frequently appears in the following objections, confirms that it was considered to be an orthodox view of the Vaibhāṣikas.

The Sarvāstivādins, also known as Hetuvādins ("causalists"), expounded a sophisticated theory of causality. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, all things are explained as coming into existence by means of a set of six causes (*hetu*) and a set of four conditions (*pratyaya*). Generally speaking, cause is the main condition, while condition is the sub-cause. Stcherbatsky, however, points out that it is hard to distinguish between cause and condition. He observes that "the list of six causes seems to be a later doctrine which came to graft itself upon the original system of four conditions".[24] His observation is supported by the following statement in MV: "The six causes are not mentioned in the Sūtras. The Sūtras only say that there are four conditions".[25] Based on the available sources, we know that Devaśarman, the author of the *Vijñānakāya*, was the first to systematize four conditions to one of the main doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins. He preceded Kātyāyanīputra, who first systematically discussed six causes in his *Jñānaprasthāna*.[26] Evidence shows that the Yogācārins shared the doctrine of four conditions with the Sarvāstivādins and that the Sautrāntikas rejected the simultaneous cause (*sahabhūhetu*), one of the six causes.[27]

The six causes are to be understood in the following way. The associated cause (*samprayuktakahetu*) refers only to the mind and mental activities in the sense that the mind, although a separate *dharma*, never appears alone, but always in the company of other mental activities, such as feeling, ideation and volition. The simultaneous cause (*sahabhūhetu*) refers to the conditioned *dharma*s in the sense that these *dharma*s, although assumed to be separate *dharma*s, never appear alone without secondary *dharma*s. The homogeneous cause (*sabhāgahetu*) has a natural fruition (*niṣyandaphala*) and is intended to explain the sequence of homogeneous moments that suggests the idea of duration and stability in all *dharma*s. The pervasive cause (*sarvatragahetu*) refers to the passions and habitual thoughts of ordinary people (*pṛthagjana*). The cause of maturation (*vipākahetu*) refers to the fact that every deed has a good or bad moral character. Finally, the efficient cause (*kāraṇahetu*) is the broadest type of cause, for "efficient" (*kāraṇa*) means "not to hinder" or "to have something done".[28] It is a supplementary cause that is unhindered to the production of effect.[29] In the case of eye-consciousness, for instance, the efficient causes include eyes, visual object, the associates and co-existents of the eye-consciousness; ears, sound, auditory consciousness; nose, smell, olfactory consciousness; tongue, taste, gustatory consciousness; body, contact, bodily consciousness; mind, *dharma*, mental consciousness; all material and immaterial, defiled and undefiled *dharma*s, and all conditioned and unconditioned existents.

The efficient cause is broad enough to cover almost all *dharma*s. However, there are exceptions. A conditioned existent cannot be the efficient cause of the unconditioned, nor can an unconditioned existent be the efficient cause

of another unconditioned existent; and, most important, a thing cannot be the efficient cause of itself.[30] Why can a thing not be an efficient cause of itself? To understand this, it is helpful to refer to the following passage in MV:

> If a thing in itself (*svabhāva*) were the efficient cause of itself, then there would be no causal difference between cause and effect, the doer and what is done, producer and what is produced, leader and what is led, perceiver and what is perceived, transformer and what is transformed, the one who is continuous and what is continued. However, they do have difference, therefore a thing in itself cannot be the efficient cause of itself.[31]

As we see, this sounds similar to the passage cited in the beginning of the section. The Vaibhāṣikas are using the same argument to refute the possibility of self-awareness and also of a thing being an efficient cause of itself. The key to this argument is that nothing can act on itself. If the awareness is to know itself, then it has to be in a causal relation with itself. Once it is in a causal relationship, there must be a difference between cause and effect. However, nothing can be different from itself, so it is impossible for anything, including awareness, to be in any type of causal relation with itself. As a result, the awareness cannot be the efficient cause of itself, nor can it know itself. Moreover, it is worth noting that terms such as "doer", "establisher", "leader", "producer", "possessor", "transformer", "perceiver" and "the one who is aware or continuous" serve as descriptions of awareness. These terms indicate how awareness is understood by the Vaibhāṣikas. The fact that they are paired with what is done and so forth also suggests a dualistic structure between the awareness and its object, which is the basis for the refutation of self-awareness in terms of epistemology later in the chapter.

The four conditions are defined in the following way. The immediately contiguous condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) refers to the immediately preceding moment in the stream of awareness. The objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) includes all that can be an object of cognition. The causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) is the main condition. The sovereign condition (*adhipatipratyaya*) includes all *dharma*s that are supplementary or unhindered to the production of effect. The category of the sovereign condition is as broad as the efficient cause to cover all *dharma*s except the thing in itself.[32] In the case of visual sensation, for instance, eye-consciousness and eyes are the causal condition; the previous vision is the immediately contiguous condition; what is seen is the objective condition; light and so forth are the sovereign condition. Now, is this visual sensation a condition for itself? No. On the Vaibhāṣika view, a thing cannot act as any type of condition for itself, as is stated in MV:

Some say: [Awareness] in itself does not benefit or damage itself, nor does it nurture or harm itself, establish or spoil itself, increase or decrease itself, gather or scatter itself. It is not the causal or immediately contiguous condition of itself, nor is it the objective or sovereign condition of itself. All *dharmas* in themselves cannot observe themselves. Instead they can only act as conditions of others (*parabhāva*), thus [awareness] in itself does not know itself.[33]

Here the phrase "some say" indicates that this is an alternative opinion of, not necessarily the Vaibhāṣikas, but possibly some other scholars within the Sarvāstivāda school. As we see, however, it is consistent with the earlier Vaibhāṣika refutation of self-awareness. This objection is based on a general assertion that a thing can only be a condition for something else, for it is observed that it does not benefit or damage, nurture or harm, establish or spoil, increase or decrease, gather or scatter itself. In a word, awareness is neither a condition nor a cause of itself.

In his NA, Saṃghabhadra argues further along this line. On his view, the reason that a thing cannot be a condition for itself is "because no *dharma* is dependent on itself (*svabhāva*)". He explains: "This means that the arising of a *dharma* is dependent on the proper (*yathāyogam*) [condition] out of the four conditions. If [the condition] is absent, the *dharma* will not arise. If it is not absent, the *dharma* will arise, which establishes the condition as a condition. It is never the case that a *dharma* lacks itself (*svabhāva*). Therefore, it is absurd to say that [a *dharma*] will not arise without the presence of itself. How can [a thing in itself] be a condition to depend on"?[34] A certain opponent proposes that "a thing in itself (*svabhāva*) should be like space and can be established as a condition, for it is unhindered [to itself]".[35] Saṃghabhadra thinks that this does not make sense because space is also dependent on other conditioned existents. It is established by others rather than its own. This confirms the rule that a thing can only be a condition of something else. For this reason, he also thinks that self-awareness is impossible.

The similes

In addition to the objection to self-awareness in terms of causality, the Vaibhāṣikas also refute it with supportive examples, as is stated in MV:

What we see in the world is the following: The finger-tip cannot touch itself; the knife-blade cannot cut itself; the pupil cannot see itself; a strong man cannot carry himself. Thus [awareness] in itself cannot know itself.[36]

Among these examples, the finger-tip and the knife-blade were mentioned by the Theravādins in the last chapter. The strong man and the pupil

were also popularly used in the later Madhyamaka refutation of self-cognition. These similes are, again, highly selective, for they only support the Vaibhāṣikas' position. The Mahāsāṃghikas, on the other hand, can draw on examples such as the lamp to support the idea of self-cognition. How to deal with this conflict between different similes? According to the Vaibhāṣika view, first of all, these similes are not essential to the argument for or against self-awareness. Unlike the Mahāsāṃghikas, who rely solely on supportive examples in their argument for self-cognition, the Vaibhāṣikas think that the teachings of the Buddha as recorded in the Sūtra, Vinaya and Ahbidharma are more important, and that "one should not dispute the teachings of the Sage [i.e., the Buddha] with worldly similes".[37] Hence the Vaibhāṣikas consider their argument with similes to be peripheral to their main argument about causality.

In the case of the lamp, the Vaibhāṣikas do not think it serves the purpose of illustrating the theory of self-awareness. First, the lamp is made of material particles, but awareness is not. The lamp has no senses, nor can it take anything as object, but awareness does. Awareness is a faculty of a sentient being, but a lamp is not. Given these fundamental differences, a lamp cannot serve as a simile of awareness. Second, and more important, it is self-contradictory to say that a lamp illumines itself. If a lamp has illumination as its nature, then it does not have to be illumined again. If it has to be illumined, then it is not endowed with the nature of illumination because only something dark needs to be illumined. But if it is not of the nature to illuminate ($\sqrt{d\bar{\imath}p}$) it cannot be called lamp (*pradīpa*). Thus, one cannot even say that the lamp illumines itself in the first place, much less use this example to prove self-cognition.

In his NA, Saṃghabhadra offers even stronger arguments against the simile of the lamp. He mentions the similes of the knife-blade, the finger-tip, the shoulder that cannot carry itself, as well as the lamp, but he does not think that there is a necessary correlation between lamp and awareness. He asks: "Why does one believe that awareness functions like a lamp that illumines rather than like a knife that cuts? Why does one believe that the lamp rather than the knife and so forth is a suitable simile for the awareness"?[38] So it is quite weak to use the simile of the lamp to prove self-cognition. If one insists on using the analogy of the lamp, Saṃghabhadra points out that the lamp does not really have a substantial nature of illumination. The lamp (*pradīpa*) is thus named because it enables one to see the difference among things. It is called illumination (*prakāśa*) because it causes eye-consciousness to arise. It is called darkness-expeller (*tamovadha*) because the darkness is opposed to it. All these names are provisional, and there exists no independent substance of illumination. For instance, if a jar is seen owing to the presence of a lamp, then we say that the jar is illumined by the lamp. In this case, what happened is simply that a combination of factors such as jar, lamp, eyes and light have been brought together to

produce a result. We cannot find an independent thing called illumination. If the lamp does not have the nature of illumination, how can it illumine itself? Moreover, even if we admit that the lamp has the nature of illumination, it is not true that the lamp can illumine both itself and others; for this would mean that fire can burn both itself and others owing to its burning nature, and that darkness can prevent one from seeing the darkness itself and other things. Saṃghabhadra thinks that this is not the case for fire or darkness, so the lamp cannot act this way, either.

Still, in the case of the jar, Saṃghabhadra argues: Even though it is conventionally true that the jar is illumined by the lamp, we cannot say that the lamp can be illumined as if it is a jar. A jar in the dark cannot be perceived because the darkness prevents one from seeing it. With the presence of the lamp, the darkness is expelled, the perception of the jar arises, and the jar is seen. Thus, we say that the jar is illumined by the lamp. In the case of the lamp, however, it is self-contradictory to say that "a lamp is in the dark", because it is the same as saying "the light is *in* the dark", which would imply that light can co-exist with darkness. As a matter of fact, the very nature of light or lamp is to expel darkness, so darkness cannot exist in the light or the lamp. Therefore, even though it is observed that darkness is expelled when the lamp is present, we cannot say that the lamp is illumined.

Saṃghabhadra's argument echoes the famous lamp argument of Nāgārjuna. In his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK), Nāgārjuna argues against a presumably Mahāsāṃghika view that "a lamp can illumine both itself and others".[39] First of all, he points out that "there is no darkness in the lamp, nor in the place where it stands",[40] because it is self-contradictory to say that darkness is in light. If there is no darkness in the lamp, one should not say that the lamp can be illumined by itself because "illumination is to destroy darkness".[41] There is no light before the lamp is lit because there is only darkness, and there is no darkness after the lamp is lit because darkness and light cannot co-exist with each other. One may argue, however, that at the very moment when the lamp is lit it should be able to illumine both itself and others.[42] Nāgārjuna replies, at that moment the flame is not bright enough to reach the darkness so as to expel it. One may further argue that the lamp can expel darkness even though it cannot reach it. Nāgārjuna says: "If darkness can be expelled by a lamp even though [the lamp] does not reach [the dark], then the lamp should be able to expel darkness everywhere while it is at this very place".[43] This is because the darkness in other places, like the darkness around the lamp, is unreachable by the flame. If the darkness around the lamp can be expelled by the flame, then it is logical to assume that the darkness all over the world can be destroyed by this single flame. This is absurd. So the lamp cannot illumine itself. Moreover, Nāgārjuna argues, "if the lamp can illumine both itself and others, then the darkness would have to conceal both itself and others".[44] But it is not the

case that darkness conceals both itself and others, so it is not reasonable to assume that the lamp can illumine both itself and others.

Although these Sarvāstivāda and Madhyamaka arguments sound convincing, those who support the Mahāsāṃghika position can still find their way around the analogy of the lamp to argue for self-cognition. In his BBU, for instance, Bandhuprabha argues for self-cognition with the simile of the lamp. When he is asked how to know that lamps illumine themselves, Bandhuprabha answers: "One can directly perceive the absence of darkness and the apparent luminosity [in lamps]. If they did not illumine themselves, they would be enveloped in darkness, and would not be directly perceptible. Therefore, I know that lamps illumine themselves".[45] The opponent argues that lamps are not in the dark, so they do not have to be illumined. Bandhuprabha responds with the following argument:

> Things like a jar or clothes are not darkness in their essence, but when they are not illumined by lamps their edges (*anta*) are enveloped in darkness and are not directly perceptible. When lamps illumine them, those lamps expel the darkness on their edges and cause them to be directly perceived. And so we say that they are illumined. It is just the same with lamps. When their nature [of being luminous] arises, the darkness on their edges is expelled, and they become directly perceptible. Thus we say that they illumine themselves.[46]

This argument is interesting in the sense that it admits a border between light and darkness, which is the edge of an object. Darkness cannot reach inside the body of the object. When there is light, it first illumines the surface of the object, then expands its border up to the point that it can reach depending on the brightness of the light. Thus, we say that darkness is expelled and the object is illumined. This analysis is applicable to any type of object including a jar, clothes or a lamp. In the case of the lamp, we can say that the lamp illumines itself because the light comes from the lamp itself. This analysis, in my view, is empirically reasonable and also avoids the logical difficulties that Nāgārjuna has pointed out.

Epistemology

The refutations of self-awareness in terms of causality and supportive similes reflect an orthodox Vaibhāṣika view. In MV, the Vaibhāṣikas also cite two other authorities, namely, Vasumitra and Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, for more arguments against self-awareness. These two figures, together with Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva, were considered to be the four authoritative Sarvāstivāda masters in MV. But their positions differ from one another, as well as from the position of the Vaibhāṣikas who composed the MV. Among them,

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva represented the Dārṣṭāntika, an early form of Sautrāntika. Vasumitra and Ghoṣaka were both Sarvāstivāda scholars from Gandhāra, located in the west of Kaśmīra where the orthodox Vaibhāṣika was established. Hence they are sometimes referred to as western or foreign masters in MV.[47] Though a foreign master, Vasumitra was regarded highly by the Vaibhāṣikas, and most of his views were adopted by them without modification. Vasumitra gives clear definitions and attempts to systematize Sarvāstivāda doctrines. In the current case, he systematically formulates ten arguments against self-awareness. These arguments can be roughly divided into two groups. The first group is epistemologically oriented, while the second deals with relevant soteriological issues.

In terms of epistemology, we have already seen that the Vaibhāṣikas maintain a dualistic structure of perceiver and the perceived when they insist on a broader causal relation between the two. It makes sense to consider epistemological issues when discussing self-awareness, for *jñāna*, the Sanskrit word for awareness, literally means knowing or knowledge. When knowledge is the topic of discussion, it becomes necessary to maintain a dualistic structure between knower and the known. This is explained by the following dialogue from MV:

> Question: Why is awareness thus named?
> Answer: Because it can know the knowable, it is named awareness.
> Question: Why is the knowable thus named?
> Answer: Because it is known by awareness, it is named the knowable.
> . . . Awareness and the knowable are established as a pair. So there is no awareness that does not know the knowable, and there is no knowable that is not known by awareness. If there is no awareness, there is no knowable, and if there is no knowable, there is no awareness.[48]

Vasumitra agrees that the dualistic structure is essential as far as the epistemological issues are concerned. In this respect, he denies the possibility of self-awareness for the following reason: "If [awareness] in itself (*svabhāva*) knows itself (*svabhāva*), the following cannot be established: grasper and the grasped, knower and the known, the one who is aware and what it is aware of, object and that which possesses object, image and object of cognition, senses and object of senses, and so forth".[49] In the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra* translated by Buddhavarman, only the first two pairs are mentioned: grasper and the grasped, knower and the known. This may suggest that the other pairs were added to the text later by the Vaibhāṣikas. In any case, this passage introduces several important concepts. The most interesting one is the concept of image (*ākāra* or *pracāra*).[50] It is well known that the concept of image was proposed by the Sautrāntikas and Buddhist logicians as a key factor in cognition. For this reason, they were called Sākāravādins. Actually, this concept has its origin in the meditative practice on the various aspects

or images of the four noble truths in early Buddhism. For the Sarvāstivādins, "image" refers to a reflection of object, as it is defined in MV: "Image refers to that which acts as a reflection (*pratisaṃkhyāna*) of the characteristics of the object".[51] In his commentary on AKBh, Puguang explains this definition in the following way:

> "Image" means that the mind and mental activities, with their tranquil nature, simply face toward the present object without being attentive, spontaneously letting go, then there will appear images and reflections [of the object], just as those appear in the clear water and bright mirror.[52]

The Sarvāstivādins understand an image to be a reflection of an external object, which is a real existent. On this point, they differ from the Sautrāntikas, who hold that the existence of the external object can only be inferred from this internal image, and from the Yogācārins, who consider the external object to be an illusory product of the immanent image. For the Sarvāstivādins, both the image and the object of cognition are real, so they are paired to indicate the dichotomy of subject and object. The other two pairs, namely, the object and that which possesses the object, the senses and the objects of senses, indicate the same dichotomy but with different emphasis. The former reflects an objective perspective, while the latter reflects a subjective perspective. The dichotomy of subject and object is reinforced by Vasumitra's objection to self-awareness that awareness is not an object. He says:

> Why does [awareness] in itself (*svabhāva*) not know itself (*svabhāva*)? Because it is not of the objective realm.[53]

The "objective realm" (*jing jie* 境界) is not frequently used in MV. Besides the above quotation, it appears only when the interdependence between subject and the objective realm is explained, where the objective realm and object are used interchangeably.[54] In this objection, Vasumitra is actually saying that awareness is not an object, so it is impossible for the awareness to know itself. On my view, this is the most clear and effective refutation of self-awareness in terms of epistemology. It reflects Vasumitra's style of clear definition, his conceptual coherence and his fondness for systematization. Examining MV carefully, though, I find that Vasumitra contradicts the Vaibhāṣikas on this point. When discussing which have a greater number, awarenesses or objects, the Vaibhāṣikas explicitly say: "Awareness can also be an object. . . . Because the associates and co-existents of the awareness and the awareness itself can all be an object".[55] For this reason, we always have a greater number of objects than awarenesses. This contradiction may indicate a difference between Sarvāstivāda masters in Kaśmīra and Gandhāra.

Vasubandhu, another Gāndhārī Sarvāstivādin, follows Vasumitra closely at this point. In his AKBh, Vasubandhu refutes self-awareness with a single statement: "There must be a difference between the object and that which possesses the object".[56] "That which possesses an object" (viṣayin) refers to the subject or awareness. Owing to the fundamental difference between the subject and the object, the conventional awareness cannot know itself (svabhāva), which, together with dharmas that are associated or co-exist with the awareness, is called the self-complex (svakalāpa) of awareness by Vasubandhu. As we see, Vasubandhu's view is closer to that of Vasumitra than to the views of any other Sarvāstivāda masters. This may be because of their shared background in Gāndhārī Sarvāstivāda.

For Vasumitra, subject and object are two independent entities. Cognition is possible only when the two join together. Neither of them can bring about the cognition alone. If awareness, as a subject, knows itself, then it would mean that a cognition arises from only one cause – the awareness itself. This view is non-Buddhistic, for it is against the doctrine of dependent origination.[57] With this concern in mind, Vasumitra puts forward the following objection to self-awareness:

> If [awareness] in itself knows itself, then the World Honored One would not establish [the doctrine] that six consciousnesses arise from two conditions, according to which eye-consciousness arises from eyes and visual objects, mental consciousness from the mind and dharma, and so forth.[58]

The doctrine that consciousness arises from the conditions of sense organ and sensory object has its source in early Buddhism.[59] According to this doctrine, consciousness is only a secondary product of the sense organ and object. The sense organ plays a key role in the process of cognition. This doctrine is important for the Sarvāstivādins in particular because it confirms their view that eyes, rather than eye-consciousness, see. With regard to the agent of sight, different opinions are reported in MV. One possibility is to say that eye-consciousness sees (the opinion ascribed to Bhadanta Dharmatrāta); another is to say that wisdom associated with eye-consciousness sees (the opinion ascribed to Ghoṣaka);[60] a third option is to say that a combination of eyes and eye-consciousness sees (the position of the Dārṣṭāntikas); finally, it is possible to say that one eye sees (the position of the Vātsīputrīyas). In contrast to all these views, the Vaibhāṣikas hold that "two eyes see".[61]

Although eyes or sense organs are the most important factor in cognizing an object, it is impossible to have a cognition without the combination of three factors, namely, sense organ, object and consciousness. In the case of cognizing the awareness itself, however, we cannot find all the three factors, let alone the combination of the three. Vasumitra refutes self-awareness again from this perspective:

If [awareness] in itself knows itself, then the World Honored One
would not establish the coming together of three factors and contact.
As it is said [in the Sūtra], from the conditions of eyes and visual
objects there arises eye-consciousness, and along with the coming
together of the three there is contact and so forth.[62]

The doctrine that contact, feeling, ideation and volition arise from the coming together of three factors, namely, sense organ, sensory object and consciousness, also has its source in early Buddhism.[63] This doctrine is concerned with the mechanism by which a cognition comes about. For the Sarvāstivādins, cognition is only possible when these three factors are available and join together. Without any one of them, the cognition cannot take place. The self-cognition of the awareness, however, only possesses one factor, namely, the consciousness, hence it is an impossible cognition. Moreover, the Sarvāstivādins dispute with the Sautrāntikas on whether contact is identical to the coming together of the three factors. The Sautrāntikas view contact as nothing more than the coming together of sense organ, sensory object and consciousness. The Sarvāstivādins, on the other hand, insist that contact is an independent mental activity associated with the mind and simultaneous with feeling, ideation and volition.[64] We shall discuss this issue more later.

To summarize, as far as epistemological issues are concerned, Vasumitra refutes self-awareness by saying that awareness is not an object, and that to make a cognition possible the conditions of sense organ and sensory object must be present and these two conditions must come together with consciousness. Since the self-cognition of awareness does not meet these criteria, it cannot be a cognition. Those who insist on the possibility of self-awareness also make the mistake of thinking that, as is phrased by Kuiji, "consciousness alone can also give rise to consciousness",[65] which violates the basic Buddhist tenet of dependent origination.

Soteriology

Vasumitra's other objections to self-awareness are concerned with soteriological issues including wrong views, evil mind, four mindfulnesses, awareness of four truths, memories of previous lives, and awareness of the minds of others. He argues, first of all, that if awareness knows itself there would be no wrong view arising from this awareness. If a wrong view can view itself as wrong, then it becomes a right view. However, the Buddha does not deny the existence of wrong views, so it is unreasonable to accept the existence of self-awareness. He says:

If [awareness] in itself knows itself, the World Honored One would
not admit the existence of wrong views. If a wrong view can know

itself as wrong, then it becomes a right view. This is to say that if the wrong view can observe itself as wrong, then it should be called a right view rather than a wrong view.[66]

In the PS, Dignāga faces a similar charge from an opponent who asks whether the awareness of conceptual construction (*kalpanā-jñāna*) should be considered perception, which by definition is devoid of conceptual construction. Dignāga replies that the awareness of conceptual construction is not perception when it is directed toward an object, but it is devoid of conceptual construction when it is internally aware of itself.[67] Vasumitra goes on to reject self-awareness by formulating a similar argument concerning evil mind. He says:

> Again, if [awareness] in itself knows itself, it would not be established that all evil minds throughout the body are not good, for it is not evil to apprehend [these minds] themselves.[68]

In his commentary to VMS, Kuiji explains this argument in the following way: "Knowing the mind itself as not good is a right awareness because it is not evil".[69] This argument implies an assumption that all minds are defiled or evil, a view shared by the majority of Buddhist sectarian schools except the Mahāsāṃghikas who hold that the nature of mind itself is pure.[70]

The second soteriological issue under consideration is related to the practice of four mindfulnesses and the realization of four truths. Vasumitra argues:

> If [awareness] in itself knows itself, then there would be no difference between the four mindfulnesses (*smṛty-upasthānāni*). The mindfulness of body would be the mindfulness of *dharma*, the mindfulness of mind would be the mindfulness of *dharma*, and so forth. Again, if [awareness] in itself knows itself, then there would be no difference between the awarenesses of four noble truths. The awareness of suffering would be the awareness of path, the awareness of cessation would be the awareness of path, and so forth.[71]

According to the Sarvāstivāda view, the four mindfulnesses and four truths should be practiced or realized gradually because they are different from one another. As a result, hierarchical stages are built to indicate different levels of attainment. The Mahāsāṃghikas, on the other hand, propose a view that one can realize four truths and practice four mindfulnesses at one and the same time when one has entered into the stage of direct realization (*abhisamaya*). As we have discussed in the last chapter, this view is the basis for the Mahāsāṃghika doctrines of omniscience and self-cognition, because this concept of direct realization makes it possible for an awareness to know all *dharma*s, including awareness itself, all at once. The fundamental position

of the Sarvāstivadins, however, is that one cannot know all *dharmas* simultaneously. To know awareness itself, one has to wait until the second moment in the mind continuum. The sequence in this continuum is also crucial in the practice of four mindfulnesses and realization of four truths, hence self-awareness in a single moment is not admissible.

The third soteriological issue has to do with memories of previous lives, one of the six supernatural powers that can be attained even by ordinary people through proper training. Vasumitra says:

> If [awareness] in itself knows itself, then the awareness of memories
> of previous lives (*pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna*) would not exist. For
> [in that case] this awareness is knowing things of the present.[72]

Those who become aware of memories of previous lives can remember their previous deeds in the realms of desire and matter. This awareness can only take things of the past as object. It cannot know anything of the present. However, if we suppose that this awareness also knows itself, then it is knowing a thing of the present – the awareness itself. This contradicts the definition of this very awareness – that which remembers *previous* lives. So Vasumitra says that this awareness would not exist if self-awareness is possible. On the other hand, if one still accepts the awareness of memories of previous lives as one of the supernatural powers, one has to reject self-awareness.

Finally, Vasumitra is concerned with the awareness of the minds of others, one of the ten awarenesses in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Those who possess this awareness gain the power to know the minds of others, which is considered to be another supernatural power. He says:

> If [awareness] in itself knows itself, then the awareness of the minds
> of others would not exist. For [in that case] this awareness would
> also know its own mental activities.[73]

The awareness of the minds of others can be attained through the practice of four meditations, which belong to the material realm. This awareness can know the present minds of others in the realms of desire, matter and the unconditioned. However, with the awareness of the minds of others, one cannot know the past or future minds of others, nor the minds of those who are in a higher stage of attainment than oneself. Most important, this awareness cannot know *itself* because it contradicts its very nature – the awareness of the minds of *others*.

A problem here, however, is that, if the awareness of the minds of others is attained through meditation, how is it possible that one does not know one's own mind in the meditation? For meditation, as it is generally understood, is a practice of self-observation and self-scrutiny. This problem

is discussed in MV, and the answer given by the Vaibhāṣikas is: "In the practice to attain the awareness of the minds of others, one can also know one's own continuum (*saṃtati*). But one only knows the continuum of others when one has accomplished [this awareness]".[74] The continuum here refers to the mind continuum of one's own or others. In MV, more restrictions are applied to this awareness: "The awareness of the minds of others can only take the *minds* of others, but not the object or image of these minds, as object".[75] The reason is that one's own mind can be the object of another mind or it may become part of the image possessed by another mind. In both cases, "there is a fault of self-knowledge if one takes the object or image of another mind as object".[76] Self-knowledge, again, contradicts the very nature of the awareness of the minds of others. So we face a dilemma: there can be no awareness of the minds of others if awareness knows itself, and there can be no self-awareness if there is awareness of the minds of others.

Self and Other

The refutation of self-awareness in terms of the relationship of self-nature (*svabhāva*) and other-nature (*parabhāva*) is ascribed to a certain Bhadanta, "the great virtuous one". In the context of MV, this is usually a respectful title for Dharmatrāta, a pioneer Dārṣṭāntika and one of the four authorities cited by the Vaibhāṣikas.[77] As we have discussed previously, the Vaibhāṣikas hold that a thing in itself or self-nature (*svabhāva*) has to be in a causal relation with something else or other-nature (*parabhāva*) because of the rule of dependent origination. Dharmatrāta, however, is not as concerned with the ontological status of these natures as the Vaibhāṣikas or Mādhyamikas are.[78] Instead, he deals with the two natures from an epistemological perspective. In this respect, he follows closely Vasumitra's last objection to self-awareness in terms of the awareness of the minds of others. The only difference is that Bhadanta Dharmatrāta expands the knowledge of the minds of others or oneself into the knowledge of self-nature or other-nature. He faces directly the dilemma that one knows either oneself or others. He argues:

> If [awareness] in itself or self-nature (*svabhāva*) knows itself, then other-nature would not be known. For [the other-nature] is transformed by the self-nature. If self-nature knows other-nature, then it would not know itself. For [the self-nature] is transformed by the other-nature.[79]

One may believe that the mind can know both self-nature and other-nature as the Mahāsāṃghikas do. If that is the case, Bhatanta Dharmatrāta questions, how does one know both of them? Does one know other-nature in the same way that one knows self-nature? Or does one know self-nature

in the same way that one knows other-nature? "If one knows self-nature as self-nature and other-nature also as self-nature, then it is right to know self-nature as self-nature, but wrong to know other-nature as self-nature".[80] For the same reason, if one knows other-nature as other-nature and self-nature also as other-nature, then it is right to know other-nature as other-nature, but wrong to know self-nature as other-nature. In both cases, there is a fault that no difference is found between right and wrong views.

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta further argues, "if one knows self-nature as self-nature and other-nature as other-nature at one and the same time, then an awareness has two cognitive functions. If cognitive functions are different, their substances would also be different. If substances are different, then they would not be the same awareness".[81] As we see, if one follows the Mahāsāṃghika assumption that the mind knows both itself and others at one and the same time, a logical consequence is that two minds or awarenesses function simultaneously. It is not surprising for the Mahāsāṃghikas to accept both the view of self-cognition and the view that two minds function simultaneously. For Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, however, it is unreasonable to believe that two minds can function simultaneously. His view, as quoted in MV, is that "the combination that gives rise to a *dharma* is unique, and one combination cannot produce two results, so there is only one mind in each moment".[82] Moreover, from a soteriological perspective, the situation would get out of control if two minds arose simultaneously since even one mind is hard to control, let alone two minds. To avoid the fault that two minds arise in one moment, Bhadanta Dharmatrāta says, one has to reject self-awareness.

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta's argument against self-awareness in terms of the knowledge of self-nature and other-nature is found, curiously, well summarized in SAH, a work by an author also named Dharmatrāta. La Vallée Poussin has identified the two Dharmatrātas as the same person.[83] But it seems improbable that a master who was quoted extensively in MV is in turn the author of a work that belongs to a group of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts attempting to summarize the magnificent MV. As is generally agreed, there is about 200 years' difference between the two Dharmatrātas. The former lived around the second century, while the latter lived around the fourth century.[84] But we do find some astonishing coincidences in the thoughts of the two masters. La Vallée Poussin (1988–90: 32) has noticed their shared view on the negation of non-representative matter (*avijñapti-rūpa*). Their denial of self-awareness in a similar way is also a good example of such a coincidence. In SAH, self-awareness is denied for the following reasons:

> When there arises an awareness that knows that all *dharma*s are empty or no-self, it cannot know its own self-nature (*svabhāva*) because it does not look upon itself. It is like a finger-tip that does not touch itself. Moreover, another reason is that there are not

two determinations. There cannot be two determinations in one
awareness: knowing oneself and knowing another.[85]

The second reason here is a nice summary of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta's
argument as quoted in MV. This passage indicates even more clearly that he
is not concerned with the self-nature or other-nature *per se*, but with the
knowledge of both together: "knowing oneself and knowing another". For
the author of SAH, knowing oneself and knowing another are two different
"determinations". In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, determination (*niścitatva*)[86]
is a synonym of *jñāna*, knowledge or awareness, because it denotes the very
function of awareness toward its object, as it is said in SAH: "Awareness
means determination; apprehension is to differentiate".[87] In MV, it even
states that the ten awarenesses are actually only one awareness, i.e., the
determinative awareness, "because determination means the same as
awareness".[88] The determination here is also similar to the cognitive function
in the above quotation from MV. In both cases, the key point is that there
are not two determinations or cognitive functions in one awareness. Because
two determinative or cognitive functions presuppose two substances, and
two substances actually mean two awarenesses instead of one. To understand
this argument, it is important to know that the presumption here is that a
mind as substance can only have one function. This view has deviated from
the orthodox Sarvāstivāda doctrine that the mind can accompany all its
associated mental activities, and that the mind as a substance can have as
many functions as manifested in its mental activities. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta
develops a model that minds arise successively, according to which the mind
and mental activities, though different in their essence, have to arise one
after another. So there is only one mind or mental activity at a particular
moment, and no two can function simultaneously. The later Dārṣṭāntikas
such as Buddhadeva even deny the priority that the mind enjoys and hold
that mental activities in their essence are also minds. Each mental activity or
function is a particular mind or substance, so it is absurd to say that one
awareness has two cognitive or determinative functions.

The author of SAH also refutes self-awareness with the simile of the
finger-tip that does not touch itself, which, in his view, is an example of the
awareness that does not look upon itself. This refutation, as we have discussed
previously, is shared by many schools and scholars, but it is interesting to
note that, among various arguments to refute self-awareness as developed in
the Sarvāstivāda school, he picks this one as the most important argument
against self-awareness. This reveals his Dārṣṭāntika tendency, which is famous
for using examples or similes to illustrate Buddhist doctrines.

The similarities between the thought of the two Dharmatrātas may
be because the later Dharmatrāta voluntarily followed the earlier one, as
is hinted by Guṇavarman, who translated SAH into Chinese: "This

Dharmatrāta views the Dharmatrāta of former time as an authority".[89] In most cases, however, the later Dharmatrāta adhered closely to views of Vasumitra and attempted to restore the Sarvāstivāda teachings from the influence of the Dārṣṭāntikas.[90] In the case of self-awareness, both Dharmatrātas share the position of the Vaibhāṣikas and Vasumitra, though they have shown some Dārṣṭāntika tendencies. The later Sautrāntikas, while still following the two fundamental principles as laid out by two Dharmatrātas, i.e., not to go against the similes such as the finger-tip and no two functions in one awareness, develop their own theory of self-cognition, which is different from the self-cognition in both of their predecessors, the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins.

The Particular and the Universal

We have already discussed some of Saṃghabhadra's views in previous sections. These views indicate that he follows closely the Vaibhāṣikas in refuting self-awareness in terms of causality and supportive similes. In both cases, he offers some further arguments to reinforce the Vaibhāṣika position. In the *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā*, an abridgment of his major work NA, he also refutes self-awareness by summarizing the Vaibhāṣika view as follows: "The Ābhidharmikas hold that [awareness does not know itself] because no *dharma* is dependent on itself".[91] In other words, the awareness has no causal relation with itself. This is exactly the key point of the Vaibhāṣikas' objections to self-awareness. And this is one of the reasons that Saṃghabhadra was called a Neo-Vaibhāṣika.[92]

On the other hand, Saṃghabhadra shows little interest in supporting the position of Vasumitra or Bhadanta Dharmatrāta. In his NA, Saṃghabhadra simply summarizes the soteriological issues that Vasumitra is concerned about in the following words: "Again, there is the fault that wrong views, awareness of the minds of others, [four] mindfulnesses, awareness of suffering and so forth cannot be established".[93] Meanwhile, he quotes the same Sūtra passage as Yaśomitra does in his AKVy to reject the possibility of omniscience and thus self-awareness in a single moment. He says: "It is said in the Sūtra that there is neither a recluse nor a brahmin who can see or know all *dharma*s at one and the same moment".[94] However, he shares no epistemological concern with Vasumitra, Dharmatrāta or Vasubandhu. This is not because he does not have such a concern. On the contrary, as I shall introduce below, he himself has developed a sophisticated epistemological argument against self-awareness. The fact that he does not support the views of those three masters indicates a dividing line between Saṃghabhadra and the other three non-Vaibhāṣika scholars as far as the epistemological issues are concerned. Saṃghabhadra may have seen their views as divergent compared to his Neo-Vaibhāṣika position.

Saṃghabhadra's argument against self-awareness in terms of epistemology is developed from the Vaibhāṣika argument that self-awareness has to avoid the fault that no difference is found between perceiver and the perceived. In the same way, Saṃghabhadra holds that "no awareness can take itself as object because there would be no difference between awareness and the knowable".[95] Moreover, still in conformity with the Vaibhāṣika position, he holds that self-awareness is a violation of the fundamental tenet of Buddhism – the doctrine of dependent origination. On his view, if awareness can know itself, then the subject, the object and the basis for this knowledge would be the same, i.e., the awareness itself. This means that the knowledge, its basis, the subject and the object are all established by a single cause – the awareness itself. If the awareness could establish all these elements with its own power, then it would mean that the awareness is establishing itself. However, "[the awareness] would be permanent if it establishes itself. If it is permanent, then it cannot be dependently originated in any sense".[96]

The argument that Saṃghabhadra does not share with the Vaibhāṣikas is concerned with the particular and universal characteristics. These two concepts are very important to the Buddhist logicians, who understand the particular and universal characteristics respectively as the objects of perception and inference, the two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). Being the object of perception, the particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) is a real existent, but the universal characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) is a conceptual construction because it is only known to conceptual thinking. This understanding has deviated from the way that the two concepts are used in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, where both the particular and the universal characteristics can be the object of direct perception. Their difference is that the particular characteristic belongs to a certain thing, but the universal characteristic is shared by many, as it is said in MV: "To differentiate the characteristic of one thing is to differentiate the particular characteristic. To differentiate the characteristic of many things is to differentiate the universal characteristic".[97]

Saṃghabhadra's major concern is whether the universal characteristic is the object of self-awareness or not. This indicates that he still uses this term in an Abhidharma sense because the Buddhist logicians take self-cognition as a type of perception that only has the particular characteristic as its object, so for them whether self-cognition can know the universal characteristic is not a relevant issue. First of all, Saṃghabhadra rejects the opinion that "awareness knows its own universal characteristic although it does not know its own particular characteristic".[98] This opinion is understandable in an Abhidharma context, where the universal characteristic is realized in the primary stage of direct realization, but the particular characteristic is realized in the advanced stage. For instance, when we say "all phenomena are impermanent", for beginners of Buddhist practice, it is only a general assertion about worldly phenomena, indicating that the

universal characteristic of the world is known as impermanent. But advanced practitioners are able to realize the impermanence of every particular phenomenon, and thus realize their particular characteristics. So this opinion is saying that, if awareness does not know its own particular characteristic, it at least is able to know its own universal characteristic, which requires less advanced practice. However, Saṃghabhadra rejects this opinion with the following argument:

> Since [awareness] can never grasp the particular characteristic of its own, it is never the case that [the awareness] takes itself as object. If [the awareness] is not the object of [its own], how can it grasp [its own] universal characteristic?[99]

Here Saṃghabhadra is using the conclusion of his opponent to argue against his premise. If the opponent admits that awareness does not know its particular characteristic, then he has to reach the conclusion that it does not know its universal characteristic either, because in both cases the awareness is not the object of its own. Saṃghabhadra formulates the following syllogism to restate his argument:

> The universal characteristic is not the object of *svabhāva*
> Because it is the characteristic of *svabhāva*
> As in the case of the particular characteristic.[100]

Furthermore, if the conclusion of the opponent stands, then it contradicts his premise that awareness does not know its own particular characteristic, as is proved by the following syllogism:

> The particular characteristic is the object of *svabhāva*
> Because it is the characteristic of *svabhāva*
> As in the case of the universal characteristic.[101]

In both cases, the reason is the same: either the particular or the universal characteristic is the characteristic of *svabhāva*, i.e., the awareness itself. In other words, if awareness does not know its own *svabhāva*, i.e., intrinsic nature, it definitely cannot know its own characteristic, either particular or universal. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the intrinsic nature of a thing is closely related to its characteristic, particular or universal. All of them are seen as real. In many cases, *svabhāva* and *svalakṣaṇa* are used interchangeably. For instance, it is said in MV: "The particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of [a thing] itself is its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), as it is said that the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of *dharma*s is the same as their particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), and that the shared nature is their universal characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*)".[102] This also explains why the opponent does not challenge

the presumption that awareness does not know its own particular characteristic in the first place, because, for both Saṃghabhadra and his opponent, to say that awareness does not know itself (*svabhāva*) simply means that awareness does not know its own particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*).

However, such a presumption is not shared by the second opponent, who alleges that awareness "can have the particular and universal characteristics as its object in a due order".[103] According to this opinion, awareness can know both its own particular and universal characteristics. But it suggests a different order from the one hinted by the first opponent. Awareness first knows the particular characteristic, then the universal one. This position has come closer to that of the Buddhist logicians, who consider perception to be more primary than inference so that knowledge of the particular characteristic is more fundamental than knowledge of the universal. Saṃghabhadra does not formulate a detailed reply to this opponent. Instead, he simply repeats the conclusion that he reached in his reply to the first opponent: "[awareness] cannot take [its own] particular characteristic as object because [this characteristic] is its own characteristic, nor can it take [its own] universal characteristic as object".[104] In other words, awareness cannot know its own particular or universal characteristic. Unfortunately, Saṃghabhadra does not further elaborate his refutation to self-awareness in terms of the distinction between particular and universal characteristics, so we have to stop here.

Discussion of self-consciousness

The self-cognition of consciousness (*vijñāna*), or simply self-consciousness, is also treated by the Vaibhāṣikas in the context of omniscience. In MV elaborate discussions are conducted to answer the question: "Is there a consciousness that apprehends all *dharmas*"? This is exactly the same question with regard to awareness (*jñāna*) except that the verb "to know" is replaced with "to apprehend". Now, how are awareness and consciousness related to each other? Do the Vaibhāṣikas refute self-consciousness the same way as refuting self-awareness?

Consciousness and awareness

In MV, a Sūtra passage is quoted to indicate the relationship between awareness and consciousness: "That which can know is thus named awareness. That which can apprehend is thus named consciousness".[105] But what exactly does it mean to say that one is "to know", while the other is "to apprehend"? Are awareness and consciousness the same or different? One opinion simply holds that "consciousness (*vijñāna*) is awareness (*jñāna*) and their only difference is that the former has a prefix *vi-*".[106] This is because *jñāna* becomes *vijñāna* when a prefix *vi-* is added. From a Vaibhāṣika

perspective, however, the prefix *vi-* suggests that awareness and consciousness are substantially different, since the prefix means "division, distinction, distribution, or opposition".

The major difference between awareness and consciousness, as is stated in a Sūtra source cited in MV, is that "awareness is associated with consciousness".[107] This does not mean that they are mutually associated. The Vaibhāṣikas make it very clear that "awarenesses are associates of consciousnesses. But consciousnesses are not associates of awarenesses".[108] This is because awareness is closely linked with wisdom (*prajñā*), a mental associate or activity, and thus belongs to the group of mental activities (*caitta*), while consciousness is the same as the mind (*citta*). This distinction is stated by some Sarvāstivāda scholars in the following way: "The word 'awareness' refers to all mental activities; the word 'consciousness' refers to the mind".[109] The view that the consciousness is classified as mind is also supported by the Vaibhāṣikas, who understand the mind (*citta*), thought (*manas*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) as synonym. It says in MV: "Mind is thought and thought is consciousness. These three mean the same, though they sound different".[110] Later, Vasubandhu restates this view by adding the word *vijñapti* to the list. He says: "Mind (*citta*), thought (*manas*), consciousness (*vijñāna*) and representational consciousness (*vijñapti*) are all synonyms".[111]

The Vaibhāṣikas also admit another difference between awareness and consciousness: awareness is fundamentally an undefiled *dharma*, while consciousness is a defiled *dharma*, as it is said in MV: "Awareness is the foundation of all undefiled things, and consciousness is the foundation of all defiled things".[112] This view is also carried on by the later Yogācāra thinkers, who take the *ālaya* consciousness as the foundation that gives rise to all *dharma*s in the defiled realm; while the four awarenesses of mirror-like (*ādarśa*), equality (*samatā*), observation (*pratyavekṣaṇā*) and accomplishment (*kṛtyānusthāna*) are the vehicles to the undefiled state. The whole purpose of Buddhist practice, in their view, is to transform consciousness into awareness.

For the Vaibhāṣikas, awareness and consciousness have the same function although their substances are different. Both awareness and consciousness can have as their objects the following *dharma*s: the particular and universal characteristics, the homogeneous and heterogeneous objects, objects of three times and of what is beyond, objects of five *skandha*s and of non-*skandha*, the self-continuum and other-continuum, the internal and external realms, the defiled and undefiled, the conditioned and unconditioned. Most important, both awareness and consciousness can have all *dharma*s as their object.

Moreover, the Vaibhāṣikas do not agree with the Vātsīputrīya view that awareness only takes the link of the path, among the twelve links, as object, while consciousness only takes the link of existent as object. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that both links can be the object of consciousness and awareness. The Vaibhāṣikas also disagree with the Dārṣṭāntikas, who hold that awareness

and consciousness cannot function simultaneously. The Vaibhāṣikas insist that there are cases where they function simultaneously.

Can consciousness know itself?

The basic attitude toward the possibility of self-consciousness is put forward in the *Jñānaprasthāna*:

> Is there a consciousness that comprehends all *dharmas*?
> No.
> If the [view] "all *dharmas* are no-self" is produced by the consciousness, then what is not apprehended by this consciousness?
> It does not apprehend itself, and *dharmas* that are associated and co-exist with it.[113]

As in the case of awareness, the opponent uses an argument associated with "all *dharmas* are no-self", which also reminds us of the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas in the last chapter. All of them are trying to prove the omniscience of consciousness by developing arguments from the basic Buddhist tenet of no-self or impermanence. To support himself, the opponent here quotes a Sūtra passage:

> When he by wisdom discerns and sees
> "All *dharmas* are no-self",
> Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
> Herein lies the way to purity.[114]

As we have seen, this is one of the three verses cited by the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas in KV XVI.4. The MV contains a lengthy discussion of this verse. Without getting too deeply into the soteriological details of this discussion, I will introduce the elements of the discussion that are relevant to the issue of self-consciousness. First of all, several questions are raised with regard to this Sūtra passage: Is it talking about the view that "all *dharmas* are no-self" or the view that "the truth of suffering is no-self"? If it is the former, why does it say that "he at all this suffering feels disgust"? If it is making the latter point, why does it say that one sees "all *dharmas* are no-self"? The Vaibhāṣikas explain that the first part of the verse is talking about the point that "all *dharmas* are no-self", while the last part discusses the point that "the truth of suffering is no-self". This discussion sounds trivial at first sight. However, it becomes important to make this distinction when soteriological categories are applied to each point. The idea that "all *dharmas* are no-self" is defiled and worldly, while the idea that "the truth of suffering is no-self" is undefiled and transcendental. As a result, the predicate "no-self" plays two roles: a defiled one that takes "all *dharmas*" as subject,

and an undefiled one that takes only "the truth of suffering" as subject. This implies that the omniscience of consciousness can only be true in the defiled worldly realm, and not in the undefiled transcendental realm. Why? The Vaibhāṣikas say:

A defiled idea about "no-self" is not an antidote (*pratipakṣa*) of defilement, so it can take all *dharma*s as object. An undefiled idea about "no-self" is an antidote of defilement, so it cannot take all *dharma*s as object, for not all *dharma*s have a defiled nature.[115]

If we understand the idea of "no-self" as the antidote of defilement, it has to have a particular object. This particular object is the view of self. Undefiled consciousness is attained by a direct realization (*abhisamaya*) "because it only observes the truth of suffering as no-self in the state of direct realization, in which state each truth is observed sequentially".[116] However, the defiled consciousness of "no-self" is not limited to a particular object, for it is not to overturn any defilement. This defiled consciousness is attained through the practice of contemplation (*śamatha*) "because when practicing contemplation all *dharma*s are observed as no-self".[117] For this reason, the defiled consciousness of no-self can take all *dharma*s as object, but the undefiled consciousness takes only the truth of suffering and so forth as object.

After clarifying the defiled nature of the omniscient consciousness, the Vaibhāṣikas go on to reconcile this omniscient consciousness with the statement in the *Jñānaprasthāna*: No consciousness can comprehend all *dharma*s. A quick solution is: "There are two kinds of 'all', namely, all 'all' and partial 'all'. Here it is only talking about the partial 'all' ".[118] To support this distinction, they also draw on other examples where the partial "all" is used. For instance, when the Buddha teaches "all are flame-like", he is not really saying that all *dharma*s are flame-like, because the undefiled *dharma*s are actually not flame-like. In the case of the omniscience of consciousness, the items excluded from this partial "all" are consciousness itself and *dharma*s that are associated and co-exist with it. Though it does not know itself, its associates or co-existents, consciousness is still considered to be "omniscient" because it knows the majority of the *dharma*s. What the consciousness knows is like the earth, ocean, mountain or space, but what it does not know is like a mustard seed, a drop of water, a particle or a spot that a mosquito occupies in space. So it is not contradictory to talk about the omniscience of consciousness as the Sūtra verse does, while also holding the doctrinal position that the consciousness cannot know itself and so forth.

Two alternative opinions are also supplied to reconcile the Sūtra verse with the Sarvāstivāda doctrine. One suggests that consciousness "can take all *dharma*s as object in two moments".[119] This opinion has been explained in the case of self-awareness: in the first moment awareness or consciousness knows all *dharma*s except itself, its associates and co-existents, and in the

second moment it knows awareness or consciousness itself. This, however, only applies to the defiled consciousness, because the undefiled consciousness cannot exhaustively know all *dharma*s even in multiple moments. The other opinion suggests that "[consciousness], even in a single moment, can take all knowable *dharma*s as object and it is not wrong [to say that the consciousness is omniscient] because [the consciousness] itself (*svabhāva*), its associates and co-existents are not knowable objects".[120] This opinion maintains the validity of omniscience, but completely rejects the possibility of self-consciousness. For these three reasons, the Vaibhāṣikas find it consistent to acknowledge the authority of the Sūtra verse while denying the possibility of self-consciousness.

Two minds and memory

As we know, the MV is an extensive commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna*, in which the issue of self-cognition is discussed in the second section of its first chapter. The beginning of this section may be summarized in the following key words: "An awareness, a consciousness, cause and condition of two minds, and memory".[121] We have discussed the awareness and consciousness in previous sections. Now we have to explain whether two minds are causally related to each other and how memory, i.e., the knowing of the past mind, is possible. Both issues are crucial for the Sarvāstivādins to refute self-cognition because the Mahāsāṃghikas, when proposing their theory of self-cognition, hold that two minds function simultaneously. The Sautrāntikas and Yogācārins, on the other hand, rely heavily on the memory argument when establishing their concept of self-cognition. On the Sarvāstivāda view, however, two minds cannot function simultaneously, and memory is possible without reference to self-cognition.

Can two minds function simultaneously?

The Sarvāstivādins apply causal analysis to every *dharma*, and the mind is not an exception. In their analysis, a mind can function as the condition of another mind. The present mind, either right or wrong, defiled or undefiled, can be the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) of the future mind of any nature because the former is the main condition to produce the latter. The present mind immediately precedes the future mind, therefore it is also the immediately contiguous condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) of the latter. Meanwhile, the future mind can take the present mind as object, hence the present mind becomes the objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of the future mind. If the present mind only serves as a relevant factor instead of a direct object of the future mind, then it is the sovereign condition (*adhipatipratyaya*) of the latter. In other words, the previous mind can be any of the four conditions of the subsequent mind. The same rule applies to

minds of different realms, various types of mental activity, and the ten awarenesses including the awareness of the minds of others.

On the other hand, the Sarvāstivādins do not think that a mind can be the cause of another mind. There are two reasons for this. First, a subsequent mind cannot be the cause of a previous mind. The MV reports a non-Buddhist view that a subsequent *dharma* can be the cause of a previous *dharma* as in the case of waves, where the later wave causes the previous wave to move forward. On this view, the future *dharma* can be the cause of the present one, and the present *dharma* can be the cause of the past one. The Vaibhāṣikas do not think this is reasonable, since it would mean that a son causes the birth of his parents, a sprout causes the existence of seed, and a person experiences a result (*phala*) before accumulating the good deeds that cause the result. Therefore, it is absurd to believe that a subsequent mind can be the cause of a previous mind. This excludes the possibility of three types of causal relation between two minds, namely, the homogeneous cause (*sabhāgahetu*), the pervasive cause (*sarvatragahetu*) and the cause of maturation (*vipākahetu*).[122]

Second, two minds cannot arise and function at one and the same time. By saying this, the Vaibhāṣikas deny the other two types of causal relation between two minds, namely, the associated cause (*saṃprayuktakahetu*) and the simultaneous cause (*sahabhūhetu*). However, they do not deny that a mind can be the efficient cause of another mind. This is because the efficient cause (*kāraṇahetu*) is the most general type of cause, and it can apply to any *dharma* except itself.

To illustrate this second reason, the Vaibhāṣikas fiercely refute the Mahāsāṃghika view that two minds can arise simultaneously in a single person. On their view, it is never the case that two minds arise or function simultaneously in a person either in the past, the present or the future. In other words, there is only one mind functioning in a person at any given moment. Why? Two reasons are given in the *Jñānaprasthāna*: (1) there is no second immediately contiguous condition (*samanantarapratyaya*); (2) a sentient being has only one mind at any given moment.

The Vaibhāṣikas explain the first reason in the following way. For any mind or mental activity to arise there must be an immediately contiguous condition, which is the immediately preceding moment of thought. To assert that two minds arise at one and the same time, one has to admit that there are two immediately contiguous conditions at the same moment. However, the Vaibhāṣikas think that the second immediately contiguous condition does not exist. This is because of the second reason, that is, a sentient being has only one mind at any given moment. Why? On their view, "any future mind must be produced by a combination of present [causes and conditions]. Without this combination, no [mind] can arise. Because there is only one combination in the present, future minds arise one by one".[123] This view is illustrated with the example that people have to go single file when they

walk along a narrow road. They can never walk shoulder to shoulder. Likewise, cows or sheep have to go through a narrow gate one by one.

Some alternative views are also supplied in MV to refute the possibility of two minds arising simultaneously. According to an anonymous author, pure and impure minds would arise simultaneously if one admits that two minds function simultaneously. If pure and impure minds arise at one and the same time, it implies that one would be born in good and evil realms at the same time. If this is true, one can never be liberated. Moreover, if two minds arise simultaneously, it is also possible that three minds would do the same. In that case, one would be able to attain maturation of the realms of desire, material and immaterial at one and the same time. For the same reason, four minds could arise simultaneously, and, as a result, one would gain maturation of the four ways of life simultaneously. When five minds arise in the same way, one would gain maturation of the five worlds simultaneously. In all these cases, it would destroy the division between three realms, four ways of life and five worlds; and, as a result, one would not be liberated.

Furthermore, if all the above cases are true, then six consciousnesses would arise and function simultaneously, and they would take all their objects at one and the same time. This point is interesting because the basic reason for the Mahāsāṃghikas to admit two minds functioning simultaneously is that they observe that seeing, hearing and so forth can take place simultaneously. Later, the Yogācārins also hold that six or eight consciousnesses arise and function simultaneously. The Sarvāstivādins, however, do not think this is true "because [these consciousnesses] come and go rapidly and only appear to be simultaneous, but actually are not".[124] Moreover, if six minds arise simultaneously, it is possible for a hundred, a thousand, even a limitless number of minds to arise simultaneously. If so, all the future *dharma*s would arise at one and the same time, and all the present *dharma*s would cease at one and the same time. If this is true, there would be no future or present. If the future and present do not exist, the past would not exist, either. If the three times do not exist, there would be no conditioned world. Without the conditioned world, the unconditioned world would not exist. In the end, no *dharma* would exist, so it is unreasonable to admit two minds arising simultaneously in the first place.

Some others are further concerned with the mental activities that are associated with the mind. If two minds arise simultaneously, does one have, for instance, two feelings at the same time? If feeling and other mental activities arise in pairs, one would have ten rather than five aggregates, i.e., two forms, two feelings, two ideations, two volitions and two consciousnesses. If one admits ten aggregates, the Buddhist doctrine that analyzes sentient beings into five aggregates would be wrong, and the practice to eliminate these aggregates and to achieve liberation would have no result. Therefore, two identical types of mental activity cannot function at one and the same time.

Although the Sarvāstivādins do not accept two mental activities of the same type functioning simultaneously, they do admit that multiple mental activities of different types function at one and the same time. Why is this admissible? At this point, Vasumitra and Bhadanta Dharmatrāta are cited as authorities by the Vaibhāṣikas to explain this view. Vasumitra, first of all, explains that only the human body and the human mind are concerned here. He reasserts that there is only one mind at any given moment in a body or life (*jīvitendriya*), and that only one set of homogeneous (*nikāyasabhāga*) mind, i.e., the human mind, exists in any given moment. Although multiple mental activities such as feeling or desire can present at any given moment, they are preceded by the same immediately contiguous condition, i.e., the immediately preceding moment of thought, as that of the mind. If the mind is one, there is still only one feeling or one desire at this moment, so it is not a fault to admit multiple mental activities of different types to function simultaneously. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta further explains that the multiple mental activities are produced by the same combination or attention (*manaskāra*) as that of the mind. "Though they are all called mental activities, these mental activities are still different in their types".[125] For instance, feeling, desire and memory may function at one and the same time, but there is only one feeling or one desire at this moment.

To summarize, the Sarvāstivādins think that a mind can be any type of condition to another mind, but cannot be its cause of any type except efficient cause. They do not believe that two minds can arise simultaneously as do the Mahāsāṃghikas, but for them multiple mental activities of different types can function simultaneously.

How Is memory possible?

In the MV, the Vaibhāṣikas report eight theories that explain how memory is possible. Five of them are proposed by other Buddhist schools, and the remaining three by non-Buddhist scholars. The Vātsīputrīyas hold that there exists the person (*pudgala*) that acts as a self to remember the experiences of this person, and that memory is impossible without such a person. The Saṃkrāntivādins, on the other hand, distinguish two types of *skandha*, namely, the foundational *skandha* and the functional *skandha*. The former is permanent while the latter is temporary. Both of them constitute the sentient beings and make memory possible in the way that the foundational *skandha* remembers the experiences of the functional *skandha*.[126] Some other Buddhists propose a permanent mental realm that makes memory possible. This mental realm can keep track of what is experienced by six consciousnesses, which are temporary. This is very similar to the Yogācāra theory of store (*ālaya*) consciousness.[127] Some Buddhists hold a theory of one awareness. According to them, a previous awareness that experiences shares the same substance with a subsequent awareness that remembers, though they function differently.

Experience and memory are only different manifestations of the same awareness in different stages. Still, some other Buddhists hold that a previous mind can inform a subsequent mind to remember its experience. On their view, the internal communication of the mind is subtle. The subsequent mind can definitely know the experience of the previous mind, and thus makes memory possible.

Some non-Buddhist scholars distinguish two states of existents, namely, the potential and the actual. For instance, during the daytime, night is a potential state, and it becomes actual in the night. The same applies to the mind. Memory is a potential state of what is experienced. Experience is the actualization of past memories. Some other non-Buddhist scholars hold that a thing always changes into something else. For instance, a living person becomes dead. A green leaf turns yellow. So the present experience will change into memory later on. Some others believe that experience does not really *change* into memory; instead, it *enters* into memory of the later time. In the last case, experience does not have to transform itself into memory. Instead, it stays as experience in a different state. In both cases, memory is possible owing to the very nature of the mind that experiences.

In contrast to all these eight views, the Sarvāstivādins hold that three factors make memory possible. First, the homogeneous awareness that is gained from the habitual power makes memory possible, as is said in the *Jñānaprasthāna*:

> The sentient beings have a habitual power that enables them to attain a homogeneous awareness of *dharma*s, and thus can know as such what they have experienced.[128]

To explain this statement, two examples are utilized in the *Jñānaprasthāna*. The first says that two seal-makers, though not communicating with each other while making their seals, can still recognize seals made by the other. This is because they have the same kind of knowledge through their training, which is called the "homogeneous awareness gained from habitual power". The second example has to do with one of the supernatural powers of Buddhist practice, namely, the awareness of the minds of others. Suppose that two persons both gain such a power. Even if they do not indicate that they are penetrating the other's mind, they can still know the mind of each other. This, again, is because that they share a homogeneous awareness gained from their practice. The latter example is confusing, for it implies that one can recollect the experience of others. In MV, a discussion is devoted to the issue whether a person can remember the experience of others. The text says:

> Question: If a mind perceives and another mind remembers, why is it not the case that Yajñadatta remembers an object that Devadatta has

perceived, or that Devadatta remembers an object that Yajñadatta has perceived?

Answer: Because their [mind] continua are different. Previous and subsequent minds [of the same person], however, share the same [mind] continuum. So we should not have difficulty in [explaining the latter case].[129]

As we see, the Vaibhāṣikas deny the possibility that one can remember the experience of others. This is because, first of all, the awareness of the minds of others can only know the present minds of others, and not their past or future minds, nor the object or image of their minds. Moreover, two different persons experience different mind continua within their particular time and space, and there is no causal relationship between the minds of two persons. It is a different case with the same person, for one's previous mind shares the same continuum with one's subsequent mind, and it can be a condition of the latter. Therefore, a person can remember what he has previously experienced. In his AKBh, Vasubandhu confirms the Vaibhāṣika view with the following statement:

> No, [Yajñādatta cannot remember the object that Devadatta has perceived]. Because there is no connection [between Devadatta and Yajñadatta]: Their [minds] are not connected in a relationship of cause and effect, as is the case for [minds] belonging to the same continuum.[130]

The second factor that makes memory possible is that "all mind and mental activities hold fast their objects in the meditation that still takes object".[131] "The meditation that still takes object" refers to all meditative stages before the meditation of cessation (nirodha-samādhi), the meditation that takes no more object. This statement means that a mind or mental activity, once taking a dharma as object, will hold it as object all the time, as is said in the Jñānaprasthāna:

> [Question]: If a dharma is an object of another dharma, is there a time that it is not the object of that dharma?
> Answer: There is no time that it is not the object [of that dharma].[132]

A problem raised in MV with regard to this point is that a certain object can be perceived by a potentially infinite number of minds and mental activities. Each of them perceives it differently in accordance with their interests and manners. Does that object appear the same or differently to those infinite number of minds? The Vaibhāṣikas do not simply take a realistic standpoint, which would assume that the object appears as such indiscriminately to any subject. If the object appears the same to all minds, there will be the fault that "what is experienced by a certain mind is remembered by

some other minds".[133] To avoid this fault, they hold that the object appears differently to every mind or mental activity to the extent that they are actually perceiving different objects. For instance, a father who has a hundred children is indiscriminately the father of all his children. In the eyes of his children, however, he is a father in a hundred different forms. This is a crucial point, for it indicates that here a naïve realism gives way to a perspectivism. So the object that stays as a permanent object of the mind is not the external object that is perceived and then fades away from one's vision, e.g., an airplane. Instead, it is the image of the object that is captured by the perceiving mind.

The third factor that enables one to remember is a strong impression, as is said in the *Jñānaprasthāna*: "Again, it is because the impression as the cause [of memory] is strong enough to make the memory unforgettable".[134] The Vaibhāṣikas explain that impression comes before memory, so it is the cause of the latter. Without a strong impression, there will be no memory in the later time. They further distinguish two kinds of impression, namely, the impression of image and the impression of object. The impression of image refers to the previously mentioned image of object that stays permanently in the mind. The impression of object is an impression drawn from the external object. There are cases where only the impression of image arises, or cases where only the impression of object arises, or both arise or, again, none arises. The two impressions play the roles of experiencing and remembering in turn, and thus make memory possible.

As we see, for the Sarvāstivādins, the three factors that make memory possible, namely, homogeneous awareness, permanent object, and strong impression, have nothing to do with self-cognition, so it is impossible to prove the existence of self-cognition with the phenomenon of memory.

The problem of self-feeling

While refuting extensively the Mahāsāṃghika theory of self-cognition, the Sarvāstivādins develop their own reflective model of self-cognition by exploring the problem of self-feeling. Self-feeling (*svabhāva-vedanā*) is a technical term used to classify feelings in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.[135] It is given various different definitions by different authors but, among them, one important definition is "the self-cognition of feeling". The self-cognition of feeling is related to but not identical to the awareness of feeling, a concept that occurred in the Vaibhāṣika refutation of the Dharmaguptakas. Later on, self-feeling is understood as the intrinsic nature of feeling by Saṃghabhadra. Among his three types of perception, self-feeling is closely related to the second type, the experiential perception, while the third perception, i.e., the perceptual awareness, becomes the Sarvāstivāda sense of self-cognition. The Yogācārins accuse Saṃghabhadra of contradicting himself by offering a concept of self-feeling on one hand while denying

self-cognition on the other. The complex of ideas associated with the self-feeling is what I have called the problem of self-feeling. I will unfold this complex by discussing the awareness of feeling, self-feeling and three types of perception.

Awareness of feeling

Along with their objection to the Mahāsāṃghika theory of self-cognition, the Vaibhāṣikas also criticize the Dharmaguptakas and Mahīśāsakas for their views that the mind and mental activities can know their associates (*samprayukta*) or co-existents (*sahabhū*). For the Mahīśāsakas, the co-existents of the mind and mental activities are "their accompanying material elements and the accompanying *dharmas* that are disassociated from the mind and mental activities".[136] Eyes, for instance, are the co-existents of eye-consciousness because they are its accompanying material forms. The reason for the Vaibhāṣikas to deny the possibility that the mind and mental activities know their co-existents is that "they are too close to [each other]".[137] For example, a person cannot see the dropper when he uses it to apply eye-drops to his eyes because it comes too close.

For the Dharmaguptakas, the associates of the mind and mental activities are the mental activities that arise simultaneously with them and take the same object. Feeling, for instance, is an associated *dharma* of awareness. According to the Dharmaguptakas, awareness can apprehend this associated feeling. In other words, when one experiences a feeling of pleasure, one also is aware of this pleasant feeling. Strictly speaking, they are not talking about the self-cognition of awareness or feeling. Instead, they are discussing a possible mutual apprehension between two mental activities. If awareness can be aware of feeling, and feeling can feel awareness, then it is possible for them further to cognize themselves. But the Vaibhāṣikas deny that the mind and mental activities can know their associates "because they share the same object and function simultaneously".[138] That is to say, the mind and mental activities simultaneously act on the same object, so it is impossible for them to know each other. For instance, when all the people in a place look down or up at the same time, they are unable to see one another. If awareness knows its associated feeling, the Vaibhāṣikas ask the Darmaguptakas, can the feeling know itself or not? If it does, then feeling would have the ability of self-cognition, which has been refuted by the Vaibhāṣikas. On the other hand, if feeling does not know itself, there is the fault that feeling does not have the same object as awareness. The reason is that feeling, in this case, is the object of awareness, but not the object of the feeling itself. In his commentary to VMS, Kuiji criticizes the Sthaviravādins with a similar argument. The Sthaviravādins share the Dharmaguptaka view that awareness can know its associated feeling, but they also agree with the Sarvāstivāda refutation of self-cognition. In Kuiji's view, the Sthaviravādins face the same

dilemma as the Dharmaguptakas. They have to accept self-cognition or deny the awareness of feeling. But for the Yogācārins and Mahāsāmghikas, Kuiji says, "there is [no] problem because [for them] the mind knows itself".[139]

The Vaibhāṣika argument against the possibility that the mind and mental activities know their associates is summarized by Vasubandhu in his AKBh as follows: "Because [they] have the same object".[140] This indicates that Vasubandhu agrees with the Vaibhāṣikas on this point. In other Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma works, however, where lengthy discussions on awareness of feeling can be found, we do not see a unanimous position with regard to this issue. In Śāriputra's *Dharmaskandha*, for instance, awareness of feeling is discussed in the context of the mindfulness of feeling, one of the four mindfulnesses. Śāriputra distinguishes between internal and external feelings. When talking about the internal feeling, he quotes the following Sūtra passage:

> The Bhikṣu, with regard to the internal feeling, reflects and con-templates its various characteristics. When he experiences a pleasant feeling, he knows as such that he himself experiences a pleasant feeling. When he experiences a painful feeling, he knows as such that he himself experiences a painful feeling. When he experiences an indifferent feeling, he knows as such that he himself experiences an indifferent feeling.[141]

The same pattern applies to the bodily, mental, gustatory, non-gustatory, attached and detached feelings of pleasure, pain or indifference. After reflecting on the internal feelings, the Bhikṣu goes on with external feelings of various types. As a result, he knows that he himself experiences all these feelings.

In the *Jñānaprasthāna*, Kātyāyanīputra further discusses what type of awareness can know a particular kind of feeling. According to him, all of the four awarenesses (*jñāna*), namely, the awareness of *dharmas* (*dharmajñāna*), inferential awareness (*anvayajñāna*), conventional awareness (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) and the awareness of the path (*mārgajñāna*), can know that one experiences a pleasant or indifferent feeling. However, only the conventional awareness knows that one experiences a painful feeling. This, as explained in MV, is "because the painful feeling is defiled only, hence it is known by the conventional awareness".[142] Besides commenting on the corresponding passages in the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the composers of MV elaborate a Vaibhāṣika view on awareness of feeling by applying a temporal analysis to the above Sūtra passage. On this analysis, the Sūtra passage has to be restated as follows:

> When a person *has experienced* a pleasant feeling, he knows as such that he himself *has experienced* a pleasant feeling. When he *has*

experienced a painful or indifferent feeling, he knows as such that
he himself *has experienced* a painful or indifferent feeling.[143]

The Vaibhāṣikas replace the present tense with the perfect, which makes
the act of experiencing a past event. They support their modification with
the following examples. When one asks, "Where do you come from?"
one actually means "Where have you come from?" In the same way, the
expression "enters" in the statement that "the Bodhisattva enters the stage
of direct realization (*abhisamaya*)" actually means "having entered". The
reason that they have to make such changes is that, in their view, "no one
can know one's own present feeling".[144] When one experiences a pleasant
feeling in the present, for instance, one cannot be aware of this present
feeling of pleasure. This is because feeling is a mental associate of awareness.
According to the Vaibhāṣika view, the mind or mental activities cannot
know their associates. If they do, there will be difficulties as discussed in the
beginning of this section. On the other hand, when one is aware of this
pleasant feeling through reflection, this feeling has already passed away into
the past. At this moment, the feeling can no longer be experienced because
"it is not functioning".[145]

As we see, with regard to the awareness of feeling, the Vaibhāṣikas hold
a consistent position, as they did in the case of self-cognition. That is, they
deny the possibility that one can be aware of a feeling at the same moment
that one is experiencing the feeling, because this would mean that the
awareness can know its associates (*saṃprayukta*). However, the awareness
of feeling can be admitted over the course of multiple moments. In other
words, when the experience of feeling has become a past event, one can be
aware of this feeling in the present.

Self-feeling and self-cognition

In the VMS, Dharmapāla criticizes the Sarvāstivāda concept of self-feeling
(*svabhāva-vedanā*) for its "contradiction to [their] own denial of self-cognition
(*svasaṃvedana*)".[146] His criticism is aimed at Saṃghabhadra's view, which is
restated by Dharmapāla as follows:

> Some allege that feeling is of two kinds: the feeling of the objective
> realm that experiences the object of cognition (*ālambana*), and self-
> feeling that experiences the simultaneous contact (*sparśa*). Only
> the self-feeling is the particular characteristic of feeling, because
> the feeling of the objective realm is a characteristic shared by other
> [mental activities].[147]

Compared to Saṃghabhadra's own statement, we find that Dharmapāla's
restatement is less accurate. For instance, Saṃghabhadra himself calls

the feeling that experiences the object of cognition the grasping feeling (*grāhakavedanā*) rather than the feeling of the objective realm. Moreover, he defines self-feeling in terms of "experiencing (*anubhava*) the contact that is accompanied by [feeling] itself",[148] in which the simultaneity between feeling (*vedanā*) and contact (*sparśa*) is not explicit.

Among the Sarvāstivāda scholars, Saṃghabhadra is unique in classifying feelings into two types, namely, the grasping feeling and self-feeling. This classification is not found in MV where various possible ways of classifying feeling are listed. The text discusses two feelings (bodily and mental), three feelings (pleasure, pain and indifference), four feelings (associated with the realms of desire, material, immaterial, and that which is disassociated from these realms) and five feelings (rooted in pleasure, pain, joy, worry and equality). Another class of five feelings includes self-feeling, present feeling, object-feeling, associated feeling and the feeling of maturation. Six feelings are those produced by contacts of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind; they become eighteen if each of the six feelings is further classified into those of joy, worry and equality (*upekṣā*). The number of feelings becomes thirty-six if each of the eighteen is classified into the attached and detached feelings. Finally, the text multiplies the list into 108 feelings when each of the thirty-six is further analyzed into the feelings of past, present and future.[149]

Saṃghabhadra's classification is closer to the second type of five feelings in MV, where we find the self-feeling and object-feeling. In MV, self-feeling is defined in terms of three feelings (pleasure, pain and indifference).[150] In his SAH, however, Dharmatrāta understands self-feeling as feeling itself: "Self-feeling is feeling".[151] This definition is carried on by Vasubandhu in his AKBh, where it says: "The self-feeling (*svabhāvavedanīyatā*) is [the feeling] of feelings because they are felt by themselves [*svabhāva*]".[152] In his AKVy, Yaśomitra explains: "Self-feeling (*svabhāva-vedanā*) is the feeling of [feelings] themselves with their characteristic of experience".[153] This way of defining self-feeling can be traced back to Vasumitra's *Prakaraṇapāda*. In this work, Vasumitra repeats the following passage seven times: "What is feeling? It is self-feeling. What is non-feeling? It is not self-feeling".[154]

Saṃghabhadra's understanding of self-feeling deviates from both traditions. Self-feeling in his sense is closer to the associated feeling, one of the previously mentioned five feelings. This feeling is defined by Dharmatrāta as "feeling of associated *dharmas*".[155] In his AKBh, Vasubandhu further specifies this feeling as the feeling of contact. He says: "The associated feeling (*saṃprayogavedanīyatā*) is [the feeling] of contact (*sparśa*), as it is said that one should feel the pleasant contact".[156] In simplifying the classification of feelings from five types to two, Saṃghabhadra seems to have ignored two epistemologically less significant feelings. These are the feeling of maturation (a feeling of pleasant, painful or indifferent *karmas*) and the present feeling (which is the feeling of pleasure at present excludes the feelings

Figure 3.1 Contact.

of pain or indifference). Meanwhile, he combines the associated feeling with the self-feeling when he considers the very nature of feeling to be "that which arises in company with contact (*sparśa*) and experiences (*anubhava*) contacts of desirable, undesirable and indifferent".[157] The feelings of pleasure, pain and indifference are produced respectively by these three types of contact. So for Saṃghabhadra the feeling itself or self-feeling is the experience of contact rather than an experience of the objective realm.

As I have discussed in previous sections, according to the Sarvāstivādins, a cognition must arise on the basis of the contact of sensory object, sense organ and consciousness, as shown in Figure 3.1.

For the Sarvāstivādins, contact is not only the coming together of object, sense organ and consciousness, but also an independent mental process that is produced by this coming together, as is stated by Yaśomitra: "Contact is the [mental process] born out of the coming together of sense organ, object and consciousness".[158] Contact in turn produces feeling, which makes it possible for the feeling to experience this contact. In explaining why feeling can experience contact, Saṃghabhadra indicates that feeling is the effect of contact. He says: "Why can this feeling experience the accompanied contact? Because feeling is a close effect of contact. The words 'the accompanied contact' indicate that [contact] is the cause".[159] Saṃghabhadra does not indicate what kind of cause the contact is. In his AKBh, Vasubandhu reports that "the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that [feeling and contact] are simultaneous because they are the simultaneous causes (*sahabhūhetu*) of each other".[160] This view is confirmed by MV and other sources.[161]

As we have seen, Dharmapāla is not wrong in explicitly speaking of the simultaneity between contact and feeling. But he criticizes Saṃghabhadra's concept of self-feeling for its ambiguity. Self-feeling (*svabhāva-vedanā*) literally means the feeling of *svabhāva*. The key to understanding self-feeling lies in the interpretation of *svabhāva*. *Svabhāva* is commonly understood as the intrinsic nature of a *dharma*. But Dharmapāla argues: "If self-feeling is thus named because it does not abandon its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), then all *dharmas* would have the intrinsic nature of feeling".[162] This is certainly absurd. If self-feeling, as defined by Saṃghabhadra, is the experience of contact,

"then it should be called the 'feeling of cause' instead of self-feeling because it feels its cause [i.e., contact]".[163] The reason that feeling can experience contact is that the two, as cause and effect, share common features, as in the case of a father and his children. But if self-feeling is understood as the experience of its cause due to their similarity, "then all effects resembling their causes would have the nature of feeling".[164] Dharmapāla also rejects this possibility. Finally, if *svabhāva* is understood as a reflexive pronoun to refer to the feeling itself, then *svabhāva-vedanā* would mean self-feeling or the feeling of feeling itself. Dharmapāla argues against this reading as well. He says:

> If self-feeling is thus named because feeling can experience the feeling itself that is produced by contact, just as a king consuming his kingdom, it is not reasonable, either. Because this contradicts [their] own denial of self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*).[165]

The example of a king consuming his kingdom is frequently used in Abhidharma works to explain the "autonomous character of feeling" in the sense that it imparts to every conscious content a definite value of like, dislike or indifference, as Buddhaghosa says in his *Aṭṭhasālinī*: "*Phassa* is only touch, *saññā* is only sensing, *cetanā* is only motivating, *viññāṇa* is only discriminating, but *vedanā* because of its lordship, expertness, and mastery relishes the taste of the object".[166] In this example, the king represents the lordship of feeling, while his kingdom is the contact that produces the feeling. The king does not really consume his kingdom *per se*, but what is produced in his kingdom, which, again, is the feeling. So the king consuming his kingdom exemplifies the self-knowledge of feeling. In other words, feeling does not really experience the contact *per se*, but its effect – feeling, hence the feeling experiences itself, and thus is named self-feeling. Dharmapāla points out that this goes against the Sarvāstivāda refutation of self-cognition, so he rejects the concept of self-feeling as a vain construction.

Having rejected self-feeling, Dharmapāla, from a Yogācāra point of view, defines feeling only in terms of the feeling of the objective realm: "Feeling has as its nature the experience of objects that are agreeable, disagreeable or neither".[167] On his view, the feeling of the objective realm is not shared by other mental activities, because the feeling of agreeableness and so forth is unique to feeling itself, so this feeling of the objective realm can be characterized as the intrinsic nature of feeling, and there is no need to construct a concept of self-feeling. As a matter of fact, not all Yogācāra scholars agree with Dharmapāla. Sthiramati, for instance, adopts Saṃghabhadra's analysis of feeling in his commentary on Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandha*.[168] But Dharmapāla's view circulated widely among East Asian Buddhists along with Xuanzang's edition of VMS, which eventually evoked a defense of Saṃghabhadra's position by Sarvāstivāda scholars in China.

In his commentary on AKBh, Fabao, a disciple of Xuanzang who specialized in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, criticizes Dharmapāla as "someone who is wrong in vainly attempting to refute the Sarvāstivāda doctrine with the Vijñānavāda view and to make himself the orthodoxy".[169] He defends Saṃghabhadra in two ways. First, the example of the king consuming his kingdom cannot be interpreted as the king consuming himself. Likewise, to say that feeling experiences contact does not mean that the feeling feels itself. "Because the word 'experience' (*anubhava*) here implies that there is another factor other than the [feeling] itself. The [feeling] itself is the one that experiences and the other factor is what is experienced".[170] On his understanding, the example of a seal better explains the way that feeling experiences contact. When a piece of paper receives a mark from a seal, the paper is the receiver and the seal is the received. If there are receiver and received, then we cannot say that paper receives this mark from the paper itself. In the same way, we cannot say that feeling experiences itself. Because, as we have discussed in previous sections, if the self-cognition of feeling or self-feeling were admitted, there would be no distinction between experiencer and experienced.

Second, and more important, Fabao distinguishes between experiencing and knowing. He says: "It is not reasonable to [speak of] the awareness of feeling or the [feeling] experiencing itself. If feeling experiences the feeling again, it contradicts [what Saṃghabhadra says] in his text: 'When it is known, it is not experienced; when it is experienced, it is not known'".[171] On his understanding, self-feeling is not involved with the *knowing* of contact because it only *experiences* the contact. So Dharmapāla is wrong in refuting the possibility of feeling *experiencing* contact with the reason that "a feeling can never *know* its simultaneous contact".[172] At this point, Kuiji defends Dharmapāla by asking: "How is it possible to speak about 'experience' without knowing the previous contact"?[173] For these Yogācārins, knowing is a precondition of experiencing.

Saṃghabhadra himself, however, insists on a reversed order: experiencing prior to knowing. He says: "Therefore, when a contact is experienced by a feeling, it is not known yet. When the contact is known, it is not being experienced any more. So knowing and experiencing are different things".[174] As we see, even Fabao has been influenced by the Yogācārins to give priority to knowing instead of experiencing when he cites Saṃghabhadra in a reversed order.

To summarize, Saṃghabhadra understands self-feeling as the experience of accompanying contact. The Yogācārins, however, see it as self-contradictory to talk about self-feeling on the one hand, but to deny self-cognition on the other. The Sarvāstivādins defend Saṃghabhadra's position by distinguishing between experiencing and knowing. This distinction is further elaborated in Saṃghabhadra's theory of perception.

Three types of perception

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is one of the key concepts in the Buddhist logic and epistemology developed by Dignāga and his followers. But this concept had already been discussed at length in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma works such as the *Jñānaprasthāna*, MV, AKBh, NA and **Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā*. Dignāga himself acknowledges the Abhidharma heritage of this concept when he talks about the definition of perception in his PS.[175]

Among Sarvāstivāda scholars, Saṃghabhadra is the first to distinguish different types of perception, which, as I will show in Chapter 5, has influenced Dignāga's theory on the typology of perception. According to Saṃghabhadra, there are three types of perception, namely, sense-based perception (**indriya-āśraya-pratyakṣa*), experiential perception (**anubhava-pratyakṣa*), and awareness as perception (**buddhi-pratyakṣa*) or perceptual awareness.[176] Sense-based perception is to perceive a material object in the present. Saṃghabhadra disagrees with the Sautrāntikas, who hold that the object of this perception has to be in the past so as to conform to their doctrine of momentariness. He insists on a Sarvāstivāda view that cognition has to arise from the conditions of object, sense organ and consciousness, "so the five [sense] consciousnesses only take the present object as object".[177] Experiential perception is an experience of feelings such as pain and pleasure. These feelings, similar to the sensory object, have to be in the present in order to be experienced by this perception. Saṃghabhadra explains:

> When one is experiencing [a feeling], it occurs at the time that he [experiences] the desirable or undesirable (*kāra-apakāra*). At that time, this feeling is not the object of the [perceptual] awareness yet. In other words, the feeling that arises simultaneously with the consciousness that cognizes other objects, when being in the present, can be the desirable or undesirable. This stage of being the desirable or undesirable is called the moment of experiential [perception].[178]

As we shall see in Chapter 5, this type of perception is called mental perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) by Dignāga. But, for him, it is the most puzzling type of perception, as his followers interpret it in various different ways. Saṃghabhadra defines this type of perception in a comparatively clear way. We can outline its basic characteristics as follows: (1) it is a perception in the form of experience (*anubhava*); (2) it is to experience the feeling of desirable or undesirable; (3) its object, i.e., the feeling, has to be in the present; (4) it arises simultaneously with "the consciousness that cognizes other objects", i.e., sense perception; (5) it, however, is not simultaneous with perceptual awareness, the third perception.

Dignāga shares the first point with Saṃghabhadra, but takes an opposite position at the fifth point. With regard to the second, third and fourth points, Dignāga does not have a clear position. In other words, he is not

clear on issues such as how mental perception is related to sense perception, whether they arise simultaneously, or how their objects differ from each other. With these issues in mind, we find that Saṃghabhadra is also, to a certain extent, unclear on these points in his definition of the experiential perception. How is feeling related to the cognition of "other objects"? Is this feeling a feeling of the objective realm or a feeling of the internal contact, i.e., self-feeling? Saṃghabhadra seems to be aware of these problems, because he continues his definition with further clarification: "[The experiential perception] is the self-feeling that arises within [feeling] itself when experiencing the accompanying contact. [Likewise], consciousness arises within itself when experiencing the desirable or undesirable aspect of that [feeling]".[179] On his view, the object of experiential perception is the internal feeling, which is different from the sensory object of sense perception, and the experiential perception is distinguished from sense perception by its immanent orientation toward experiencing the feeling.

Saṃghabhadra further explains the fifth point in his definition of the third perception, perceptual awareness. He says: "Only when this [feeling] has passed away into the past can it become an object that arises and appears in memory. This stage of memory is the moment of [perceptual] awareness".[180] This perception, in many ways, is similar to the third type of perception in Dignāga's system, i.e., self-cognition (svasaṃvedana). Unfortunately, we are not sure about the Sanskrit word that Saṃghabhadra used to denote this perceptual awareness. Based on the knowledge we have of the translation habit of Xuanzang, I have reconstructed this term as *buddhi-pratyakṣa. Buddhi has a similar sense of cognition as svasaṃvedana except that the reflexive prefix sva- is missing. However, the perceptual awareness is no less reflexive than self-cognition, as indicated in the following passage:

> For instance, the feelings of others are not experienced by one's own experiential perception, hence one does not have the perceptual awareness that can say "I have already experienced such pain or pleasure". The awareness that takes feelings of others as object should not be perceptual awareness. Likewise, in the case that the present visual object and so forth are not perceived by one's own sense-based perception, one should not have the perceptual awareness that can say "I have already perceived such a visual object and so forth". The awareness that takes those objects as object should not be perceptual awareness either.[181]

As we see, Saṃghabhadra explains perceptual awareness with reflexive expressions such as "I have already experienced or perceived such and such", which are also used by the Sautrāntikas and Yogācārins to argue for the existence of self-cognition. Known as the memory argument for self-cognition,

1st moment   2nd moment

memory

sensory object ⟶ sense consciousness

perceptual awareness

feeling ⟶ experiential perception

Figure 3.2 Three types of perception.

this argument says that in our memory we recollect not only the perceived object, but also the fact that "*I* have perceived this object", thus it is proved that there was self-cognition when we were perceiving the object. Saṃghabhadra himself does not prove the existence of perceptual awareness with memory; instead, he defines the perceptual awareness *as* memory. That is, the reflexive awareness only occurs in memory when feeling or sensory object becomes the object of mental reflection. If perceptual awareness is the memory that knows the previous experience or perception, it cannot be simultaneous with the sense or experiential perception, and its object has to be in the past, as Saṃghabhadra explicitly states:

> Only after feelings such as pain are experienced by experiential perception can the perceptual awareness that takes these feelings as object arise. Likewise, only after visual object and so forth are perceived by sense-based perception can the perceptual awareness that takes the visual object and so forth as object arise.[182]

Saṃghabhadra's concept of perceptual awareness provides a reflective model of self-cognition. The way that this model of self-cognition works and its relations to the other two types of perception can be illustrated with Figure 3.2.

As we see, in this model, it is crucial to apply a temporal analysis to these types of perception. This is also reflected in their definitions, being called the "moment" (**avasthā*) of such and such perception. Among them, the perceptual awareness has to occur after the other two types of perception in order to reflect on them. This confirms the Vaibhāṣika view that awareness can only apprehend itself in the moment that comes after its apprehension of other objects. Saṃghabhadra also agrees with the Vaibhāṣika view that the awareness of feeling occurs after the experience of feeling. When being

asked how to make sense of the previously cited Sūtra passage that says, "One knows as such that he himself experiences a pleasant feeling when he experiences a pleasant feeling", Saṃghabhadra defends the Vaibhāṣika position. He says: "This [saying] is not contradictory to [our view]. It is talking about the moment of reflection (*vyavacāraṇa), not the moment of experiencing. It is thus said to show that yogis are not mistaken about the feelings such as pleasure that are already attained by the experiential perception. Hence [we say] that one would not be able to have the perceptual awareness of the object that is not yet experienced by [other] types of perception".[183]

As is pointed out by Kawasaki (1992: 91), it is not unusual for the Sarvāstivādins to apply a temporal analysis to issues such as awareness of feeling, self-cognition and omniscience because they have developed a sophisticated metaphysics of time and committed themselves to a pan-realism, i.e., to admitting the existence of things in all three times. Other schools, including Mahāsāṃghika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, do not agree with such a pan-realism, so they see it as self-contradictory to speak about self-feeling or awareness of feeling on the one hand, but to deny self-cognition on the other.

To summarize Chapter 3, the Sarvāstivādins systematically refute the Mahāsāṃghika theory of self-cognition in terms of causality, epistemology, soteriology and supportive similes. They do not agree with the Mahāsāṃghika view that self-cognition can occur at the same moment as the awareness of other objects, and that two minds can arise simultaneously. On the other hand, they admit that awareness or consciousness can apprehend itself in a subsequent moment of reflection, and that the awareness of feeling occurs in the same manner. This eventually leads to a reflective model of self-cognition as established by Saṃghabhadra in his theories of self-feeling and perception.

Notes

1 The Chinese attribute these two works respectively to Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana. See Buswell and Jaini 1996: 102 for the chronological order of the seven Abhidharma classics.
2 Willemen *et al.* 1998: 75.
3 See, for instance, Yinshun 1992: 204–9.
4 For Xuanzang's account, see T2087: 886b–887a; for Paramārtha's account, see T2049: 189a.
5 See Nishi 1975: 65; Willemen *et al.* 1998: 155–60.
6 See Enomoto 1996.
7 Yinshun (1992: 488) believes that Dharmaśreṣṭhin was about a century later than the composition of MV. Willemen *et al.* (1998: 174, n. 109; 256), among others, thinks that Dharmaśreṣṭhin lived before the composers of MV.
8 Willemen *et al.* 1998: xii defines the Sautrāntikas as "non-Kāśmīri Sarvāstivādins".
9 頗有一智知一切法耶。答無。若此智生一切法非我。此智何所不知。答不知自性。及此相應俱有諸法。 T1544: 919b.

10 Owing to the contradictory information from different sources, it is hard to identify who the Vibhajyavādins ("those who distinguish") are. Cousins (2001) recently argues that it designates "the Mahiṃsāsaka, Dhammaguttaka, Kassapiya and Tambapaṇṇiya branches of the ancient Theriyas". In the context of MV, however, it is safe to assume that the *vibhajyavādins* refer broadly to those who do not agree with the Vaibhāṣikas. See La Vallée Poussin 1988–90: 38–41, Yinshun 1992: 408–68, and the entry "Vibhajyavāda" in the *Zhong hua fo jiao bai ke quan shu.*

11 此中一智者。謂一刹那智 T1545: 43a.

12 AKBh IX 935: *naiva ca vayaṃ sarvatra jñānasammukhībhāvād buddhaṃ sarvajñam ācakṣmahe /.*

13 AKVy VII.18: *ihāsmākaṃ bho gautama upasthānaśālāyāṃ sattaṣaṇṇānāṃ sattipatitānām evarūpāntarākathāsamudāharo 'bhūt / śramaṇo gautamaḥ kilaivamāha nāsti sa kaścic chramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yaḥ sakṛt sarvaṃ jānīyāt sarvaṃ paśyet iti / tathyam idaṃ bho gautama smarāmi bhavato 'ham evaṃ vaktum / api tu nāsti sa kaścit śramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yaḥ sakṛt sarvaṃ jñāsyati vā drakṣyati vā iti /.* This passage is found, with some variations, in Pāli in the *Kaṇṇakatthala Sutta* (*Majjhima* II) and in Chinese in the *Yi qie zhi jing* 一切智 經 (T26: 793c).

14 若作是問。於十智中。頗有一智知一切法耶。應答言有。謂世俗智 . . . . . . 若 即於此世俗智中。作如是問。頗二刹那頃知一切法耶。答有。謂此智初刹那 頃。除其自性相應俱有。餘悉能知。第二刹那。亦知前自性相應俱有法。故答 言有。 T1545: 43a.

15 See Williams 1998: 235–43 and Matilal 1986: 148–9 for the distinction between the reflexive and reflective, though they are not aware of the Mahāsāṃghika or Sarvāstivāda views on this matter.

16 See MV T1545: 396a–b; Willemen *et al.* 1998: 21–2; Dhammajoti 2002: 81–106.

17 AKBh IX 935: *santānena samarthatvād yathā 'grih sarvabhug mataḥ / tathā sarvavid eṣṭavyo 'sakṛt sarvasya vedanāt //.*

18 一念但知一分諸法共相 T1530: 309c. La Vallée Poussin (1988–90: 1367, n. 69) also notices this passage, but he omits "a moment of thought" in his translation.

19 Naughton (1989: 80) also notices the same phenomenon in his study of the Pāli sources.

20 無漏智各各有所緣。無有能悉緣一切法者。唯有世俗智。能緣一切法。以是故 說一切智是有漏相。T1509: 257c.

21 有漏智是假名虛誑勢力少故。不應真實緣一切法。 T1509: 257c.

22 是十智入是如實智中。都為一智。所謂無漏智。如十方水入大海水中都為一味 T1509: 257c.

23 勿有因果。能作所作。能成所成。能引所引。能生所生。能屬所屬。能轉所 轉。能相所相。能覺所覺。無差別過。是故自性不知自性 T1545: 43a.

24 Stcherbatsky 1962 (Vol. 1): 138.

25 然此六因非契經說。契經但說有四緣 T1545: 79a.

26 See Buswell and Jaini 1996: 110.

27 See Katō 1989: 309–13.

28 不障礙義 . . . . . . 有所辦義 T1545: 107b.

29 See MV T1545: 80a16–22. I follow Willemen *et al.* 1998: 28–9 in characterizing the six causes except for the efficient cause, which is considered by Willemen *et al.* to be "the leading factor in the production of a fruition". I think it is misleading to say that the efficient cause is "a leading factor". See Dhammajoti 2002: 107–27 for further elaboration.

30 The MV explains: "Is there a *dharma* that is not an efficient cause of a *dharma*? Answer: Yes. A thing in itself (*svabhāva*) cannot be [the efficient cause] of itself.

Is there a *dharma* that is not an efficient cause of others? Answer: Yes. The conditioned existents are not [the efficient cause] of the unconditioned, and an unconditioned existent is not [the efficient cause] of another unconditioned" (頗有法於法非能作因耶。答有。謂自性於自性。頗有法於他性非能作因耶。答有。謂有為於無為及無為於無為 T1545: 107b).

31 若自性於自性為能作因者。則應因果能作所作能生所生能引所引能相所相能轉所轉能續所續皆無差別因果等。二既有差別故於自性非能作因 T1545: 104b.

32 See MV T1545: 128c5–8 and Dhammajoti 2002: 128–32 for further discussion.

33 有說。自性於自性。無益無損。無養無害。無成無壞。無增無減。無聚無散。無因無等無間。無所緣。無增上。諸法自性。不觀自性。但於他性能作諸緣。是故自性不知自性 T1545: 43a. The sovereign condition is missing in the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra* translated by Buddhavarman.

34 此言意顯諸法生時。隨其所應待四緣性。隨有所闕法則不生。不闕便生立為緣性。諸法無有闕自體時。故畢竟無闕不生義。寧可建立為所待緣 T1562: 742b.

35 體應如虛空等。由無障礙可立為緣 T1562: 742b.

36 世間現見。指端不自觸。刀刃不自割。瞳子不自見。壯士不自負。是故自性不知自性。 T1545: 43a.

37 又不可以世俗現喻難賢聖法 T1545: 43c. Notice that the Vaibhāṣikas consider Abhidharma to be part of the authentic teachings of the Buddha.

38 復有何因智知用。但如燈照非刀割等。謂見何理執智與燈。法喻冥然非與刀等 T1562: 742b.

39 MMK VII.8ab: *pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau saṃprakāśayitā yathā /*.

40 MMK VII.9ab: *pradīpe nāndhakāro 'sti yatra cāsau pratiṣṭhitaḥ /*.

41 MMK VII.9d: . . . *prakāśo hi tamovadhaḥ //*.

42 See Piṅgala's commentary on MMK: "The lamp cannot illumine itself when it is not lit or when it has already been lit. But at the very moment that it is lit it can illumine itself and others" (是燈非未生有照亦非生已有照。但燈生時。能自照亦照彼。 T1564: 9c). See also Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* VII.9: "This action [i.e., illumining self and others] can be accomplished at the very moment that the lamp is lit" (*tac cānenotpadyamānena pradīpena kṛtam iti /*).

43 MMK VII.11: *aprāpyaiva pradīpena yadi vā nihataṃ tamaḥ / ihasthaḥ sarvalokasthaṃ sa tamo nihaniṣyati //*.

44 MMK VII.12: *pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau saṃprakāśayate yadi / tamo 'pi svaparātmānau chādayiṣyatyasaṃśayaṃ //*.

45 現見無闇分明顯現。若不自照應有闇障。應不現見。由此故知燈等自照 T1530: 303b.

46 如瓶衣等。體雖非闇無燈等照邊有闇障。不得現見。燈等照時除彼邊闇。令得現見。說名為照。燈等亦爾。自體生時邊闇障除。令現得見故名自照。 T1530: 303b. Keenan (1980: 295–6) omits the "edges" (*anta*, bian 邊) in his translation, thus missing the force of this argument.

47 See Yinshun 1992: 245–304; La Vallée Poussin 1988–90: 28–35. Yinshun believes that this Vasumitra was the same person as the author of the *Prakaraṇapāda*, *Dhātukāya* and SB, the first two of which are among the seven Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma classics, but La Vallée Poussin does not offer a definite answer.

48 問何故名智。答能知所知故名為智。問何故名所知。答是智所知故名所知 . . . . . . 智與所知相對建立。故無有智不知所知。亦無所知非智所知。無智無所知。無所知無智 T1545: 558b.

49 若自性知自性者。不應建立能取所取。能知所知。能覺所覺。境有境。行相所緣。根根義等 T1545: 43b.

50 For the Sanskrit equivalent of *xing xiang* 行相, see Hirakawa and Hirai 1973–8 (Vol. 2): 89. For further discussion on this concept in a Sarvāstivāda context, see Dhammajoti 2004: 96–104.

51 於諸境相簡擇而轉是行相義 T1545: 409a. For *pratisaṃkhyāna* as the Sanskrit equivalent of *jian ze* 簡擇, see Hirakawa and Hirai 1973–8 (Vol. 2): 119.

52 言行相者。謂心・心所。其體清淨。但對前境不由作意。法爾任運影像顯現。如清池明鏡眾像皆現 T1821: 26c.

53 何故自性不知自性。答非境界故 T1545: 43a.

54 The MV says: "*Dharma*s that possess object such as the sense of eyes are limited by their own objective realm, thus it is said that the objective realm has its opposition" (如眼根等諸有境法各於自境界有所拘礙。如是名為境界有對 T1545: 391b). Hirakawa, Hirai *et al.* 1973–8 (Vol. 2): 86–7 has *viṣaya*, *ālambana* or *jñeya* for objective realm.

55 智亦境故 . . . . . . 彼智相應俱有等法及智自性皆是境故 T1545: 228b–c.

56 AKBh VII.18: . . . *viṣayiviṣayabhedād*. . . .

57 See Nishi 1975: 307.

58 若自性知自性者。世尊不應安立二緣生於六識。謂眼及色為緣生眼識。乃至意及法為緣生意識。 T1545: 43a.

59 See La Vallée Poussin 1988–90: 346, n. 258; Dhammajoti 2002: 53, n. 21.

60 Yinshun (1992: 287) argues that Ghoṣaka did not actually deviate from the Vaibhāṣika view.

61 二眼見色。 T1545: 61c. For more discussion, see Willemen *et al.* 1998: 20, n. 115; Cox 1988: 34; Dhammajoti 2004: 13–54.

62 若自性知自性者。世尊不應安立三和合觸。謂眼及色為緣。生眼識三和合故。觸乃至廣説。 T1545: 43b.

63 See *Sūtra* passages from the *Saṃyukta* such as: "如是緣眼・色。生眼識。三事和合觸。觸俱生受・想・思" (T99: 72c and T99: 87c). The Sanskrit is quoted in AKBh III.32: *cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam / trayāṇāṃ samnipātaḥ sparśaḥ / sahajātā vedanā samjñā cetaneti /.* Compare the Pāli passage from the *Saṃyutta* II.72, IV.33 and passim: *cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇam / tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso / phassapaccayā vedanā / vedanāpaccayā taṇhā /.* Dhammajoti (2002: 53, n. 21) notes that the word *sahajātā* that is evident in the Sanskrit and Chinese texts is not found in the Pāli ones except in a quotation in the *Peṭakopadesa* V.48. This supports the view that the latter has a different origin from other Pāli texts.

64 See MV T1545: 984a; AKBh III.32.

65 識亦生識故 T1830: 321a.

66 若自性知自性者。世尊不應安立邪見。謂彼邪見若能自知我是邪見便為正見。如説。邪見若能自觀是邪見者。應名正見非謂邪見。 T1545: 43b.

67 See PS I Dd in Hattori 1968: 27–8.

68 復次若自性知自性者。不應建立惡心遍體皆是不善。以了自體非邪僻故。 T1545: 43b.

69 自知心是不善故。此為正智。非邪惡故 T1830: 321a.

70 Vasumitra reports that Mahāsāṃghika and three of its sub-schools, namely, Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravāda and Kaukkuṭika, hold that "the nature of mind is pure" (心性本淨 T2031: 15c; the Tibetan reads: *sems rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba* D4138: 143b). Bhavya and Vinītadeva mention the same view held by the Ekavyavahārikas and Lokottaravādins. See D4139: 149b and D4140: 155a. For the Sarvāstivāda refutation of this view, see MV T1545: 140b–c.

71 若自性知自性者。則四念住應無差別。以身念住即法念住。乃至心念住即法念住故。復次若自性知自性者。四聖諦智應無差別。以苦智即道智。乃至滅智即道智故。 T1545: 43b.

72 若自性知自性者。則宿住隨念智應不說有。以彼即知現世事故。 T1545: 43b.

73 復次若自性知自性者。則他心智應不說有。以彼亦知自心所故。 T1545: 43b.

74 又他心智雖加行時亦緣自相續。而成滿時唯緣他相續。 T1545: 514a.

75 又他心智但緣他心。不緣他心所緣行相。 T1545: 514a.
76 若緣彼心所緣及能緣行相者。則有自緣之過。 T1545: 48c.
77 See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 261; Yinshun 1992: 245–68.
78 See, for instance, MMK XV.4, 6.
79 若自性知自性者。則應不知他性。於自性轉故。若自性知他性者。則應不知
自性。於他性轉故。 T1545: 43b.
80 若如知自性是自性。知他性亦爾者。則知自性是自性。可是正。知他性是自性
應是邪。 T1545: 43b.
81 若一時知自性是自性。知他性是他性者。則應一智有二解用。解用別故體亦
應別。體既各別。應非一智。 T1545: 43c.
82 法生時和合唯一無二。不可一和合有二果生故。一剎那心唯有一。 T1545: 49c.
83 See La Vallée Poussin 1988–90: 32–3. But he distinguishes between the master
simply called Dharmatrāta in MV and the master referred to by the Vaibhāṣikas
with the reverent title, the Bhadanta. He supports himself with Yaśomitra's
AKVy. But in the current case, it shows a coincidence between the views of the
Bhadanta and the author of SAH, so his distinction seems not to stand.
84 See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 261; Dessein 1999 (Vol. 1): xxii. But, if we follow
Yinshun (1992: 268), the former Dharmatrāta is 600 years earlier than the
latter.
85 若此智生知一切法空及無我。而不知自己自性。不自顧如指端不自觸。此亦如
是。又無二決定故。無有一智二決定。自知知他 T1552: 953c. See Dessein 1999
(Vol. 1): 684 for his translation.
86 The Sanskrit equivalent for *jue ding* 決定 is based on Dessein 1999 (Vol. 2): 309,
n. 10, while Hirakawa, Hirai *et al.* 1973–8 (Vol. 2): 112 has *niyama* and others.
87 智者決定義。了者分別也 T1552: 916c.
88 以決定意是智意故 T1545: 549c.
89 此達摩多羅以古昔達摩多羅為尊者 T1552: 946b.
90 See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 265, n. 62, and Dessein 1999 (Vol. 1): xxiii.
91 諸對法者立此因言。諸法必無待自體故 T1563: 952a.
92 This title is given by Kuiji in his commentary to VMS. See T1830: 271a.
93 又邪見他心智及念住苦智等。皆有建立不成過故。 T1562: 742b.
94 如契經說。無有沙門婆羅門等。於一切法頓見頓知。 T1562: 742c.
95 又智所知應無別故。必無有智能緣自體。 T1562: 742c.
96 自建立故應許是常。常故應無能緣他義。 T1562: 742c.
97 分別一物相者。是分別自相。分別多物相者。是分別共相。 T1545: 217a. The
different senses of the two concepts in the Abhidharma and Buddhist logical
texts are strictly maintained in the Chinese Yogācāra school. See Kuiji's
commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa* T1840: 128a and Lü 1991: 1384.
98 智於自體。不知自相。共相可知 T1562: 742b.
99 於自自相既永不能取。則定無有以自為所緣。既非所緣寧取共相。 T1562:
742c.
100 共相非自體境。自體相故猶如自相。 T1562: 742c.
101 自相亦應為自體境。自體相故。猶如共相。 T1562: 742c.
102 自體自相即彼自性。如說諸法自性即是諸法自相。同類性是共相。 T1545:
179b. See also T1545: 180c, 196c.
103 自共相如次能所緣。 T1562: 742c.
104 既不自緣自相為境自體相故。亦不應緣共相為境。 T1562: 742c.
105 能知故名智。能了故名識。 T1545: 44c.
106 識即是智唯長一字所謂毘字 T1545: 44b.
107 智相應識 T1545: 44b.
108 諸智皆識相應。非諸識皆智相應 T1545: 229a. See also T1544: 928b.
109 謂若說智則總顯諸心所法。若說識則顯心 T1545: 44c.

110 心即是意意即是識。此三聲別義無異故 T1545: 371a.

111 *Viṃśatikā* 1: *cittaṃ mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptiś ca iti paryāyāḥ /*.

112 一切清淨品中智為根本。一切雜染品中識為根本。 T1545: 44c.

113 頗有一識了一切法耶。答無。若此識生一切法非我。此識何所不了。答不了 自性。及此相應俱有諸法。 T1544: 919b.

114 若時以慧觀 一切法非我 爾時能厭苦 是道得清淨 T1545: 44c.

115 有漏非我行相。非煩惱對治故。能緣一切法。無漏非我行相。是煩惱對治故。 不緣一切法。非一切法順煩惱性故。 T1545: 45b.

116 以現觀時但緣苦諦為非我故。現觀位中別觀諦故。 T1545: 45c.

117 以修觀時觀一切法為非我故 T1545: 45b.

118 一切有二種。謂一切一切。少分一切。此中但說少分一切。 T1545: 45a.

119 二剎那頃緣一切法 T1545: 45c.

120 一剎那頃。亦緣一切所應緣法 自性相應俱有諸法。非所緣故。不應為責。 T1545: 45c.

121 一智識因緣二心念 T1544: 919b.

122 See MV T1545: 47c.

123 未來心聚。必由現在和合故生。不和合則不生。現在但有一和合故。令未來心 一一而起。 T1545: 49b. What is the subject of combination? Is it independent? See Kimura 1929–34 (Vol. 7): 186, n. 32.

124 剎那迅轉非俱似俱故 T1545: 719c. For the Mahāsāṃghika view on this issue, see Chapter 2. For the Yogācāra view, see Kuiji's commentary on VMS T1830: 390b, 421a, 485b, 561a.

125 雖皆名心所而體類各異 T1545: 50a. See Yinshun 1992: 254–9 for his discussion on Dharmatrāta's view.

126 See MV T1545: 55b. The theory of two *skandhas* is also recorded as a Sautrāntika doctrine in Xuanzang's translation of SB. See T2031: 17b.

127 See MV T1545: 55b; Kimura 1929–34 (Vol. 7): 215, n. 43.

128 有情於法由串習力。得如是同分智。隨所更事能如是知。 T1544: 919b.

129 問若異心所更異心能憶者。云何不天授所更祠授能憶。祠授所更天授能憶耶。 答彼相續異故。前心後心相續無異。不應為難。 T1545: 56b.

130 AKBh IX 943–4: *na asambandhāt / na hi tayoḥ sambandho 'sti akāryakāraṇab-hāvād yathaikasantānikayoḥ /*.

131 一切心心所法。於所緣定安住所緣 T1544: 919c.

132 若法與彼法作所緣。或時不與彼法作所耶。答無時非所緣。 T1544: 1026b.

133 餘心聚所更。餘心聚能憶。 T1545: 56c.

134 又以受意為因力強。念便不忘 T1544: 919c.

135 For the Sanskrit equivalent of *zi xing shou* 自性受, see AKVy IV.49. The **AKBh** IV.49 has its passive form: *svabhāva-vedanīyatā*.

136 此隨轉色。及此隨轉不相應行。 T1545: 43c.

137 極相近故。 T1545: 43c. Vasubandhu offers the same reason: "For they are too close" (AKBh VII.18: *. . . atisaṃnikṛṣṭavāc ca /*).

138 同一所緣。俱時轉故 T1545: 44a.

139 心自緣[無]妨。 T1830: 294c.

140 AKBh VII.18: *. . . eka-ālambanatvād. . . .*

141 謂有苾芻。於此內受。觀察思惟內受諸相。受樂受時。如實知我受樂受。受 苦受時。如實知我受苦受。受不苦不樂受時。如實知我受不苦不樂受 T1537: 476c.

142 以苦受唯有漏故世俗智知。 T1545: 949a.

143 受樂受已。如實知我已受樂受。受苦受不苦不樂受已。如實知我已受苦受不苦 不樂受。 T1545: 948b. My emphasis.

144 無有自知現在受故 T1545: 819a.

145 無作用故 T1545: 948b.

146 違自所執不自證故。 T1585: 11c. In his commentary on VMS, Kuiji indicates that the author of the treatise (*lun zhu* 論主), i.e., Dharmapāla, holds this view. See T1830: 331b–332a.

147 有作是說。受有二種。一境界受。謂領所緣。二自性受。謂領俱觸。唯自性受是受自相。以境界受共餘相故。 T1585: 11c.

148 謂能領納自所隨觸 T1562: 338c.

149 See MV T1545: 714c–715b.

150 The MV explains: "Self-feeling refers to the above-mentioned three feelings, i.e., the feelings of pleasure, pain and indifference." (自性受者。如說三受。謂樂受。苦受。不苦不樂受 T1545: 596a.)

151 自性受者受也 T1552: 896b.

152 AKBh IV.49: *svabhāvavedanīyatā vedanānām svabhāvenaiva vedanīyatvāt /*.

153 AKVy IV.49: *svabhāva-vedanā 'nubhava-lakṣaṇena vedanīya-svabhāvaḥ /*.

154 云何受謂自性受。云何不受。謂非自性受。 T1541: 632b. See also T1541: 669b, 672b, 680c, 683b, 685c and 687c.

155 受相應法 T1552: 896b. See MV T1545: 596b, where the associated feeling is specified into pleasure, pain and indifference.

156 AKBh IV.49: *samprayogavedanīyatā sparśasya sukhavedanīyaḥ sparśaḥ iti /*.

157 隨觸而生領納可愛及不可愛俱相違觸 T1562: 338c.

158 AKVy II.25: *indriya-viṣaya-vijñānānāṃ samnipātāj jātā spṛṣṭiḥ /*.

159 云何此受領納隨觸。謂受是觸鄰近果故。此隨觸聲為顯因義。 T1563: 783a.

160 AKBh III.32: *samānakālam iti vaibhāṣikāḥ anyonyaṃ sahabhūhetutvād /*.

161 See MV T1545: 79b; *Abhidharmadīpa* V.306. Candrakīrti quotes a similar passage in his *Prasannapadā* III.7: *trayāṇāṃ samnipātāt sāsravasparśaḥ sparśasahajā vedanā. . . .* In his edition La Vallée Poussin (1903–13: 119, n. 7) notes that contact is a simultaneous cause (*sahabhūhetu*) of feeling.

162 若不捨自性名自性受。應一切法皆是受自性。 T1585: 11c.

163 又既受因應名因受。何名自性。 T1585: 11c.

164 似因之果應皆受性 T1585: 11c.

165 若謂如王食諸國邑。受能領觸所生受體名自性受。理亦不然。違自所執不自證故 T1585: 11c.

166 *Aṭṭhasālinī* 290: *Phassassa hi phusanamattakam eva hoti, saññāya sañjānanamattakam eva, cetanāya cetanamattakam eva, viññāṇassa vijāna[na]mattakam eva. Ekaṃsato pana issaravatāya vissavitāya sāmibhāvena vedanā va ārammaṇarasaṃ anubhavati.* Guenther's translation. See Guenther 1974: 37, n. 3, where he assigns this passage a number of III.185.

167 受謂領納順違俱非境相為性。 T1585: 11c.

168 See the Tibetan translation D4066: 207a4–208a2. It is interesting to note that the Chinese translation (T1613: 851b) does not mention any of Saṃghabhadra's views on feeling. In his *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, however, Sthiramati seems to agree with Dharmapāla when he defines feeling as follows: "Feeling has the nature of experience. Again, owing to the difference of the *object* that is directly experienced in the forms of agreeable, disagreeable or neither, it has three types: pleasure, pain and indifference" (*Triṃśikābhāṣya* 3: *vedanā anubhavasvabhāvā / sā punar viṣayasya-āhlādaka-paritāpaka-tadubhayākaravivikta-svarūpa-sākṣātkaraṇabhedāt tridhā bhavati / sukhā / duḥkhā aduḥkhāsukhā ca /*).

169 有人妄敘唯識轉計破有部之義。將為正宗誤也 T1822: 486a.

170 此中言領者。即是自體有彼相故。自為能領彼為所領。 T1822: 486a.

171 證受自領。皆非應理　若受還領受即違文。若時為所緣。爾時非所領　若時為所領。爾時非所緣 T1822: 486a.

172 受定不緣俱生觸故。 T1585: 11c.

173 既不緣前觸。如何名為領。 T1830: 331b. Notice that Kuiji here understands contact as prior to feeling. Lingtai, a disciple of Kuiji, notes that this is because "the Sarvāstivādins do not admit the mutual knowledge of the simultaneous mind and mental activities" (薩婆多不許俱時心心所得相緣。 From the *Cheng wei shi lun shu yi* of Han Jingqing).

174 由此觸於受。若時為所領。是時非所緣。若時為所緣。是時非所領。故緣領事別。 T1562: 339a.

175 See PS I Dab in Hattori 1968: 26–7.

176 I rely on Hirakawa, Hirai *et al.* (1973–8) and Ui (1961) to reconstruct the Sanskrit terms for each perception. *Buddhi* is equivalent to *jue liao* 覺了, which is more frequently called *xian liang jue* 現量覺 or perceptual awareness.

177 由此五識唯緣現境。 T1562: 375a.

178 領納時者謂為損益時。爾時此受未為覺了境。謂了餘境識俱生受。正現前時。能為損益。此損益位。名領納時。 T1562: 374c.

179 即自性受。領所隨觸。自體生故。識等領彼損益行相。自體起故。 T1562: 374c.

180 此滅過去。方能為境。生現憶念。此憶念位。名覺了時。 T1562: 374c.

181 如於他身受非自領納現量所受。則無現量覺。言我曾受如是苦樂。緣彼受智。既非現量覺。如是現色等。非自依根現量所受。應無現量覺。謂我曾受如是色等。緣彼境智。應非現量覺。 T1562: 374c.

182 如苦受等。必為領納現量受已。方有緣彼現量覺生。如色等。必為依根現量受已。方有緣彼現量覺生 T1562: 374c.

183 此無違失。如是所說。是觀察時。非領納時。顯觀行者。於曾領納現量所得樂等受中無迷謬故。作如是說。是故不應於諸現量曾未受境有現量覺。 T1562: 374c.

4

SYNTHESIS: SAUTRĀNTIKA

Sautrāntika: Sources

According to later Indian philosophers, Sautrāntika, along with Vaibhāṣika, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, made up the four major Buddhist philosophical schools. The Sautrāntika itself never developed into an independent sect as it still shared monastic rules and institutions with the Sarvāstivādins, as is observed by Lamotte (1988a: 526): "As for the Sautrāntikas, they represented a philosophical movement rather than a homogenous sect: up until now the existence of Sautrāntika monasteries has not been attested by any inscriptions. The expressions *sutaṃtika, sutātakinī* . . . seem to be epithets applied to particular people 'versed in the Sūtras,' rather than names of sects." Doctrinally, this school carries on the Sūtra-oriented tradition of Saṃkrāntivāda (a school that separated from the Sarvāstivāda about a hundred years after its establishment) and of the Dārṣṭāntikas (a sub-group of Sarvāstivādins active in the Gandhāra area around the second and third centuries). But they are distinct from both of their predecessors. They disagree with the Saṃkrāntvādins, who admit the existence of person (*pudgala*) in the ultimate level, a doctrinal position akin to that of the Vātsīputrīyas, another sub-school of Sarvāstivāda. They also deviate from the Dārṣṭāntikas, who still agree with the fundamental tenet of the Sarvāstivāda, i.e., the existence of things in three times, and thus can still be legitimately called *sarva-asti-vādins* ("those who hold all things exist").

According to Katō (1989), Sautrāntika was formally established as a separate school by Śrīlāta at the end of the fourth century. He was a disciple of Kumāralāta, who is thus traditionally considered the "previous teacher" (*pūrvācārya, ben shi* 本師) of Sautrāntikas.[1] Since the establishment of Sautrāntika is attributed to Śrīlāta, the most important sources for Sautrāntika would be the works of Śrīlāta himself, but none of his writings is extant today. Fortunately, Vasubandha, one of his followers, wrote AKBh to present and sometimes to rectify the views of Śrīlāta. This work is also the earliest source that attests the school name *sautrāntika*.[2] Saṃghabhadra,

a contemporary of Vasubandhu, composed NA to criticize Śrīlāta from an orthodox Vaibhāṣika point of view. Both works provide rich and important information on the doctrinal positions of the Sautrāntika as represented by Śrīlāta and Vasubandhu.

Harivarman, another disciple of Kumāralāta, is traditionally considered a divergent Sautrāntika owing to his involvement with the Bahuśrutiyavādins. His sectarian affiliation is still a subject of debate. Fukuhara (1969: 25–51) lists various opinions that consider him a Dharmaguptaka, Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika, Sarvāstivādin, Mahāsāṃghika, Bahuśrutiyavādin, Mahāyāna, or an independent scholar. Contemporary scholars such as Fukuhara (1969: 52) and Katsura (1974) tend to associate him with the Bahuśrutiyavādins, but Mizuno (1997: 279–300), Yinshun (1992: 573–80) and Tokoro (1990) insist on regarding him a Sautrāntika or Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika. Given the fact the Sautrāntika is more of a philosophical school than an independent sect, I think the latter view makes more sense if taking account of his thought rather than of his institutional association. His major work *Cheng shi lun* 成實論 is only extant in Chinese. The Sanskrit title of this work is usually reconstructed as *Tattvasiddhi* or *Satyasiddhi*; but I found a source that records this title in phonetics as *she na jia bo lou wu you po ti she* 闍那迦波樓侮優婆提舍, which, in Middle Chinese, can be *Janaka-parama-upadeśa* (JP).[3] The fact that *upadeśa* is included as part of its title reinforces the view that considers it a Sautrāntika work, as Lü (1991: 2383) points out that the Sautrāntikas were in favor of *upadeśa*, one of the twelve divisions of the Buddhist canon.[4] This work of Harivarman provides the primary access to Sautrāntika doctrines in their formative period. Another Sautrāntika text extant in Chinese is the *Catuḥsatyaśāstra*, which is believed to be a work of Vasuvarman.[5]

The Sautrāntikas contributed to the formation of Yogācāra and finally merged into the Yogācārins. Sources for the later Sautrāntikas are thus found in writings of Yogācārins such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Both authors share many common views with the Sautrāntikas, but they refute the Sautrāntika position with regard to some key issues. In Madhyamaka writings, we also find some references to the shared views of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, when the Mādhyamikas attempt to refute the latter. Scattered information passed down to later Hindu scholars, such as Mādhava in the fourteenth century, whose reports have become the stereotype for our perception of Sautrāntika today.

As far as the issue of self-cognition is concerned, after surveying the extant sources for Sautrāntika, I find the most important material in Harivarman's JP. Translated in 412 by Kumārajīva, this primarily Sautrāntika work provides information on how the Sautrāntikas developed their theory of self-cognition by synthesizing the views of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins. Another piece of material is drawn from Candrakīrti's MA, a work only extant in Tibetan. Candrakīrti, while refuting the Yogācāra

doctrines, presents a series of rather mature proofs of self-cognition that are attributed to both Sautrāntika and Yogācāra. Moreover, I refer to a few verses in PV. The externalists (*bāhyārthavāda*) in this major work of Dharmakīrti are identified, in many cases, to be the Sautrāntikas by his commentators.[6]

Multiple minds

Harivarman, as a Sautrāntika, did not develop his theory of self-cognition from scratch. Instead, he articulated views on self-cognition by arguing with his predecessors, the Mahāsāmghikas and Sarvāstivādins. His argument against the Mahāsāmghika theory of self-cognition is conducted in a context that discusses whether the mind is one or many. Unlike the soteriologically oriented omniscience, which is the general framework that the Mahāsāmghikas and Sarvāstivādins argue for or against self-cognition, the issue on the oneness or multiplicity of the mind is more epistemologically oriented. By insisting on the position that there are multiple minds in a person, Harivarman confirms the basic Sautrāntika tenet that minds arise successively. With this successive model of mind, he criticizes the Mahāsāmghikas for their simultaneous model of self-cognition. On his view, self-cognition is only possible during the course of successive moments of cognition.

Minds arising successively

As we have discussed in the last chapter, the Sarvāstivādins, though refuting the Mahāsāmghika view that two minds arise simultaneously, admit to the simultaneity of the mind and mental activities. On their understanding, the mind is a substance that accompanies each of its functions – mental activities. In any given moment, the mind must be simultaneous with one or possibly multiple mental activities. This is also the basis on which they develop the concepts of the associated and simultaneous causes. The Dārṣṭāntikas, including Bhadanta Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, disagree with the Sarvāstivādins by insisting that all *dharmas* have to arise successively, as is reported in MV:

> Some, such as the Dārṣṭāntikas, allege that *dharmas* arise successively rather than instantaneously. The Bhadanta says: "*Dharmas* arise successively, and none of them arise simultaneously. This is just like merchants walking along a narrow road in single file. No two of them can walk shoulder to shoulder, let alone many. In the same way, each conditioned *dharma* arises from its own conditions. Those born from other combinations [of conditions] should not arise simultaneously with it".[7]

For the Dārṣṭāntikas, this successive model is applicable to all the conditioned *dharma*s. In particular, it applies to the mind and mental activities. The MV reports: "Some, such as the Dārṣṭāntikas, allege that all mental activities arise successively rather than simultaneously. The Bhadanta also says: 'All mental activities arise successively rather than simultaneously'".[8] Moreover, it reports: "The Dārṣṭāntikas hold that the *mind and mental activities* arise successively. Their Bhadanta says: 'The mind and mental activities arise one by one like [people] walking along a narrow road. No two of them can arise simultaneously, let alone many'".[9] Although Bhadanta Dharmatrāta is one of the major advocates of the successive model of mind, he adheres to a Sarvāstivāda position in dealing with the relationship between the mind and mental activities. He still acknowledges the fundamental difference between the mind and mental activities by saying that "mental activities are not minds".[10] Buddhadeva, on the other hand, is famous for identifying mental activities with the mind. He says: "A mental activity is also a mind. . . . A mental activity is a specific state (*avasthāviśeṣa*) of the mind".[11] On his understanding, mental activities such as feeling are also independent minds. By granting an independent status to mental activities, he actually denies the existence of mental activities as understood by the Sarvāstivādins, and admits that there are multiple minds.

Śrīlāta also insists on the successive arising of the mind and mental activities, but he limits the number of mental activities to three. His view is reported by Saṃghabhadra as follows: "The Sthavira [i.e., Śrīlāta] says: 'The *mahābhūmika dharma*s are not ten as held by [the Sarvāstivādins]. They are only three, which consists of what the Sūtra says the simultaneously arisen feeling, ideation and volition'".[12] In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, ten of the forty-six mental activities are called the *mahābhūmika dharma*s, and they are considered to be associated with the mind of any nature. These ten are feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*samjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), contact (*sparśa*), desire (*chanda*), wisdom (*prajñā*), memory (*smṛti*), verification (*adhimokṣa*), attention (*manaskāra*) and meditation (*samādhi*). Śrīlāta only accepts the first three as mental activities. Although speaking of the simultaneity of these three, according to the study of Katō, Śrīlāta actually sees them as arising successively. Sense organ and object arise in the first moment, and consciousness arises in the second moment, followed by feeling, ideation and volition, which arise respectively in the third, fourth and fifth moments.[13]

With regard to the relationship between the mind and mental activities, Harivarman follows closely Buddhadeva to identify mental activities with the mind. In the chapter on consciousness in JP, Harivarman elaborates five important views: (1) there are no mental activities; (2) there are no associates of the mind; (3) there are multiple minds; (4) all minds are temporary; (5) no mind can arise simultaneously with another mind. All these views are to demonstrate a successive model of mind, as he says:

There are no *dharmas* associated with [the mind]. Why? Because there are no mental activities. What can the mind be associated with [if there are no mental activities]? Again, it is because feeling and so forth cannot arise simultaneously. Moreover, it is because cause and effect cannot be simultaneous. Consciousness is the cause of ideation and so forth, so these *dharmas* should not arise simultaneously. Therefore, there are no associated *dharmas*. . . . Again, consciousness and so forth should also arise successively, just as the seed, sprout, stem, leaf, flower and fruit are seen springing up in a causal order.[14]

Harivarman's theory of multiple minds is especially interesting because it is in this context that he criticizes the Mahāsāṃghikas and explores his own view on self-cognition. As we know, the Mahāsāṃghikas hold that two minds can arise simultaneously, which, at first sight, sounds similar to Harivarman's view of multiple minds. But, in his view, the Mahāsāṃghikas still commit themselves to a substantial understanding of mind, according to which the mind as a substance accompanies various mental activities and manifests in different consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness, mental consciousness and so forth. When they say that the mind knows *it-self*, this *self* means a substantial mind that pervades all mental states and mental activities. So they actually hold a view of one mind. Harivarman, following Buddhadeva, rejects the privilege that the mind enjoys. His denial of the existence of mental activities is to elevate them to the same status as that of the mind. As a result, after the denial of mental activities, there emerge multiple minds. He states the basic reason for the multiplicity of mind as follows:

There are multiple minds. Why? Consciousness refers to the mind. The consciousness of visual objects is a different [mind], and the consciousness of odors is another different [mind], hence there are multiple minds.[15]

Harivarman is saying that there exist multiple minds because of the multiplicity of their objects. To a certain extent, every particular object requires a different mind to perceive it. These multiple minds have no chance to arise simultaneously because each of them possesses an independent substance. These minds arise and cease successively the same way as their objects arise and cease successively.

In a word, the successive model of mind developed by the Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas is the context in which the issue of self-cognition is discussed. It is interesting to note that, while the Dārṣṭāntikas deny the possibility of self-cognition under this model, the Sautrāntikas establish self-cognition under the same model.

How does the mind know itself?

When discussing whether the mind is one or many, i.e., whether it arises as one mind continuously or as multiple minds successively, Harivarman argues with an opponent on the issue of self-cognition. The opponent can be identified as a Mahāsāṃghika from his following statement:

> The mind as a *dharma* can know itself (*svabhāva*), just like a lamp that can illumine itself and other things, or a fortune-teller who can tell his own fate as well as that of others. Thus the mind is one and it can know itself as well as others.[16]

As we see, this is exactly the way that the Mahāsāṃghikas present their theory of self-cognition, although the simile of the fortune-teller is new to us. Examining this statement carefully, however, we see some significant differences from what we have seen previously. First, it does not mention mental activities, which, according to the Mahāsāṃghikas, are also self-cognizant. This is, I think, because the Sautrāntikas deny the independent status of mental activities. So the mind here must have included mental activities. Second, the passage concludes that the mind is one. This implies that the unified mind continuum makes self-cognition and cognition of others possible. This view is not explicitly expressed by the Mahāsāṃghikas in previous chapters. Harivarman argues against the Mahāsāṃghikas with the following words:

> The grasper differs on account of the difference of the grasped. For instance, a certain person knows his own mind sometimes. How does [the mind] in itself (*svabhāva*) know itself? Eyes do not see themselves; a sword does not cut itself; a finger does not touch its own tip. Hence the mind is not one.[17]

This passage is puzzling because it seems to argue against self-cognition if we only pay attention to the similes of eyes, sword or finger. Both Katsura and Sastri insist that Harivarman here is to refute the Mahāsāṃghika view of self-cognition with these similes.[18] However, if we put these similes back in to their context, we shall discover that the problem is more complicated than simply denial of self-cognition. First of all, Harivarman is using the person who knows his own mind as a supportive example for his main thesis: subject differs on account of its different object. In other words, the mind differs if it perceives different objects, so there has to be more than one mind to perceive various different objects. This is why the passage is concluded with "the mind is not one". Now, what is the function of these similes if they are not to refute self-cognition? I think that they are to reply to the question: "How does the mind in itself know itself"? It implies

that both parties are not disputing *whether* the mind can know itself. Instead, they only disagree with each other on *how* it knows itself. The Mahāsāṃghikas, as usual, maintain that it is one and the same mind that knows both itself and other objects. Harivarman, however, holds that one mind cannot have two objects and that different object requires different mind to apprehend. So the mind that has the external object as its object must be different from the one that takes this mind itself as object.

This view of Harivarman is elaborated in his analysis of the supportive examples of the Mahāsāṃghikas. With regard to the lamp, he says, it is only necessary to light a lamp when we need to illumine something that is not illumined. The lamp is not something that is not illumined, so it does not illumine itself. So far we do not see any difference in his argument from those of the Sarvāstivādins and Mādhyamikas. What makes him distinct is the following analysis:

> When a lamp expels darkness, eye-consciousness arises. The eye-consciousness, after arising, can see the lamp as well as things like a jar.[19]

What is interesting about this analysis is that eye-consciousness is involved with the lamp. The eye-consciousness here is the one that sees or "illumines" the lamp. If we apply this analysis to the mind itself, the mind that illuminates other object is a lamp, while the mind that knows itself is eye-consciousness. These two minds should be different in the same way as eye-consciousness differs from a lamp. On this analysis, the eye-consciousness arises after the lighting of the lamp, which seems to suggest that self-cognition arises after the cognition of other object.

The other simile used by the Mahāsāṃghikas has to do with the practice of fortune-telling in ancient India. According to Harivarman, fortune-telling is one of the three ways to gain the supernatural power that knows the minds of others. The other two are to attain this power by birth, like the spirits do, and by practice, like the Buddhists do. Unlike the spirits or Buddhist practitioners who can directly know the minds of others, a fortune-teller knows others' minds by reading their bodily signs (*aṅga*), or by using the magical charm of these signs.[20] Therefore, "the fortune-teller has what is called the knowledge of signs because he knows his own material form (*rūpa*) as well as those of others".[21] On Harivarman's analysis, this simile has nothing to do with self-cognition because the mind of the fortune-teller does not take this mind itself as object. Instead, he knows his own fate by reading his own bodily signs, which has no difference from reading those of others.

In sum, Harivarman is not disputing with the Mahāsāṃghikas on whether the mind can know itself. Instead, he disagrees with them on how it is self-known. In a framework of successively arising minds, he argues that it involves multiple mental processes when the mind is to know itself and

other objects. But, with regard to issues such as what kind of mind is self-known and how it is self-known, his position is still ambiguous and requires further clarification.

Mental consciousness

In addition to his critique of the Mahāsāṃghikas, Harivarman also criticizes the Sarvāstivādins when developing his theory of self-cognition. On his view, the Sarvāstivāda negation of self-cognition is valid for five sense consciousnesses, but the sixth or mental consciousness is an exception. In Sautrāntika epistemology, mental consciousness is a crucial factor that makes cognition possible by its capacities of conceptualization, taking images, and memory. This consciousness is also endowed with self-cognition, a capacity that knows the consciousness itself. The self-cognition, as a faculty of the conceptual mind, has to be ceased when the two-truths analysis is applied.

"Mental consciousness is self-cognizant"

In the chapter on all-knowing awareness in JP, Harivarman further explores the issue of self-cognition. This chapter, as its title indicates, discusses the omniscient awareness. Here Harivarman is believed to argue directly against the Sarvāstivādins. First of all, he does not think that the "all" in the Sūtra verse "all are no-self", which we have discussed in previous chapters, means "all *dharma*s". Instead, it only refers to various realms and loci. He says: "If an awareness acts on various realms (*dhātu*), loci (*āyatana*) and so forth, it is called all-knowing [awareness]".[22] To support his view, Harivarman borrows the distinction of two "alls" from the Vaibhāṣikas. But, unlike the Vaibhāṣikas who exclude the mind itself, its associates and co-existents with the partial all, Harivarman excludes the undefiled and unconditioned *dharma*s. On his view, "nobody can produce a thought of self in the unconditioned realm",[23] so it is unnecessary to say: "The unconditioned *dharma*s are no-self". The exclusion of the unconditioned *dharma*s also indicates a view held by the Sautrāntikas that the unconditioned *dharma*s are not real existents.[24]

The Sarvāstivādins deny that this awareness of loci and so forth can know all *dharma*s, because it cannot know the awareness itself and *dharma*s associated and co-existed with this awareness. To refute this view, Harivarman argues:

> [Yes], it can know [all]. If [an awareness] can know loci and so forth, then it is called the awareness of universal characteristic. It can know all because it is the awareness of universal characteristic. Why? Because all *dharma*s are included in what is called the twelve loci (*āyatana*). Thus, we know that this awareness also knows itself (*svabhāva*).[25]

The awareness of universal characteristic (*zong xiang zhi* 總相智) is a key word here. Katsura (1976: 679) reconstructs it into **sāmānyalakṣaṇajñāna* and renders it as "conceptual knowledge" (*gainen chi* 概念知). This is because he identifies *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* with the universal in Buddhist logic, which is the object of inference. Hence the awareness or knowledge of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is inference, a conceptual knowledge. He further says that self-cognition in Harivarman's sense is conceptual knowledge, which is different from the self-cognition in Dignāga's system, where it is a type of perception that is devoid of conceptual construction. I think Katsura follows too closely the Buddhist logicians in understanding the term *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and ignores its alternative meaning in Abhidharma texts. As I have discussed in previous chapters, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in an Abhidharma sense means the universal characteristic of reality that can be an object of direct perception or realization. The awareness of universal characteristic can be perceptual or conceptual knowledge but not limited to either of them. Most important, the awareness of universal or particular characteristic marks different stages of attainment, as is stated in the same chapter of JP:

> In what sense is a Bhikṣu called the omniscient? He who knows as such the arising and cessation of six contact-loci (*sparśāyatana*) is the one who knows all *dharma*s in their universal characteristics rather than in their particular characteristics. The Buddha knows both the universal and particular characteristics, and thus is named the omniscient. But the Bhikṣu is called the omniscient in the sense that he knows in general that all *dharma*s are impermanent. Though bearing the same title, they are actually different. [The latter] only signifies a partial [omniscience].[26]

For Harivarman, the awareness of universal characteristic, though a partial omniscience, has already known all *dharma*s including the awareness itself. The self-cognition of this awareness here is part of its knowledge of universal characteristic. But, once the awareness is directed toward itself, it knows its own particular characteristic and becomes knowledge of particular characteristic. So self-cognition is not necessarily categorized as knowledge of universal characteristic, or "conceptual knowledge" as Katsura would like to put it.

The opponent denies the possibility of self-cognition with reference to causality and similes such as finger-tip and eyes, as well as a Sūtra passage which says that consciousness must be produced by the conditions of sense organ and object. As we have discussed in Chapter 3, these are standard formulations against self-cognition among the Vaibhāṣikas. Harivarman replies: "It is not necessary for a consciousness to arise from two conditions as you said. Because not all awarenesses are produced by two conditions, as some of them can arise without these conditions".[27] For example, he says,

mental consciousness can arise without any object, because it does not directly take anything of the present as object. When it arises, the present *dharma* has already vanished. So the mental consciousness can never take a sensory object as object. If it does, then the blind would be able to see things. The blind argument is a packed argument, for it reveals some basic Sautrāntika views on mental consciousness. According to the Sautrāntikas, mental consciousness arises later in the successive sequence of cognition by following the arising of sense organ and sensory object, and then the arising of sense consciousness. Mental consciousness can never have a direct access to sensory objects, because they are always in the past when this consciousness arises. Unlike the Sarvāstivādins who admit the existence of the past and the future, the Sautrāntikas do not think that the past or future *dharmas* are so real to act as objects of consciousness.

For Harivarman, the fact that the arising of mental consciousness is not subject to the conditions of sense organ and sensory object has proved that this consciousness is self-cognizant. He further states this point explicitly as follows:

> You said that there are no causality or similes [to support] the knowing of [the mind] itself. Here is a saying that mental [consciousness] is self-cognizant. In other words, a yogi, by following his mind, observes that there is no mind in the past or the future, so he knows that the present mind takes this very present mind as object. If not so, no one would be conscious of the associated *dharma*s of the present mind.[28]

Besides the explicit assertion that the mental consciousness is self-cognizant, there are a couple of points worth noting in this statement. First, it is based on the yogic experience that self-cognition is established. This reveals a possible relationship between self-cognition as a strictly epistemological concept and self-realization (*pratyātmasaṃvedya*), a soteriologically oriented term that is frequently used in Buddhist, especially Yogācāra, literature.[29] Second, mental consciousness of the present can only take itself as object because there is no mind in the past or the future. Mind of the past, like sensory objects in the past, has vanished and cannot act as an object of the present mind. Third, one of the purposes in establishing self-cognition is to know the mental activities that are associated with the present mind. The last point is dubious because it implies that mental activities are functioning simultaneously with the present mind. As is pointed out by Sastri (1975: 502, n. 73a), this is contradictory to Harivarman's view that minds arise successively and that there are no mental activities associated with the present mind.

To consider this problem, it is helpful to refer to a passage in JP discussing how feeling, being a mental activity, is known. It starts with the Sūtra

passage that we have discussed in the last chapter: "When a person experiences a pleasant feeling, he knows as such that he experiences the pleasant feeling." Now the question is: What feeling does he know? The Vaibhāṣikas would say that he knows the past feeling. But the Sautrāntikas deny the reality of past or future feelings, so they do not think that one can know these feelings. Now, what about the present feeling? It seems that Harivarman agrees with his opponent, who states that "the present feeling cannot know itself".[30] This statement has two implications. First, feeling or, in general, mental activities are not self-cognizant. The capacity of self-cognition belongs exclusively to mental consciousness. Second, at the very moment when a feeling is functioning, this feeling is not known yet. But, if a feeling is not known at the very moment of experiencing the feeling, it has to be known when it becomes a past feeling. If this were the case, Harivarman would fall back to a Vaibhāṣika position. In contrast, he addresses this issue in the following way:

> When feelings such as pleasure come to one's body, one can know them with one's mental [consciousness]. So it is not a fault [to say that a person knows as such that he experiences a pleasant feeling when he experiences the pleasant feeling].[31]

For Harivarman, it is the mental consciousness that knows the present feeling. As a result, the feeling is known and the mental consciousness becomes self-cognizant. At this point, we encounter the same problem as before: Does this mean that feeling is associated with mental consciousness? Are they functioning simultaneously? Harivarman is fully aware of this problem and offers the following solution:

> This person *first* experiences the pleasant feeling, *then* grasps its image (*ākāra). This is what is meant by saying that one knows as such [that one experiences a pleasant feeling] when one experiences the pleasant feeling.[32]

Here Harivarman distinguishes between "first" and "then", which implies that he shares a Theravāda understanding of the present as a continuum. So the present is not a single moment, but a continuum of multiple moments, in which one can distinguish between first and then, before and after. Even though a person knows the feeling *after* he experiences it, it is still true to say that he knows that he experiences the feeling *when* he experiences it, because the distinction of before and after is still within the continuum of the present. So the feeling as a mental activity is not really simultaneous with the mental consciousness that knows this feeling. Instead, they constitute a continuum in the sense that mental consciousness knowing a feeling is considered to be self-cognition. This is similar to his analysis of the lamp,

where the self-illumination of the lamp is explained as the eye-consciousness seeing the lamp. In both cases, it underlines a Sautrāntika view that the mind and mental activities are not fundamentally different.

Although the pleasant feeling in the previous moment is considered part of the present, it is still something fading away, so one can only "grasp its image" rather than directly perceiving this feeling. The image (*ākāra) here is an important concept for the Sautrāntikas. Unlike the Sarvāstivādins, who consider image to be a reflection of the external object and thus somewhat secondary, the Sautrāntikas hold that image is a real entity for cognition to take as object, from which the reality of the external object can be inferred. For them, the image is the key to explaining the mechanism of the cognition, not only of feelings, but also of all *dharmas*. On their view, there arise sense organ and sensory object first, then sense consciousness, and finally mental consciousness. The sensory object has always already disappeared when the consciousness arises. The only thing that connects them and thus makes the cognition possible is the image, the trace of the disappearing object. Harivarman says:

> In the case that a *dharma* arises in the mind of a certain person, there arises mental consciousness after the *dharma* has disappeared. [The mental consciousness] can know this [*dharma*] as an event, and thus is called the consciousness that takes image (*ākāra) as object.[33]

On Harivarman's understanding, what makes cognition possible is the interaction between the consciousness that takes image as object and the image itself. Things like horn of hare, hair of turtle or feet of snake bear no images, so it is impossible to have cognition of these things. One may argue that, if we can speak about things like horn of hare, it would mean that there is a cognition of horn of hare in our mind. Otherwise, we would not even be able to speak of such a thing. At this point, Harivarman is forced to make a distinction between imaginary image and efficient image in order to avoid the danger of inferring the reality of images such as the horn of hare. The imaginary image is not real image, for image in his understanding has to be something efficient or functioning. For instance, we can remember a person after he has gone. The image of this person is functioning because the person was present. In general, the efficient image is of things that have arisen and then ceased, but not of a thing that has never existed. However, the Sautrāntikas do not think that consciousness can directly get access to external objects. The existence of the external object can only be inferred from the image that functions as the internal object of cognition. So the difficulty remains with regard to the distinction between imaginary and efficient images.

Another way to distinguish the two is to discern whether the image is out of memory or imagination. The horn of hare is of an imaginary nature

because no one has ever experienced it. On the contrary, the image of a thing that one has experienced is the efficient image. But why is the image out of memory efficient? This has to do with the nature of memory. Memory, in general, plays an important role in Sautrāntika epistemology. Harivarman sees memory as the force that makes cognition possible. For instance, upon hearing *de-va-da-tta*, there is no single consciousness that can comprehend all these four syllables because, on a Sautrāntika view, the consciousness of each syllable is a separate consciousness. Now, how can these four consciousnesses come together to form a cognition of the word *devadatta*? It is because of memory or retention that holds the traces of previous syllables and provides them to the mental consciousness to conceptualize the word *devadatta*.[34] In the particular case of mental consciousness, memory makes the conceptualization of this consciousness possible. Harivarman says:

> Again, one knows because of the force of memory. For instance, eye-consciousness cannot tell man from woman [lit., conceptualize a man or a woman]. If the eye-consciousness cannot, then mental consciousness should not be able to do so either. But actually the mental consciousness can do so. This is also [because of the force of memory].[35]

Since both memory and mental consciousness take what have been experienced as object, they are very much identical. Harivarman says: "*Dharma*s such as consciousness are to remember their own [experienced] events, so they are also named memory. Memory arises from the grasping of image: following a *dharma* and grasping its image, there arises memory".[36] Given the important role of memory in cognition, we are not surprised to see that the Sautrāntikas rely heavily on the phenomenon of memory to argue for the existence of both self-cognition and the external object.

So far we have discussed a few capacities of mental consciousness, namely, taking images, remembering and conceptualizing. Now, if the mental consciousness is self-cognizant, then do the Sautrāntikas also admit that self-cognition can take images, remember or conceptualize? The first two seem not to be a problem since with self-cognition one can take one's own image of consciousness, and remember oneself as the subject of experience. This is actually a major Sautrāntika argument for the existence of self-cognition. The last point, i.e., whether self-cognition is conceptual, however, is uncertain, for Harivarman does not explicitly say that self-cognition is devoid of conceptual construction as does Dignāga. Katsura (1976: 679) has attempted to interpret the Harivarman sense of self-cognition as conceptual knowledge, but I do not find it convincing. This may not be a relevant issue for Harivarman and the Sautrāntikas at all.

Finally, the epistemological framework in which Harivarman presents his view on self-cognition can be illustrated and summarized with Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 Mental consciousness being self-cognizant.

Cessation of self-cognition

In JP, there is another passage that discusses the issue of self-cognition. It did not attract the attention of either Katsura (1974) or Sastri (1975, 1978); or they may have intentionally ignored this passage because it potentially contradicts all that we have discussed in previous sections. The text says:

> Question: If mental consciousness does not know *dharma*s such as visual objects, then should it know itself?
> Answer: No *dharma* knows itself. Why? It cannot know itself in the present, just as a knife cannot cut itself. In the past or the future, there exist no *dharma*s or other minds. Therefore, mental consciousness cannot know itself.[37]

Here the self-cognition of mental consciousness is explicitly denied for two reasons: (1) mental consciousness in the present cannot know itself; (2) there exist no *dharma*s or other minds in the past or the future. The second reason is understandable because the Sautrāntikas deny the reality of the past and the future. The first reason, however, directly contradicts Harivarman's own argument for the self-cognition of mental consciousness. Though it is explained with the simile of the knife, which is also used by Harivarman to argue against the Mahāsāṃghikas, this statement shows that he is inconsistent in his views on self-cognition. How to understand this inconsistency? Did he change his mind when composing different parts of his work? We may have a clue to this in the following conversation:

> Question: If a person knows the minds of others, does that mean that mental consciousness can know mental *dharma*s?
> Answer: A person who does not know his own mind can still have the thought, "I have this mind", so is the case with the minds of others.

> Again, a *dharma* of the future, though it does not exist, can still produce knowledge. What is wrong if the minds of others are likewise?[38]

The opponent here, in conformity with his previous position, is arguing that, if mental consciousness knows neither itself nor *dharma*s like visual objects, it at least knows some mental *dharma*s, which can be proved by the knowledge of the minds of others. Harivarman's answer links together all three cases, namely, the knowledge of the mind itself, of the minds of others, and of future *dharma*s. In the case of the self-knowledge of the mind, a person who does not really know his own mind can construct a thought that he knows this mind. In other words, self-cognition is a construction over the reality that there is no self-cognition. The same is true with the knowledge of the minds of others and of future *dharma*s, for this knowledge is also constructed over the reality that it does not exist. In these cases, concepts such as self-cognition, the knowledge of the minds of others, or the knowledge of future *dharma*s are all provisional constructions over the ultimate reality that they do not exist.

As we see, this is exactly an application of the theory of two truths, namely, the conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) and the ultimate truth (*paramārtha-satya*). This theory has its origin among early Buddhist schools. From KV V.6 and I.1.245, we learn that both the Andhakas and Vātsīputrīyas discuss this theory. Being respectively descendants of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sthaviravādins, they seem to share this theory, which implies that their distinction of two truths must have a common and earlier origin. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, we also find extensive discussions on the two truths. Nāgārjuna further elaborated this theory by applying the key concept of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) in the Perfection of Wisdom literature to the ultimate level. The Yogācārins, unsatisfied with the two-truths analysis, further developed the theory of three natures (*trisvabhāva*). Interestingly enough, we can find all these types of truth theory in Harivarman's JP. In defining the provisional mind (**prajñapti-citta*), he cites an Abhidharma definition of two truths:

> The Buddha taught two truths, namely, the true truth (*zhen di* 真諦) and the conventional truth. The true truth refers to *dharma*s such as matter and *nirvāṇa*. The conventional truth refers to concepts that have no intrinsic nature. For instance, a jar is established depending upon matter and so forth; a person is established on the conditions of five *skandha*s.[39]

A similar definition can be found in Vasubandhu's AKBh VI.4. But it seems that Harivarman is not in favor of this set of two truths. Instead, he uses more often the other pair that sounds closer to that of the Mādhyamikas. In the latter pair the five *skandha*s are no longer ultimate truth, but only

nirvāṇa or the cessation of five *skandhas* is the ultimate. His favor of the latter pair is not because he "changes his view".[40] On the contrary, I find that Kumārajīva, who translated JP into Chinese, consistently maintains a distinction between the true truth (*zhen di*), a Sarvāstivāda sense of ultimate truth, and the ultimate truth (*di yi yi di* 第一義諦), a usage found more often in the Perfection of Wisdom literature, as is indicated in the following passage:

> The ultimate (*di yi yi*) [truth] means that matter, consciousness and so forth are empty. Thus when one observes *dharmas* such as matter as empty, one is named the one who sees the ultimate emptiness.
> Question: If five *skandhas* exist in terms of the conventional truth, why do [the Sarvāstivādins] say that *dharmas* such as matter are true truth (*zhen di*)?
> Answer: It is said so for the sake of sentient beings. "But for the sake of those who view five *skandhas* as real, we say that the five *skandhas* are empty in terms of the ultimate [truth]".[41]

Harivarman here not only distinguishes the ultimate truth from the true truth, he actually also thinks that it is superior to the true truth as understood by the Sarvāstivādins. So he adds one more layer to the Abhidharma theory of two truths. The threefold truth is evident in his definition of the truth of cessation (*nirodha-satya*). He says: "Cessation of three kinds of minds is called the truth of cessation. [The three minds are] provisional mind (**prajñapti-citta*), the mind of *dharma* (**dharma-citta*) and the mind of emptiness (**śūnyatā-citta*)".[42] Among these three minds, the provisional mind is "the conceptual construction over the *skandhas*".[43] It corresponds to the conventional truth. "The mind of *dharma* is the awareness that sees the five *skandhas* as real".[44] This mind is identical to the true truth in the Abhidharma sense. According to Harivarman's view, this mind is not the ultimate because the mind of emptiness goes beyond it. The mind of emptiness is the awareness of *nirvāṇa* or emptiness. This mind of emptiness even has to cease when one enters into the *nirvāṇa* without residue or the meditation that takes no more object (*nirodha-samāpatti*). As we see, the ultimate truth in Harivarman's understanding is more negative than that of the Mādhyamikas, who were usually labeled by others as nihilists. Despite its negativity, the threefold mind resembles the three natures as developed by the Yogācārins, namely, imagined nature (*parikalpa-svabhāva*), dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) and accomplished nature (*parinispanna-svabhāva*).

Now let us return to the "inconsistency" that we find in Harivarman's view of self-cognition. His denial of self-cognition is found in the context of the cessation of mental consciousness, part of the cessation of provisional mind. Similar to *dharmas* such as five material realms and causality, or concepts such as oneness, difference, ineffability and emptiness, mental

consciousness is seen as a conceptual construction over the real existent – five *skandha*s. Self-cognition, as a capacity peculiar to mental consciousness, is also a conceptual construction that does not exist in the ultimate level. Now we understand that Harivarman is not really contradicting himself when establishing self-cognition on one hand but denying it on the other, because he is applying a two-truths analysis here. On this analysis, both the establishment and denial of self-cognition can be true. The denial of self-cognition is valid in the ultimate level. In the conventional level, however, self-cognition still exists. With regard to whether self-cognition exists in the conventional level, there were debates among the later Mādhyamikas, especially in Tibet, as Williams (1998) has treated at length. Harivarman's discussion on the cessation of self-cognition reveals his Madhyamaka tendency. This is also the reason why he was regarded as a Mahāyāna master in the early period when his work was introduced to China.[45]

Proof of self-cognition

In Candrakīrti's MA, we come across another piece of material on the Sautrāntika doctrine of self-cognition. This is the passage mentioned by many contemporary scholars, including La Vallée Poussin (1925: 182, n. 2), Yamaguchi (1951: 21), Lü (1991: 2396–7), Katsura (1969: 34, n. 6) and Kajiyama (1983: 37), as an evidence for the Sautrāntika origin of self-cognition. But, in my view, this passage does not really indicate an origin of the concept of self-cognition. Instead, it presents to us a series of rather mature arguments for self-cognition. These arguments are so well formulated that we cannot help but assume that they have been developed for generations among the Sautrāntika scholars. My study has shown that there were extensive discussions and disputations on self-cognition among the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins before the emergence of Sautrāntika. It seems that the Sautrāntikas did not commit themselves to the doctrine of self-cognition in the beginning. The Sautrāntika doctrines as reported in MV and NA do not contain any information on self-cognition. Vasubandhu, as the author of AKBh, is well known for his Sautrāntika tendency. But he was still in conformity with the Sarvāstivāda view on this matter, though he chose to be sided with Vasumitra instead of with the Vaibhāṣikas. So far as we know, Harivarman is the earliest Sautrāntika who developed a doctrine of self-cognition although he is usually considered a divergent Sautrāntika. His view on self-cognition is clearly developed out of disputations with the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins, and thus is not organized in a systematic way. In Candrakīrti's report, however, we see a series of systematically formulated proofs of self-cognition. Though not necessarily consistent with Harivarman's view, they indicate how the Sautrāntikas have developed their doctrine of self-cognition for over 300 years, which is the span between the time of Harivarman and of Candrakīrti.

An important feature of the Sautrāntika argument for self-cognition as reported by Candrakīrti is that *rang rig* or *svasaṃvedana*, the technical term for self-cognition, is explicitly used. If we strictly trace the origin of the term *svasaṃvedana* in the sense of self-cognition, then this text of Candrakīrti can be an evidence for the Sautrāntika origin of this term. However, two factors further complicate the problem. First, given the fact that Cantrakīrti lived after the time of Dignāga, he might find it easy to restate the Sautrāntika doctrine of self-cognition by utilizing the Dignāga featured term *svasaṃvedana*, as Vinītadeva did to the Lokottaravādins as I have discussed in Chapter 2. Second, Candrakīrti here is reporting a shared view of the Sautrāntikas and some Vijñānavādins. This increases the possibility for Candrakīrti to rephrase the view of the Sautrāntikas with Dignāna's terminology. Owing to the shortage of original materials on Sautrāntika, especially on its later phase of development, we cannot determine who were the initiators of the technical usage of *svasaṃvedana* in the sense of self-cognition, the Sautrāntikas or the Yogācārins.

The Sautrāntika view as reported by Candrakīrti consists of three well-formulated proofs of self-cognition. These proofs have to do with the supportive similes, memory and infinite regress. The first proof is in a Mahāsāṃghika style of using similes to make sense of self-cognition. The text says:

> Here some [Vijñānavādins] accept the view of the Sautrāntikas, who prove the existence of self-cognition (*rang rig*) in the following way. When a flame arises, it illumines both itself and things like a jar simultaneously rather than gradually (*mi 'jug pa*). When a sound is uttered, one knows the sound itself and what it denotes [simultaneously]. Likewise, when a consciousness arises, it cognizes both itself and other objects [simultaneously] rather than gradually. Therefore, "self-cognition" must exist.[46]

This argument sounds familiar because it echoes a Mahāsāṃghika tone of using the simile of the lamp and of emphasizing simultaneity. Here the simultaneity (*cig car*) is discussed in contrast to the gradualness (*'jug pa*). It, however, seems to contradict the basic Sautrāntika tenet that minds arise successively. As I have shown in previous sections, Harivarman analyzes the example of the lamp illumining itself and others into a gradual process, in which the flame, the illumination of other objects, the arising of eye-consciousness, and the illumination of the lamp itself come into being in a due order. In the case of the awareness of feeling, however, Harivarman still admits to the simultaneity between the feeling and the awareness of feeling even though he applies a gradual analysis to the case. This ambiguity in the usage of simultaneity and gradualness reflects a dilemma among the Sautrāntikas. They cannot commit themselves to the reflective model of

self-cognition as developed by the Sarvāstivādins because they do not accept the past or the future as real existent. On the other hand, to explain phenomena such as memory or perception, they have to introduce a mind continuum within the present. The present can be analyzed into multiple moments, and minds arising in the same present continuum are considered to be simultaneous. As a result, the Sautrāntikas blend the border between simultaneity and gradualness. I suppose this is why we see a Mahāsāṃghika-like argument in the first proof of self-cognition. In his commentary on MA, Tsong kha pa thinks that neither the Sautrāntikas nor the Vijñānavādins in this text should use simultaneity as a proof of self-cognition since the very idea of simultaneity has been dismissed by Dharmakīrti. So he "suspects that the Sanskrit text might be wrong".[47] I think this can be another possibility.

The second proof of self-cognition proposed by the Sautrāntikas is the so-called memory argument. This argument is usually attributed to Dignāga and regarded as one of the most effective arguments for self-cognition.[48] It goes like this:

> Even those who do not accept [self-cognition] have to admit the existence of self-cognition. Because if there were no [self-cognition] it would be unreasonable for one to remember an object in later time and to say: "This has been seen". Nor is it reasonable for one to remember the experience of this object and to say: "I have seen this". Why? Because memory is of the object that has been experienced. If an awareness has not experienced an object, it cannot remember this object. Without self-cognition, [the awareness] cannot know its own experience.[49]

This statement comprises three major arguments that are associated with the phenomenon of memory, and all of them aim at a common end, that is, there exists self-cognition. The three arguments are: (1) Memory is of things that have been experienced. If consciousness has not experienced a thing, it cannot remember the thing; (2) It is reasonable for one to remember an object in later time and to say: "This *object* has been seen"; (3) It is also reasonable for one to remember the experience of the object and to say: "*I* have seen this object".

Among them, the first is the most basic argument. It also bases itself on the most obvious phenomenon: one cannot remember things that are not experienced; whatever appears in one's memory must be what one has experienced. Dignāga also sees this as the core of the entire memory argument, as he formulates it in a verse: "And memory of later time is not of things that have not been experienced".[50] In his auto-commentary, he further proves the existence of self-cognition on the basis of this argument. This argument, as a basis, serves two goals. First, it proves that when one remembers an

object one can say: "This object has been seen". This point would not stand if memory were not of *things* that have been experienced. Thus, it has proved the existence of the external object. Second, it proves that when one remembers the experience of the object one can say: "I have seen this object." This point, again, would not be true if memory were not of things that have been *experienced*. This has proved the existence of self-cognition.

As we know, the Sautrāntikas commit themselves to a strict sense of momentariness. For them, when sense organ and sensory object are in contact, consciousness has not arisen yet. The sense organ in their system does not enjoy the privilege of making cognition possible as it does in Sarvāstivāda system. The Sautrāntikas adopt a view developed by early Dārṣṭāntikas that only consciousness or the combination of consciousness and sense organ sees.[51] Therefore, in their system, for cognition to come true, one has to wait until the arising of consciousness in the subsequent moment. But in this moment the sensory object and sense organ have already disappeared, and what is left to the consciousness is only innate images. The consciousness of these images that have been experienced is exactly memory. Hence memory becomes the only solid ground for the Sautrāntikas to infer the existence of both the external object and self-cognition.

The Sautrāntika argument for the existence of the external object is also found in the *Viṃśatikā*, a Yogācāra text of Vasubandhu. In this text, he refutes various types of realism including that of the Sautrāntikas, who use exactly the same memory argument to prove the existence of the external object. The text says:

> [Anything] not experienced is not remembered by mental conscious-ness. Therefore, an object must be necessarily experienced, and that which sees objects such as the visible (*rūpa*) should be considered perception.[52]

The Sautrāntikas here attribute the faculty of memory to mental consciousness, which confirms Harivarman's view that mental consciousness in its essence is memory. Their memory argument also starts with the most basic phenomenon: one cannot remember anything that is not experienced. This leads to a further argument that the object that appears in memory must have been experienced in the previous moment when memory has not yet taken place. In this previous moment, the object is an external object, and that which perceives it is perception. Therefore, the existence of the external object can be inferred from the very phenomenon of memory, though memory is not in direct contact with the external object. For this reason, the Sautrāntikas are also known as those who infer the existence of the external object (*bāhyārthānumeyatva*).[53]

Vasubandhu, however, does not agree with this argument from the beginning. First of all, he does not think memory is of things that have been

experienced, because, in the Yogācāra system, "it is said that memory is of the representational consciousness (*vijñapti*) that appears as that [object]".[54] On his idealistic view, the object in memory has no external basis because it is only produced by the representational consciousness (*vijñapti*). By reducing the object to the objective appearance of consciousness, Vasubandhu has eliminated any possible further argument for the existence of the external object on the basis of memory.

In his PV, Dharmakīrti also adopts this memory argument when refuting the Mīmāṃsaka view that perception is conceptual construction (*savikalpa*). For the Mīmāṃsakas, the perception of visual objects and so forth is conceptual knowledge, and "there also exists the experience (*anubhava*) of this [perception]".[55] This experience of perception is what we call self-cognition. Now, if the perception is conceptual, "how can [the experience of perception] be non-conceptual"?[56] On a Mīmāṃsaka view, the experience of perception, i.e., self-cognition, is definitely conceptual. Now, Dharmakīrti argues, if the two conceptual awarenesses arise at the same time, it contradicts their own view that "no two conceptual [awarenesses] are simultaneous".[57] If the experience of perception arises after the perception has taken place, Dharmakīrti says: "[The conceptual awareness] of the past [perception] is memory. How can it [i.e., memory] be possible without grasping [the past perception]"?[58] In other words, memory is only possible when there is the grasping or experience of the past perception, i.e., the self-cognition of this perception. Therefore, the fact that the past perception can be remembered at present has proved the existence of self-cognition at an earlier time. As is pointed out by Tosaki (1979: 48), Dharmakīrti here is using a Sautrāntika featured memory argument for self-cognition. Later in the text, Dharmakīrti also adopts a view that the consciousness of an object arises after the object has disappeared, which has been identified to be a Sautrāntika view by his major commentators, including Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin.[59]

The third proof of self-cognition proposed by the Sautrāntikas is concerned with the problem of infinite regress. If a consciousness is not known by itself, but by a separate consciousness, they argue, there will be a fault of infinite regress. For instance, if a consciousness of blue has to be known by another consciousness, does the consciousness that knows the consciousness of blue have to be known by yet another consciousness? If it does not, the consciousness of blue should not either. If it does, the consciousness that knows this consciousness has to be known by one more consciousness, which, again, requires another consciousness to know it. This can go on infinitely. As a result, it is impossible to know the consciousness of blue at the first place. Moreover, if a cognition is known by another cognition, the latter would not be able to have any other external objects as object, because the cognition of the former cognition and of the external object are two different cognitions. These two cognitions, according to the Sautrāntikas, cannot

arise simultaneously. Therefore, it is proved that the cognition has to be known by itself, and that there is self-cognition.

Among these proofs of self-cognition, the one associated with memory is particularly interesting. It is not unusual for the Sautrāntikas to develop this memory argument. As we have discussed previously, memory plays an important role in Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika epistemology. Saṃghabhadra defines perceptual awareness, a reflective form of self-cognition, as the moment of memory. Harivarman regards memory as equivalent to mental consciousness, which, in his understanding, is self-cognizant. In both cases, self-cognition enjoys a close relationship with memory. For Saṃghabhadra, self-cognition only occurs in the memory of later time when an awareness can reflect on the past awareness. Harivarman, however, does not admit that the present mind can get access to the past mind because the latter has vanished. Instead it can grasp the image of the object that has been perceived, which is exactly the way that memory functions. For the later Sautrāntikas, the object and the awareness that perceives this object are both to be remembered and not to be directly perceived, because they have passed away into the past when consciousness arises. Their existences can only be inferred from the phenomenon of memory and the image perceived. So the memory becomes crucial for their proof of the existence of both the external object and self-cognition.

To summarize Chapter 4: based on the limited sources on Sautrāntika, I have demonstrated how Harivarman, as a representative of early Sautrāntika, develops his theory of self-cognition by synthesizing the views of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins. His model of self-cognition is established in an epistemological framework of successively arising minds. He limits the capacity of self-cognition to mental consciousness. He also applies the two-truths analysis to self-cognition and grants no ultimate status to it. The later Sautrāntikas formulate a series of mature proofs of self-cognition in terms of simultaneity, memory and infinite regress. Their memory argument for self-cognition is especially influential to the Yogācārins.

Notes

1 This tradition has its source in Xuanzang and Kuiji's works. See T2087: 942a, T2053: 250c, T1830: 274a.
2 Katō (1989: 58) identifies Vasubandhu as a direct disciple of Śrīlāta, but Fukuda (2004: 271, n. 36) carefully examines Katō's evidence and concludes that Vasubandhu was not a direct disciple of Śrīlāta but a "fellow believer". See also Cox 1995: 51, n. 114.
3 This record is found in a medieval Japanese work, *Sanron gengi kennyūshū* 三論 玄義檢幽集 by Chōzen 澄禪, who cites from a Chinese source, *Si lun xuan yi* 四論玄義, a work still extant but missing the portion under discussion. See T2300: 417c, 441b.
4 Thanks to Ven. Dhammajoti for pointing me to Lü's view on the issue.
5 See Yinshun 1992: 594–603.

6 Dunne (2004: 59, n. 13) insists on a distinction between the externalists and Sautrāntikas in Dharmakīrti's works. He suspects that the attempt to identify the two comes later among the commentators of Dharmakīrti.

7 謂或有執。諸法生時漸次非頓。如譬喻者。大德說曰。諸法生時次第而生無並起義。如經狹路有多商侶一一而過。尚無二人一時過義。況得有多。諸有為法亦復如是。一一從自生相而生。別和合生理不俱起。 T1545: 270a.

8 謂或有說。諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。如譬喻者。大德亦說。諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。 T1545: 493c.

9 如譬喻者說心心所次第而生。彼大德言。心心所法一一而起。如經狹路。尚無二並。何況有多。 T1545: 745a.

10 心所法非即是心 T1545: 662b. The MV reports elsewhere: "The Bhadanta says: 'Association (*saṃprayoga*) means accompanying. Consciousness and mental activities embrace each other, arising simultaneously, and having the same object. Hence they are associated with each other'" (大德說曰。同伴侶義是相應義。識與心所互相容受俱時而生。同取一境乃是相應。 T1545: 81a). Studies show that this opinion of the Bhadanta was imposed by the Vaibhāṣikas. See Yinshun 1992: 255–65 and Katō 1989: 223–4, n. 11.

11 心所即心……心所即是心之差別。 T1545: 661c. The AKBh attributes this view to "some other masters", but the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* of *Abhidharmadīpa* records it as a view of Buddhadeva. See Dhammajoti 2002: 173.

12 彼上座言。無如所計十大地法。此但三種。經說俱起受想思故。 T1562: 384b.

13 See Katō 1989: 206–16.

14 無相應法。所以者何。無心數法故心與誰相應。又受等諸相不得同時。又因果不俱。識是想等法因。此法不應一時俱有。故無相應……又如穀子牙莖枝葉花實等現見因果相次。故有識等。亦應次第而生。 T1646: 276b.

15 多心。所以者何。識名為心。而色識異。香等識亦異。是故多心。 T1646: 278b.

16 心法能知自體。如燈自照亦照餘物。如算數人亦能自算亦算他人。如是心一能知自體。亦能知他。 T1646: 279a.

17 又可取法異故。能取亦異。如人或自知心。云何自體自知。如眼不自見刀不自割指不自觸。故心不一。 T1646: 278b–c.

18 See Katsura 1976: 679; Sastri 1975: vi.

19 以燈破闇。眼識得生。眼識生已亦能見燈及瓶等物。 T1646: 279c.

20 See JP T1646: 370a.

21 又算數人。能知自色亦知他色。故名相知。 T1646: 279c. Sastri (1975) reconstructs *xiang zhi* 相知 as *nimittajñāna* or *lakṣaṇajñāna*.

22 若智行界入等名一切緣。 T1646: 364a.

23 無人於無為中生我想。 T1646: 365a.

24 See Katō 1989: 297–303.

25 能知若緣入等。是名總相智。總相智故能緣一切。所以者何。若說十二入則更無餘法。故知此智亦緣自體。 T1646: 364a.

26 云何比丘名一切智。謂如實知六觸入生滅。是名總相知一切法。非別相智。佛總別悉知名一切智。是比丘總知諸法無常等。故名一切智。其名雖同而實有異。名攝一分。 T1646: 365a. Contact-locus (*sparśāyatana*) or *chu ru* 觸入 is defined by Harivarman as a combination of six consciousnesses and their corresponding senses, therefore we have six contact-loci. See T1646: 251a.

27 汝說二因緣生識此事不定。亦有無緣生智。非一切皆從二因緣生。 T1646: 364a.

28 汝言無有因緣譬喻能知自體。此中有說意能自知。言行者隨心觀而去來無心。故知以現在心緣現在心。若不爾終無有人能識現在心相應法。 T1646: 364b.

29 The relationship between the two concepts has become a subject of debate in recent years. See Williams 1998 and Kapstein 2000. I will discuss this further in Chapter 5.

30 現在受不得自知。 T1646: 284b.

31 又樂等受來在身。以意能緣故亦無咎。 T1646: 284b.

32 是人先受樂受。然後取相故。名受樂受時如實知。 T1646: 284b.

33 若法於此人心生。此法失滅後意識生。能知此事是名相緣識。 T1646: 364b.

34 Husserl (1966: 38–40) uses a similar example in his argument for time-consciousness.

35 又以憶力故知如眼識不能分別男女。若眼識不能意識亦不應能。而意識實能是事亦爾。 T1646: 364b.

36 故識等法憶本事。故亦名為憶。是憶從取相生。隨法取相是則憶生。 T1646: 288b.

37 問曰。若意識不知色等法應知自體。答曰。法不自知。所以者何。現在不可自知。如刀不能自割。過去未來無法故。亦無餘心。是故意識不能自知。 T1646: 331b.

38 問曰。若人知他心時。則意識能知心法。答曰。如人心不自知。亦作是念言。我有心於他心中亦復如是。又若未來法無亦能生知他心。若如是有何咎 T1646: 331b.

39 佛說二諦真諦俗諦。真諦謂色等法及泥洹。俗諦謂但假名無有自體。如色等因緣成瓶。五陰因緣成人。 T1646: 327a.

40 Katsura 1979: 960.

41 第一義者所謂色空無所有。乃至識空無所有。是故若人觀色等法空。是名見第一義空。問曰。若五陰以世諦故有。何故說色等法是真諦耶。答曰。為眾生故說。有人於五陰中生真實想。為是故說五陰以第一義故空。 T1646: 333a.

42 滅三種心名為滅諦。謂假名心法心空心。 T1646: 327a.

43 因諸陰所有分別。 T1646: 327a.

44 有實五陰心名為法心。 T1646: 332c.

45 See Liu 1994: 88–92.

46 MA VI.73: *'dir kha cig gis mdo sde pa'i phyogs khas blangs nas rang rig pa rab tu sgrub pa'i phyir / ji ltar me ni skyes pa nyid na rang gi bdag nyid dang bum pa la sogs pa dag gnyis su mi 'jug par cig car gsal bar byed la / spras kyang rang gi bdag nyid dang don ston par byed pa de bzhin du / rnam par shes pa yang nye bar skye ba nyid na gnyis su mi 'jug par rang gi bdag nyid dang / yul so sor yang dag par rig par byed pa yin no // de'i phyir rang rig pa zhes bya ba yod pa kho na yin no //* D3862: 272a. La Vallée Poussin (1910: 350) renders *mi 'jug par cig car* as "sans entrer dans l'un et l'autre".

47 *snang ste phal cher rgya dpe ma dag pa'i skyon yin*. . . . Sungbum 5408: 157b.

48 See, for instance, Williams 1998: 1–18.

49 MA VI.73: *gang zhig mi 'dod pa des kyang gdon mi za bar rang rig pa khas blang bar bya dgos te / gzhan du ma mthong ngo zhes dus phyis 'byung ba'i dran pas yul dran pa nyid dang / ngas mthong ngo snyam du yul gyi nyams su myong ba dran par mi 'gyur ro // de ci'i phyir zhe na / dran pa ni nyams su myong ba'i yul can yin na shes pa yang nyams su ma myong bas dran pa yod par mi 'gyur ro // rang rig pa med pa'i phyir na re zhig de nyid kyis de nyams su myong ba yod pa ma yin no //* D3862: 272a.

50 PS I.11cd: *smṛter uttara-kālaṃ ca no hy asāv avibhāvite //.*

51 Kajiyama (1989: 135) attributes the view that eye-consciousness sees to the Sautrāntikas.

52 *Viṃśatikā 16: nānanubhūtam manovijñānena smaryata ityavaśyam arthānubhavena bhavitavyaṃ tacca darśanam ity evaṃ tadviṣayasya rūpādeḥ pratyakṣatvaḥ mataḥ /.*

53 See *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha 20.*

54 *Viṃśatikā 17ab: uktaṃ yathā tadābhāsā vijñaptiḥ smaraṇam tataḥ /.*

55 PV III.177c: *asti cānubhavas tasyāḥ.* . . .

56 PV III.177d: *so 'vikalpaḥ kathaṃ bhavet //.*

57 PV III.178b: *na vikalpadvayaṃ sakṛt /.*

58 PV III.179ab: *smṛtir bhaved atīte ca sā 'gṛhīte kathaṃ bhavet /.*

59 See Tosaki 1979: 282.

5

SYSTEMATIZATION: YOGĀCĀRA

Yogācāra and its two schools

Yogācāra is by no means a unified school as it has developed in multiple directions throughout history. Contemporary scholars in the West tend to distinguish the logic school represented by Dignāga and his followers from the traditional idealistic system of Yogācāra. This doxographical distinction has its root in Tibetan Buddhism, where Buddhist logic (*tshad ma*) is separated from Buddhist idealism (*sems tsam*). Having little knowledge about Buddhist logic, contemporary Chinese Yogācāra scholars such as Ouyang Jian attempt to distinguish *wei-shi* 唯識, or Buddhist idealism, from a more Abhidharma-oriented tradition, which Ouyang Jian calls *fa-xiang* 法相 (*dharmalakṣaṇa*). But this distinction does not make too much sense in a Chinese context because the Chinese Yogācāra school represented by Xuanzang and Kuiji, while naming themselves the Faxiang school, undoubtedly adhered to the Buddhist idealism or *wei-shi*, which became an alternative label for this school. On the other hand, the conflict between the so-called old and new Yogācāra in China was almost inevitable. The new school refers to the school of Xuanzang, while the old one is represented by Paramārtha, a sixth-century Indian missionary to China. Xuanzang's introduction of the new Yogācāra attempted to dismiss the old one. But, ironically, the new Yogācāra school itself became one of the most short-lived Chinese Buddhist schools. The Yogācāra teachings of Paramārtha, on the contrary, had continuously influenced Chinese Buddhists by providing the theoretical foundation for the formation of the indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools including Huayan, Chan and, to some extent, Tiantai.[1]

Many scholars see the conflict between the old and new Yogācāra as a unique Chinese phenomenon and fail to link it with an Indian source. In my opinion, however, this conflict is an extension of the doxographical distinction between Sākāravāda, or those who hold cognition with image, and Nirākāravāda, or those who hold cognition without image, in Indian Yogācāra. According to the extant sources, the distinction between these two schools is first found in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, where the

foundational position of each school is introduced. As a Nirākāravādin, Śāntarakṣita has presented these schools in such a mature way that we cannot help but suspect that this distinction had an earlier origin. In his lengthy treatises, including the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* and *Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra*, Jñānaśrīmitra presents the most systematic formulation of the Sākāravāda position. He quotes, among others, Prajñākaragupta and Dharmakīrti as authorities. Bodhibhadra, in the twelfth century, attributes the founding of Nirākāravāda and Sākāravāda respectively to Asaṅga and Dignāga. The following is a genealogy of the two traditions:[2]

Nirākāravāda: Asaṅga – Vasubandhu – Sthiramati
Sākāravāda: Dignāga – Dharmapāla – Dharmakīrti

Paramārtha is usually believed to follow in the footsteps of Sthiramati.[3] But some suggest his thought is actually akin to that of Nanda, another early commentator on Vasubandhu. Xuanzang and Kuiji are no doubt strict followers of Dharmapāla. Therefore, it is reasonable to link the Chinese doxography of the old and new Yogācāra to that of Nirākāravāda and Sākāravāda in India. The reason that many scholars fail to do so is that the doxography of Nirākāravāda and Sākāravāda was a later development unfamiliar to the Chinese. Another factor is that Dharmapāla, unlike other Sākāravādins, attempted to connect the two traditions by commenting on works of both Dignāga and Vasubandhu. Thus he continued to adhere closely to the early Yogācāra tradition even though he was called a new Yogācārin by his commentators.

Compared to Dharmapāla, Dignāga is obviously a divergent scholar within the Yogācāra school. For instance, although he discusses three natures (*tri-svabhāva*) in his *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃgrahakārikā*, he does not admit to *ālayavijñāna*, a distinctive Yogācāra concept.[4] Since the Sākāravāda position has its origin in the Sautrāntika concept of image (*ākāra*), Dignāga's thought bears a strong Sautrāntika influence, although he rejects their realistic assumption by committing himself to the idealism of Yogācāra, which is evident in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. So the Sākāravāda features a tendency toward Sautrāntika–Yogācāra synthesis from its very beginning. This tendency is even intensified among the later Sākāravādins including Dharmakīrti and his followers.

We have no reason to believe that the camp of Nirākāravāda is less complicated. As a matter of fact, Vasubandhu turns out to be one of the most mysterious figures in the history of Indian Buddhism. His thought is also complicated, as it is not confined by the categories of either Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika or Yogācāra. Putting aside his non-Yogācāra writings, we find that the idealistic tendency is stronger in his later works such as the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* than in his earlier Sūtra commentaries, where a realistic tendency is revealed.[5] So Vasubandhu also marks a transition from Yogācāra

to Vijñānavāda. The Yogācāra signifies primarily the philosophy of Yoga Masters (*yoga-ācārya*), who were evidently a group loosely connected with the Sarvāstivādins and thus bore an Abhidharma mark, as the Chinese prefer to call them the school of Faxiang or dharmic appearance.[6] Vijñānavāda, on the other hand, became a popular name for the Yogācārins later in India, and continued to be so in China as Consciousness-only (*wei-shi*) or in Tibet as Mind-only (*sems tsam*). At this point, the speculation of two Vasubandhus as proposed by Frauwallner (1951: 1–69) cannot really explain the complexity of Vasubandhu's thought. To understand fully those intellectual products associated with the name of Vasubandhu, we might have to presume four Vasubandhus: a Sarvāstivādin, a Sautrāntika, a Yogācārin and a Vijñānavādin. As I shall show below, in dealing with Vasubandhu's theory of self-cognition it is still safer to believe that there was only one but creative Vasubandhu, and to accept the conversion story as presented by Paramārtha.[7]

Given the diversity within the Yogācāra school, I shall present the Yogācāra systematization of self-cognition in a rather unsystematic way. The subject will be discussed in three separate camps, namely, early Yogācāra, Dignāga and Dharmapāla. By early Yogācāra I refer to the founding figures of the Nirākāravāda, including Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and the anonymous authors of the Sūtras that were authorized in this school. Their theory of self-cognition features an emphasis on the soteriologically oriented self-realization due to yogic practice. On the other hand, some of them rejected the epistemological sense of self-cognition under the influence of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, while some others accepted it by following the Sautrāntikas. Dignāga is generally considered to be the point where the history of self-cognition begins. But my study shows that he really marks a stage in which the concept of self-cognition was systematized in an epistemological context. He transformed an originally soteriological issue into an epistemological concept. Dharmapāla further developed a concept of cognition of self-cognition in the context of *pramāṇa* theory. Meanwhile, he connected this epistemological concept with the traditional Yogācāra idealism and made it part of the Yogācāra theories of eight consciousnesses and consciousness-only.

Self-cognition in early Yogācāra

Self-realization

In his commentary on Candrakīrti's MA, Tsong kha pa distinguishes self-cognition in three senses. He says: "Therefore, it is foolish to say that the refutation of such a self-cognition (*rang rig*) is also meant to refute the self-cognition in the sense of self-realization of the reality (*so so rang rang gis de kho na nyid rig pa*) among the yogis or the self-cognition in the conventional

sense that the ordinary people say: 'I see by myself (*ngas nga rang rig*)' ".[8] In the context of Tsong kha pa's commentary, the self-cognition that he refutes is the technical sense of self-cognition found among the Vijñānavādins and Sautrāntikas. This self-cognition, in his understanding, is different from the soteriological sense of self-realization among the yogis or the conventional sense of knowing by oneself. While refuting self-cognition in the first sense, he is not trying to deny the other two senses of self-cognition. It is interesting that Tsong kha pa here understands self-realization as part of the broader sense of self-cognition and links it especially to the yogis (*rnal 'byor pa*). By "yogi" he does not necessarily mean the Yogācāra (*rnal 'byor spyod pa*) because the yogi can refer to any yogic practitioner in various traditions of Buddhism. But it is also true that the Yogācāra tradition has a strong link to the practice of yogis, and thus bears the name of "the yogic practice" (*yoga-ācāra*).

This observation is supported by the frequent appearance of the term "self-realization" (*pratyātmasaṃvedya*) in the early Yogācāra literature, a group of treatises and Sūtras that were authorized in this school. Although *paccattaṃ veditabba*, the Pāli word for self-realization, can be found in the *Majjhima Nikāya* I.265 and *Aṅguttara Nikāya* I.157, 207, 221,[9] it is evident that *pratyātmasaṃvedya* became a popular term among the early Yogācāra writings including the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and *Ratnagotravibhāga*. According to Sasaki (1994), the term *pratyātmansaṃvedya* or *so so rang (gis) rig* appears frequently in the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga*, and is also used once in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, four times in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, three times in the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* and four times in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. In all these cases, *pratyātmasaṃvedya* signifies a direct realization that is free from the conceptual construction of words. It is a soteriological category attributed to the Buddha or one who is in a higher stage of yogic practice.

In these early Yogācāra texts, however, self-cognition is explicitly denied. In the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, for instance, it says: "As a sword cannot cut its own blade, or as a finger cannot touch its own tip, the mind cannot see itself".[10] This statement appears in a context of discussing the Yogācāra doctrine of mind-only. The mind that exists solely is not subject to any division, although there appear the subjective and objective aspects within the mind. The mind, being not involved with the subject perceiving the object, cannot see itself, just as the sword or finger that cannot cut or touch itself. This is a classical expression of the Nirākāravāda position on self-cognition. This issue is also discussed in an interesting dialogue between the Buddha and Maitreya in the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, which says:

[Maitreya]: The World Honored One, if the image, the focus of that [*samādhi*], is not different from the mind, how can the mind still see the mind itself?

[The Buddha]: Good man, there is no *dharma* that can see any *dharma*. But when this mind arises as such, there appears such an image. Good man, for instance, based on form (*bimba*), form itself is seen in a perfectly clear mirror, but one thinks, "I see an image". One takes the appearance of the image as something different from the form. Likewise, when the mind arises, there appears the seemingly different image that is the focus of *samādhi*.[11]

Maitreya's question challenges the fundamental thesis of Yogācāra idealism: the object of the mind is not different from the mind itself. On his view, this thesis faces the same difficulty as the mind seeing itself. Asvabhāva comments that "this [question] shows that it is contradictory to act on [the mind] itself".[12] Wŏnch'ŭk, besides citing Asvabhāva's commentary, further relates this question to the similes of eyes, finger-tip and sword, and concludes that the mind also cannot take itself as object.[13] So Maitreya's question implies a position shared with the Sarvāstivādins that self-cognition is impossible because it is contradictory to worldly phenomena. The Buddha's answer indicates an early Yogācāra approach to this problem. First of all, it affirms a general principle: no *dharma* can see any *dharma*. The reason, according to Asvabhāva, is that all *dharma*s in an ultimate level are "devoid of activity".[14] Therefore, no distinction can be found between seeing and seen, subject and object. As we shall discuss in the following sections, Dignāga confirms the same principle when expounding his theory of the twofold appearance of cognition. Second, the Buddha uses the example of a mirror to explain that the image that is seen in the mirror is actually an appearance of the person who sees the mirror. Likewise, the image, being the focus of *samādhi*, is only an appearance of the mind itself, and is not independent from the mind. The mind observing this image is to observe the mind itself.

What does this mean? For Jñānaśrīmitra, who cites this passage to support his argument for self-cognition, it simply means that there is self-cognition. He says: "'The arising of mind and image of object (*arthābhāsa*) etc.' shows exactly self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), because the cognized and cognizer are one".[15] Wŏnch'ŭk, however, points out that "it does not mean the seeing-portion observing seeing-portion [itself] when speaking of [the mind] seeing itself [this way]".[16] In other words, the mind is not known to itself intuitively; instead it is known through an objectified image, which is like its reflection in the mirror. This is different from the technical sense of self-cognition as found in Dignāga.

This dialogue shows that the early Yogācārins, though insisting on an idealistic position that the object of cognition is only a manifestation of the mind itself, still see it as absurd that the mind observes itself intuitively. This attitude can be attributed to the Sarvāstivāda influence on the early yogic groups, who are believed to be the composers of the two Sūtras that we discussed above. In the *Abhidharmadīpa*, a Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text,

however, we find that *svasaṃvedana* rather than *pratyātmasaṃvedya* is used in an explicitly soteriological sense to denote the self-realization of solitary realizers (*pratyekabuddha*) in contrast to the excessive compassion of the Buddha and the hearers' (*śrāvaka*s) realization through others (*parasaṃvid*). Its commentary, the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, says: "And there occurs excessively self-realization (*svasaṃvit*) of thoughts to the solitary realizer".[17] All these texts reveal a complicated relationship between self-realization and self-cognition.

In recent years, the relationship between the soteriological and epistemological senses of self-cognition has become a topic of debate. Kapstein (2000) criticizes Williams (1998) for not distinguishing self-realization (*pratyātmasaṃvedya, so so rang gis rig pa*) from self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana, rang rig*). Kapstein observes that these two terms are consistently distinguished either in the Tibetan translations of Indian texts or in the indigenous Tibetan writings. He insists that the soteriological and epistemological meanings that are carried by the two terms should not be mixed up.

Kapstein is lucky to have drawn evidence for his argument from Tibetan instead of Chinese sources. In the Chinese translations, especially, of those Indian texts that are now lost, it is never clear what the Sanskrit equivalent is for the term *zi zheng* 自證. It could be either *pratyātmasaṃvedya* or *svasaṃvedana*. In three Chinese translations of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, for instance, several different words are used to render *pratyātmasaṃvedya*, and one of them is *zi zheng*, the standard translation for *svasaṃvedana*. Xuanzang also uses *zi zheng* to render *pratyātmasaṃvedya* in his translation of the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*. But he distinguishes *pratyātmasaṃvedya* from *svasaṃvedana* in his other translations. This ambiguity reflects a more complicated relationship, rather than a clear-cut distinction between the two concepts.

I agree with Kapstein in maintaining a distinction between self-cognition and self-realization in their technical usage. Especially, we should not simply use the Tibetan term *rang rig* or the Chinese word *zi zheng* to reconstruct a Sanskrit word *svasaṃvedana* without critically examining the context. This is a dangerous practice when those Indian texts are unavailable in their Sanskrit originals. Therefore, in the present project, I deliberately ignore dozens of references to *zi zheng* in the Chinese translations of Indian texts that are now lost. I sympathize, however, with Williams (and with Tsong kha pa) in the sense that we should not limit ourselves to word-searching. Instead, we should have a broader vision of the issue itself. This is why I have traced the origin of self-cognition as a doctrine rather than as a term to the Mahāsāṃghikas, where we find a close link between the soteriological and epistemological senses of self-cognition. The Sarvāstivādins, when refuting the Mahāsāṃghikas, also discuss self-cognition in the soteriological context of omniscience. The Sautrāntikas, especially Harivarman, refer to

the yogic practice when expounding his view that mental consciousness is self-cognizant. The central thesis of this book is that self-cognition evolved from a soteriological concern to an epistemological inquiry. Following Tsong kha pa, I see self-realization as part of the broader sense of self-cognition in the context of early Yogācāra. But after Dignāga this soteriological concept is clearly distinguished from the epistemological sense of self-cognition.

The self-knowledge of consciousness

Given the multiple identities of Vasubandhu as a Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika, Yogācārin and Vijnānavādin, his view on self-cognition is by no means consistent. For instance, he follows a Sarvāstivāda position to refute self-awareness in the verse part of the *Abhidharmakośa*; but when explaining why it is refuted in AKBh he shows a Sautrāntika tendency by pursuing it epistemologically, rather than placing the emphasis on causality of the Vaibhāṣikas. In his later works, we find no further objections to self-cognition. These views, though inconsistent, do reveal a trend of development, so we do not have to accept the hypothesis of two Vasubandhus. As I have already discussed Vasubandhu's view on self-cognition before his conversion to Yogācāra in Chapter 3, I am now going to explore his later views on this issue based on his later writings.

Although we draw much important information from commentaries on the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*, especially those by Dharmapāla, these works of Vasubandhu do not mention self-cognition. The only work that speaks of this issue is his BD. Preserved only in its Chinese recension, this treatise was translated by Paramārtha between 557 and 569. Its ascription to Vasubandhu has been questioned by scholars such as Hattori (1955) and Nakamura Zuiryu (1961: 58) who find it safer to attribute this treatise to Paramārtha.[18] But, as Sakamoto (1935a: 10–13) shows, Paramārtha's own commentaries, seventeen passages in total, are clearly indicated by the phrase "to comment" (*shi yue* 釋曰) or "to remark" (*ji yue* 記曰). If we take out these passages, the rest of the text can still be considered an Indian work. In particular, the sections that I am going to deal with are records of debates between the author and two Indian philosophical schools, namely, Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas. These sections must have an Indian origin and could not have been composed by Paramārtha himself in China. Therefore, I follow Ui (1965: 456–7) and Takemura (1977: 36–8) in thinking it reasonable to insist on the traditional attribution to Vasubandhu.

In this treatise, Vasubandhu discusses the issue of self-cognition in the context of refuting the Sāṃkhya theory of *pramāṇa* or the means of cognition, along with his criticism of the Sāṃkhya doctrines of nature, particle, inference, causality and memory. According to the Sāṃkhya view, "awareness as *pramāṇa* can establish itself without the condition of object as *prameya*".[19] It is also true to say that the object or *prameya* can be established without

awareness. This view is consistent with the basic Sāṃkhya tenet that all existents consist of nature (*prakṛti*), and thus arise in their own right. The Buddhists, including the Sarvāstivādins who admit to the intrinsic nature of existents, do not agree with this view because it goes against the basic Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. To convince the Buddhists, the Sāṃkhyas use the simile of a lamp to show that lamp and jar are both real existents before they face each other to act as an illuminator and the illuminated. Vasubandhu replies that this example does not apply here because the lamp shares no common feature with awareness. The most important difference between the two is that the lamp does not illuminate itself but the awareness *does*. With regard to the lamp, Vasubandhu agrees with the Sarvāstivādins and Mādhyamikas in denying that it has the nature of self-illumination. He says:

> A lamp only illumines others, but absolutely not itself. If its essence were darkness, the lamp would require another [lamp] to illumine it. But, since its essence contains no darkness, why does it have to be illumined by another [lamp]? It is not like things such as a jar that has to be illumined by a lamp. Because the essence of the jar is dark, and thus cannot be seen by itself. If the lamp has to be illumined, then it requires another lamp to illumine it. But this is not the case, so we know for sure that the lamp is only an illuminator, but not the illuminated.[20]

The reason why Vasubandhu denies the self-illumination of the lamp is not very different from those of the Sarvāstivādins and Mādhyamikas that we have discussed in Chapter 3. His conclusion that the lamp can only be an illuminator or *pramāṇa* brings us back to the context of *pramāṇa* theory. For Vasubandhu, awareness as a *pramāṇa* is totally different from a lamp because awareness can be both *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. He says: "[Awareness] can know the present object, and thus is called *pramāṇa*; it can also be known by itself or other awareness, and thus is named *prameya*".[21] The awareness "known by itself" is the self-knowledge or self-cognition of this awareness. To explain this point, Vasubandhu goes on to say:

> The self-knowledge [is explained as follows]. For instance, eye-consciousness, as perception, faces directly the present visual object, but it cannot conceptualize or produce a thought that this [object] is blue. When there is the thought that this is blue, it is produced by mental consciousness. Thus, the two consciousnesses function simultaneously: the eye-consciousness grasps the visual object but not itself; the mental consciousness conceptualizes the blue or yellow, and thus grasps the eye-consciousness. [The mental consciousness] cannot grasp the visual object perceived by [consciousness] itself, so

it only conceptualizes. What is cognized by the eye-consciousness is *prameya*; that which conceptualizes the eye-consciousness is *pramāṇa*. Therefore, perception is established by the conceptualization of the other [i.e., the mental consciousness].[22]

As in other pre-Dignāga texts, this text does not use the technical term *zi zheng* or *svasaṃvedana* when discussing the issue of self-cognition. Instead, it uses *zi yuan* 自緣, or self-knowledge, whose Sanskrit equivalent could be *svaḥ . . . ālambanam*. This text also shows a strong link to Dignāga's writings when *pramāṇa, prameya* or perception are discussed. But, unlike Dignāga, Dharmakīrti or the Mahāsāṃghikas, Vasubandhu argues for self-cognition by refuting the simile of the lamp. As we have discussed in Chapter 4, this is exactly a position held by Harivarman and probably other Sautrāntikas. So we see a Sautrāntika heritage in Vasubandhu's thought, as indicated in both his BD and his AKBh.

A more interesting parallel between Harivarman and Vasubandhu is that both regard only mental consciousness as self-cognizant. In the context of the *pramāṇa* theory, Vasubandhu illustrates this point more clearly than Harivarman does. First of all, he claims that eye-consciousness cannot grasp itself because it only takes the visual object as its object. Vasubandhu here explicitly denies that all mind and mental activities are self-cognizant, a position shared by the Mahāsāṃghikas and some Yogācārins such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.[23] If the eye-consciousness and so forth are not self-cognizant, the only candidate to demonstrate the self-knowledge of consciousness is mental consciousness. In the above passage, Vasubandhu does not explicitly state that the mental consciousness is self-cognizant as does Harivarman. Instead, he characterizes mental consciousness as conceptualizing and grasping eye-consciousness because the former cannot grasp the visual object. Does this mean that the mental consciousness is self-cognizant? It seems to require more clarification. In Vasubandhu's definition, mental consciousness, when grasping eye-consciousness, is a *pramāṇa*. Its *prameya*, however, is not the visual object, but the image of the visual object that is cognized by eye-consciousness. When mental consciousness functions, it takes this image as object on the one hand, and grasps the eye-consciousness on the other. So the self-cognition of mental consciousness is actually manifested in the mental consciousness grasping eye-consciousness.

It is also worth noting that the eye-consciousness here is called perception, but the mental consciousness is characterized as conceptualization. If we follow the definition of perception proposed by Dignāga, namely, as being devoid of conceptual construction, then the mental consciousness cannot be considered a type of perception. Vasubandhu seems to agree with this because he concludes the passage by saying that perception is established by the conceptualization of mental consciousness. Here it implies that mental consciousness is something *other* than eye-consciousness, but meanwhile

both consciousnesses have to work together to the extent that they function simultaneously. The eye-consciousness perceives the present visual object, while the mental consciousness conceptualizes the blue, yellow and so forth. As we have discussed in Chapter 4, this simultaneity is rejected by Harivarman, but accepted by those Sautrāntikas who share more common views with the Vijñānavādins. Vasubandhu, at this point, clearly indicates his Vijñānavāda position that mental consciousness always accompanies five sense consciousnesses.

Another implication of this passage is that self-cognition, like mental consciousness, is conceptual. This is indicated in the statement that mental consciousness "conceptualizes eye-consciousness". Conceptualization is the way that mental consciousness "grasps" or cognizes eye-consciousness. So the self-cognition of mental consciousness is by its very nature conceptual. As we have discussed in the last chapter, Harivarman's position seems to have the same implication, but both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti understand self-cognition as non-conceptual.

To conclude, in BD we learn that Vasubandhu develops his view on self-cognition from a Sautrāntika starting-point toward a Yogācāra conclusion as it contains a mixture of views from both sides. His view is evidently less mature than that of Dignāga, which also proves that the author of this treatise must come before Dignāga, so the attribution to Vasubandhu is still tenable. ⸘

Self-cognition: Dignāga

More than twenty works are ascribed to Dignāga. Among them, twelve are extant in Tibetan and six in Chinese. As far as the issue of self-cognition is concerned, the following works are extremely important: the *Nyāyamukha* (NM), the PS and its auto-commentary the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV). NM is an introductory work to Buddhist logic. It is only extant in Chinese and has been very influential among East Asian Buddhists. In its small section on perception, Dignāga discusses self-cognition in his system of *pramāṇa* theory by using the technical term *zi zheng* or *svasaṃvedana*. PS and its auto-commentary PSV are later, and probably the last major work by Dignāga. Extant in its two Tibetan translations, this work rearranges and enlarges the perception section of NM into a full chapter on perception. Along with other chapters of PS, it presents us with a systematic formulation of Buddhist logic and epistemology. In this epistemological framework, Dignāga also discusses self-cognition in a more detailed manner.

Self-cognition as a type of perception

Dignāga is one of the first to systematize the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa*, or means of cognition. He only accepts two means of cognition, i.e., perception

(*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), as he states in his NM: "As regards one's own understanding there are only two *pramāṇa*s, i.e., perception and inference, since [the other *pramāṇa*s admitted by] other schools such as verbal testimony (*śabda*), analogy (*upamāna*) and so forth are included in these two".[24] The reason that he admits only two means of cognition is that the object to be cognized has only two aspects, i.e., the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which are, respectively, the objects of perception and inference. As is pointed out in NM: "Besides these two, [i.e., the particular and the universal,] there is no other object of cognition (*prameya*) which can be apprehended by a *pramāṇa* other than [perception and inference]".[25]

However, Dignāga is not the first Buddhist scholar to discuss this issue. In MV we already see extensive discussions of perception and inference in an Abhidharma framework. In his *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā*, Saṃghabhadra expresses similar views with regard to the objects of the two means of cognition. He says: "However, it is admitted that there are two kinds of particles: one real, and the other conventional. What are their characteristics? The real refers to the particular characteristic of matter, whose collection is perceived by perception. The conventional is known by inference, which is analytical".[26]

Dignāga defines perception as the cognition "that is free from conceptual construction".[27] Conceptual construction, in turn, means "the association of name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*), etc. [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing]".[28] So perception in his understanding should be inexpressible by words. Dharmakīrti follows Dignāga's definition in his PV III.123a, but he adds "non-erroneous" (*abhrānta*) to this definition in NB I.4 and the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. He says: "Perception is the awareness that is not affected by illusion produced through the darkness of eyes, rapid motion, traveling on a boat, a violent blow or other causes".[29] To define perception as non-erroneous did not start with Dharmakīrti. On the contrary, by introducing the term *abhrānta* to the definition of perception, he falls back to an understanding of perception found in the early Yogācāra school.[30] In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, an encyclopedic work ascribed to Maitreya or Asaṅga, perception is defined as follows: "What is perception? It is not indirect, neither already inferred nor to be inferred, and not erroneous (*avibhrānta*)".[31] This text also mentions the first three illusory objects as singled out by Dharmakīrti.

According to Dharmakīrti, perception is classified into four types, i.e., sense perception, mental perception, the self-cognition of all mind and mental activities, and the yogic perception.[32] It has been hotly debated among contemporary scholars whether Dignāga himself accepts four types of perception. In a short article entitled "Did Dignāga accept four types of perception?" published in 1993, Franco propounds the view that Dignāga accepts only three types of perception, namely, sense, mental and yogic

perception. As a matter of fact, he was not the first to propagate this view. Those who agree with him include some eminent scholars in the field of Dignāga and Buddhist epistemological studies, such as Hattori, Nagatomi, Nagatomo and Schmithausen.[33] The only person who seemed to go against this prevailing view was Wayman (1991). In his article targeted by Franco, Wayman himself, however, does not provide any solid evidence that Dignāga actually accepts one more type of perception, i.e., self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*).[34] Therefore, it seems that Franco and others have reached a convincing conclusion on this issue.[35]

I agree with Franco's criticism of Wayman for imposing the later interpretation of Dharmakīrti on Dignāga. I do not think that Wayman's argument for the four types of perception is legitimate, because he uses Dharmakīrti's interpretation to read Dignāga. Franco (1993: 296) has correctly pointed out that "we have to read Dignāga's text independently of his so-called 'Great Commentator'", although he meanwhile regrets that "unfortunately we do not have any other commentatorial tradition except that of Dharmakīrti and his followers". In the course of my study of Dignāga and his concept of self-cognition, however, I find some evidence supporting Wayman's claim in Dignāga's own writings and in the commentatorial works of Kuiji, a Chinese Yogācāra scholar.

It seems that none of these scholars has paid attention to the early works of Dignāga himself that are extant in Chinese and to the commentatorial tradition of Dharmapāla and his Chinese counterparts. But it is exactly in Dignāga's NM that we find evidence for his fourfold classification of perception, even before he wrote PS and PSV. In NM, after sense perception is introduced, he continues to say:

> The mental realm (*mānasa*), when occurring in the form of immediate experience of [external objects], is also devoid of conceptual construction. Again, [there are] the self-cognition of desire and so forth, and the yogic [intuition] that is devoid of doctrinal conception. All these are perception.[36]

The two Chinese translations by Xuanzang and Yijing are exactly the same except that Yijing adds "to explain" to the beginning of the passage to indicate that it is an auto-commentary by Dignāga himself. Hattori (1968: 92, n. 1.45) cites this passage without translating or explaining it, and thus fails to attract the attention of his Western readers. In this passage, the puzzling fusion between self-cognition and mental perception does not occur, for they are separated by the particle "again" (*you* 又). At the end of the passage, it explicitly states that the previously mentioned categories, namely, self-cognition of desire and so forth, and yogic intuition, are *both* perceptions. These two, plus the mental realm that is devoid of conceptual construction and the sense perception, make up the four types of perception for Dignāga.

Moreover, in his commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa*, a work by one of Dignāga's direct disciples, Śaṅkarasvāmin, Kuiji states even more explicitly that there are four types of perception. He says: "There are, in brief, four types of [perception] that are devoid of conceptual construction: (1) five consciousnesses; (2) the mental [consciousness] that accompanies the five [consciousnesses]; (3) self-cognition; (4) the yogic [intuition]".[37] Kuiji himself does not indicate the source of this information. As we know, the PS was translated into Chinese by Yijing in 711, but was lost soon after. Kuiji had already passed away by this time, so he could not have known Yijing's translation. But Kuiji refers to PS at least eighteen times in his writings, so the only possibility is that he gained access to PS through his learned master Xuanzang.

Therefore, we have evidence for four types of perception in the early work of Dignāga himself and in the commentatorial tradition apart from that of Dharmakīrti. Even in PS and PSV, from which those scholars develop their argument against the four types of perception, I can find evidence to support my view. To deny self-cognition as an independent type of perception, Hattori (1968: 27) squeezes it into a second *kind* of mental perception. Nagatomi (1979: 254) emends it as the second *aspect* of mental perception to be in conformity with the theory of the dual appearance of cognition discussed later in Dignāga's text. Both scholars base their arguments on the Sanskrit passage cited in Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam*: "*rāga-dveṣa-moha-sukha-duḥkhādiṣu ca sva-saṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānasaṃ pratyakṣam*".[38] Hattori translates this passage as follows: "The self-awareness (*sva-saṃvedana*) of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc., is [also recognized as] *mental perception* because it is not dependent on any sense organ".[39] Judging from the Sanskrit text, this is a fine translation. But the problem is that it does not match the Tibetan translation, which literally means: "As for desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, and so forth, on account of their independence of sense organ, [they can be regarded as] *perception* [in terms] of cognizing themselves (*rang rig pa'i mngon sum*, *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*)".[40] The Tibetan translation is consistent with the Chinese translation of NM cited above when it is literally put: "Again, for desire and so forth, their self-cognition, and . . . are both *perception*". Both the Tibetan and Chinese texts indicate that self-cognition of desire is a type of *perception*, but not a kind of *mental perception* as shown in the Sanskrit text.[41]

To be in conformity with Prajñākaragupta's Sanskrit text, Hattori (1968: 181) changes *rang rig pa'i* (self-cognizant) in the Tibetan text into *yid kyi* (mental) and replaces *ni* with *la yang rang rig pa*. With these illegitimate modifications against all Tibetan translations, he understands self-cognition as a kind of *mental perception* rather than a separate type of *perception*.[42] Based on this understanding, Hattori (1968: 27) also interprets the verse PS I.6ab that this passage comments on as follows: "[T]here is also mental

[perception, which is of two kinds:] awareness of an [external] object and self-awareness of [such subordinate mental activities as] desire and the like, [both of which are] free from conceptual construction". This translation is less problematic if we skip what Hattori supplies in the brackets, for the remaining part matches the Tibetan and the Sanskrit as cited by Prajñākaragupta.[43]

The Sanskrit verse PS I.6ab that is cited by Prajñākaragupta again becomes a subject of debate. Franco (1993) and Wayman (1991) dispute whether to put an *anusvāra* after *artha*. If there is the *anusvāra*, as Wayman suggests, then *artha* can be separated from the compound *artha-rāgādi-sva-saṃvitti*, and we can avoid the traditional reading *arthasaṃvitti* and *rāgādisvasaṃvitti*, which is adopted by Hattori and Nagatomi.[44] The verse would mean, as Wayman (1991: 423) translates: "Also the mental (sense) having the object-entity (*artha*) and self-intuition of passion (*rāga*), etc. are without constructive thought". As is pointed out by Franco, this translation is equally problematic because Wayman does not explain the insertion of the word "sense" and he ungrammatically uses the word *artha*, which should be *ārtha* if without a governing verb.[45] At this point, I do not think that the *anusvāra* here really matters much. As a matter of fact, I find that the *anusvāra* appears in the index to Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition of Prajñākaragupta's text, although it is not found in the text itself.[46] Thus, I see this debate as provoked by an editorial error.

It is evident that self-cognition is a separate type of perception and there are altogether four types of perception for Dignāga. His own works do not support the allegation that he accepts only three types of perception, which is only found in the commentatorial work of Prajñākaragupta. But most contemporary scholars follow him to interpret Dignāga's position on the typology of perception. This reflects a general tendency among scholars of Indian Buddhism, who give Sanskrit texts a higher preference despite the fact that the Sanskrit manuscripts we have today are usually dated quite late. In the case of Dignāga, none of his works survives in the original Sanskrit, but many scholars still prefer to study him on the basis of the Sanskrit fragments found in later commentatorial works. When these Sanskrit fragments do not agree with the Tibetan or Chinese translations, they would disregard or emend the translations accordingly without hesitation. This is basically what happened in the current discussion on the typology of perception among scholars.

In dealing with the disagreements between the received Sanskrit text of the *Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* and its early Chinese translation by Kumārajīva, Lancaster (1977: 149) finds that in many cases the Chinese translation is supported by the recently discovered Gilgit Sanskrit fragments. He concludes that the disagreements are due not to the deliberate alteration by the translators that scholars usually assume but to the fact that the Sanskrit text underwent "constant and at times radical changes through the

centuries", so that the Chinese translation is more valuable in terms of preserving the earlier format of the Sūtra. In the current case, I would argue that, even if Dignāga's works were available in their Sanskrit version, the value of their Chinese or Tibetan translations still cannot be dismissed, especially when they disagree with each other. Now, since the Sanskrit texts have not survived, we have to follow the Chinese and Tibetan translations to conclude that Dignāga actually accepted four types of perception. As a result, we have to dismiss the later Sanskrit commentatorial tradition of Prajñākaragupta that alleges only three types of perception for Dignāga, a view followed by most contemporary scholars.

Self-cognition and other types of perception

Those scholars, from Prajñākaragupta onward, who deny self-cognition as a separate type of perception, have misunderstood the relationship between self-cognition and mental perception. This in turn is because of their failure to apprehend the nature of mental perception. On their understanding, mental perception has two functions, namely, externally to experience object and internally to be aware of desire and so forth.[47]

But I understand mental perception solely as the experience of external objects.[48] My understanding is supported by Dignāga's own definition. In his NM, Dignāga defines mental perception as follows: "The mental realm (*mānasa*), when occurring in the form of immediate experience [of object], is also devoid of conceptual construction".[49] My emendation "of object" is supported by Dignāga in his PSV: "The mental (*mānasa*) [perception] which, taking visual object, etc., for its object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (*anubhava*) is also free from conceptual construction".[50] The definition in PSV further specifies *mānasa* as "taking visual object, etc., for its object" (*rūpādi-viṣayālambanam*). These words, in turn, explain the word *artha* in the verse PS I.6ab: *mānasaṃ cārtha-rāgādi-sva-saṃvittir akalpikā.*

According to these definitions, mental perception is an aspect of the mental realm or mental consciousness, which sometimes occurs in the form of the immediate experience of sensory objects. Here the reference to sensory objects indicates that the immediate experience is externally directed. If this experience were directed internally, it would become self-cognition. If we admit that Dignāga, in contrast to his predecessors, elevates self-cognition to the status of a separate perception, it has to be independent of mental perception.

Dignāga's concept of mental perception is presented more clearly than similar concepts in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra Abhidharma. Experiential perception (**anubhava-pratyakṣa*) for Saṃghabhadra denotes the experience of internal feeling, which is also called self-feeling. But self-feeling, as criticized by Dharmapāla, either does not exist or overlaps with self-cognition. The early Yogācāra concept of mental experiential perception (*manonubhava-pratyakṣa*), as developed in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, is defined as "the objective

realm (*gocara*) of mental sense (*manas*)",[51] which can be both internal and external. So the advantage of mental perception in Dignāga is that it is distinguished from self-cognition, and thus is only directed externally.

Those who understand self-cognition as an aspect of mental perception must also have confused *mental perception* (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) with *mental consciousness* (*manovijñāna*). Mental perception is an aspect of mental consciousness that experiences but does not conceptualize the sensory object. This concept indicates that Dignāga disagrees with the Sautrāntikas, who hold that mental consciousness can never directly experience the sensory object because the object has already disappeared when the consciousness arises.[52] Self-cognition, on the other hand, is the internal awareness of mental consciousness (not mental perception) and its associated mental activities such as desire and so forth. Yogic perception, the fourth type of perception, is again a specific state of mental consciousness. A yogi starts with inferential knowledge about the teaching of the Buddha, which is called the true object (*bhūtārtha*). Through a meditative practice that visualizes repeatedly its object in mind, the object finally is "perceived as clearly as though it were a small grain on the palm of his hand".[53] At this point, yogic perception is devoid of conceptual construction.

On my understanding, Dignāga, when singling out various types of perception, does not go beyond the traditional classification of six consciousnesses. Five sense consciousnesses are no doubt perception. Mental consciousness, being the actual agent of conceptual construction, still can be perception when immediately experiencing the sensory object, internally being aware of itself and its mental activities, or concentrating on the object itself in a meditative state. The relationship between six consciousnesses and four types of perception can be illustrated with Figure 5.1.[54]

As we know, to understand self-cognition as capability of mental consciousness is shared by Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas. Dignāga's view that self-cognition is attributed to mental consciousness is further

Figure 5.1 Six consciousnesses and four perceptions.

indicated in his discussion on whether conceptual awareness (*kalpanā-jñāna*) is perception. He addresses this issue in a dialogue with an opponent. The dialogue goes like this in NM:

> [The opponent:] If the self-cognition of desire and so forth is also [considered] perception, why do you exclude conceptual awareness [from perception]?
> [Dignāga:] I do not exclude the self-cognition of this [conceptual awareness], because it is free from conceptual construction and [thus] is perception. But in the respect that this [conceptual awareness] apprehends other objects, it is not called perception.[55]

This dialogue is included and reformulated in PSV I Dd. In both texts, the opponent's question provides one more piece of evidence for self-cognition being an independent form of perception. This question makes sense if we put it in the context of early Yogācāra theory of perception. As we have discussed previously, the definition of perception in the *Yogācārabhūmi* influenced Dharmakīrti. Its classification of perception also affects Dignāga at this point. In this text, perception is classified into four types, namely, perception of material sense organs (*rūpīndriyapratyakṣa*), perception of mental experience (*manonubhavapratyakṣa*), worldly perception (*lokapratyakṣa*) and pure perception (*śuddhapratyakṣa*). The first two are identical to the first two types of perception in Dignāga. These two are also called the worldly perception in contrast to the pure perception, which closely matches the yogic perception in Dignāga.[56] So it seems to be a common view among early Yogācārins to accept three types of perception: sense, mental and yogic perception. Now, if Dignāga has come up with anything innovative, it is self-cognition. But it is exactly this self-cognition that causes controversy if we accept it as a type of perception. The opponent argues that, if self-cognition is perception, then conceptual awareness should also be considered perception. In other words, self-cognition is conceptual, so it cannot be perception, if perception is understood as non-conceptual. On Dignāga's view, however, conceptual awareness *is* perception when it is internally aware of itself, because in that case it is devoid of conceptual construction. Some scholars even classify the self-cognition of conceptual awareness (*kalpanā-jñāna-svasaṃvitti*) as a separate kind of perception.[57] I do not think that it is necessary to single out the self-cognition of conceptual awareness as another type of perception, because Dignāga here is not talking about the typology of perception but replying to his opponent's objection with regard to conceptual awareness. This discussion explicitly shows that self-cognition is a capacity of conceptual awareness that includes mental consciousness and mental activities such as desire and so forth. Both phrases, namely, "self-cognition of conceptual awareness" and "self-cognition of desire and so forth", indicate that self-cognition is *of* the mental consciousness that is primarily conceptual.

Having made it clear that self-cognition is the internal awareness of mental consciousness, and that mental perception and yogic perception are also different aspects of mental consciousness, now, how is self-cognition related to sense perception? Is sense perception self-cognizant? As we have shown in the last chapter, the Sautrāntikas do not understand sense consciousness to be self-cognizant simply because the mental consciousness that is capable of self-cognition has not arisen when sense consciousness is active. But if it is true that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were both influenced by the Mahāsāṃghikas, then they should hold that all mind and mental activities, including sense consciousness, are self-cognizant.[58] However, this remains a mystery in Dignāga's own works. In PSV, he explicitly says: "As for desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, and so forth, on account of their independence of *sense organ*, [they can be regarded as] perception [in terms] of cognizing themselves (*rang rig pa'i mngon sum, svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*)".[59] This suggests, as concluded by Matilal, that self-cognition is "mental".[60] When defining sense perception, Dignāga mentions the following verse in both NM and PS:

A thing possessing many properties cannot be cognized in all its aspects by the sense. The object of the sense is the form which is to be cognized [simply] as it is and which is inexpressible.[61]

Here the phrase "to be cognized simply as it is" (*svasaṃvedya*) is worth noting. All the Chinese and Tibetan translators have carefully chosen alternatives to distinguish it from self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*). The Chinese use *nei zheng* 內證 (internal cognition) instead of *zi zheng* 自證 (self-cognition). The Tibetans render it as *rang rang rig bya* or *rang gi rig bya* instead of *rang rig*. However, Dignāga himself interprets this word as "self-cognizable" when refuting the Mīmāṃsaka theory of perception. He explains the last part of the verse as follows: "This [object of the sense] is, as it were, [a part of] the cognition itself, and [therefore] is self-cognizable".[62] This clearly indicates that he uses *svasaṃvedya* in a sense of self-cognizable to show that the *object* of sense perception is self-cognizable by the *cognition* because the object is actually the object-appearance (*viṣayābhāsa*) of the cognition itself. So, according to Dignāga, the cognition that acts as the basis for both sense perception and sense object is self-cognizant. But he does not speak of the self-cognition of sense perception itself.

Another way to explore this issue is to suppose that the Sautrāntika view that only mental consciousness is self-cognizant also stands in Dignāga's system.[63] If so, the key to determining whether sense consciousness is self-cognizant is to examine how the mental and sense consciousnesses are related to each other. If mental consciousness arises after sense consciousness, then sense consciousness cannot cognize itself. This is the position of the Sautrāntikas. If, however, we adopt the Yogācāra position that mental

consciousness functions simultaneously with sense consciousness, we can say that sense consciousness also cognizes itself, because it is always accompanied by mental consciousness, and they are to a great extent indistinguishable.[64]

For the commentators on Dignāga, the relationship between mental and sense consciousnesses has been one of the most puzzling issues. This, again, has to do with the very nature of mental perception, which is an intermediate state between these two consciousnesses. If mental perception is understood as the experience of sensory objects, how does it differ from sense perception? Why is it necessary? This confusion was actually caused by Dignāga himself, who failed to define this concept clearly. As is pointed out by Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary on PS, if mental perception perceives the same object as sense perception, mental perception cannot be recognized as a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) because it does not offer any new knowledge. If, on the other hand, the object of mental perception is absolutely different from that of the sense perception, even a blind person would be able to see things, because his mind is not defective.[65]

Dharmakīrti was aware of exactly the same problem, as he says: "If mental [perception] grasps [an object] perceived previously [by sense perception], then it is not a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). If it grasps [an object] that has not been seen, then the blind should be able to see a [visual] object".[66] He takes the position that the object of mental perception is not the same as that of sense perception, but this object co-operates with sense perception. Mental perception, on the other hand, has to arise after sense perception, which acts as its immediately contiguous condition. This view is expressed in his classical definition of mental perception: "Mental consciousness [as perception] is the product of sense consciousness, which forms its immediately contiguous condition and which co-operates with the immediately succeeding object (*anantaraviṣaya*) of its proper object (*svaviṣaya*)".[67] This position of Dharmakīrti is usually associated with the Sautrāntikas, who, as we have discussed in Chapter 4, maintain that different moments of cognition have to arise successively. This is part of the reason that he was called a Sautrāntika-Yogācārin.[68]

However, in the Chinese Yogācāra school that closely follows Dharmapāla, we find an opposite position. Dharmapāla, when commenting on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, expresses a similar concern with regard to the relationship between mental and sense consciousnesses, that is, whether they arise simultaneously or successively, and whether they have the same or different objects.[69] In VMS, Dharmapāla offers a solution that mental consciousness must arise and function simultaneously with five sense consciousnesses. He says: "When five [sense] consciousnesses arise, there must arise a mental consciousness, which can give rise to the mental consciousness of the subsequent moment. Why does [this later mental consciousness] need the five [sense] consciousnesses as its immediately contiguous conditions

(*samanantarapratyaya*)"?[70] In his commentary on this passage, Kuiji traces this view to early Yogācāra writings, including the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* and *Yogācārabhūmi*. Most interestingly, he also attributes this position to Dignāga himself. He says:

> It is said in [Dignāga's] treatise of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, etc., that there must be a mental consciousness to accompany five [sense] consciousnesses. It is this mental consciousness that gives rise to the seeking (*vitarka*) mental consciousness of the subsequent moment, which takes the previous mental consciousness of the same genre as its immediately contiguous condition. Why does it need the five [sense] consciousnesses [as its immediately contiguous conditions]?[71]

Here the mental consciousness that accompanies sense consciousness refers to the mental perception in Dignāga's system. Later, it became an alternative name for this type of perception among East Asian Yogācārins. Kuiji believes not only that mental perception and sense consciousness arise simultaneously, but also that they share the same object. He says: "In the treatise of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, etc., the mental consciousness that accompanies five [sense consciousnesses], being perception, must have the same object [as the sense perception]".[72] For instance, when one listens to the preaching of a Master, the mental perception that accompanies one's auditory consciousness can only perceive the sound but not the *dharma* that the Master preaches, which has to be apprehended by one's mental consciousness in the subsequent moment.

It seems that both Dharmapāla and Kuiji are arguing against the Sautrāntika position held by Dharmakīrti. Their view represents a reading of Dignāga from the orthodox Yogācāra tradition, which accepts the Mahāsāṃghika view that two or multiple minds arise simultaneously. Kuiji acknowledges their Mahāsāṃghika influence in the following passage: "As for the Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., and the Mahāyānas, who hold that various consciousnesses are simultaneous, the mental perception that accompanies five [sense] consciousnesses is the same as these five consciousnesses in the sense that neither of these two types of perception can explicitly construct [an external object]. Only the mental consciousness of the subsequent moment can conceptually construct what is called the external object".[73]

Therefore, if we follow Dharmapāla and Kuiji to understand mental perception as accompanying sense consciousness and taking the same object, then sense perception is self-cognizant. In their system, all the eight consciousnesses, namely, store-consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), thought (*manas*), mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) and five sense consciousnesses, have four divisions. They are the seeing portion, the seen portion, self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition. However, if we follow Dharmakīrti to understand mental perception as arising after sense perception and taking a

different object from that of sense perception, we have to accept the Sautrāntika position that sense perception is not self-cognizant, and that self-cognition occurs in the subsequent moment when mental consciousness arises. This example shows that the cryptic text of Dignāga can be interpreted in different, even opposite, ways.

So far as Dharmakīrti's position on the issue is concerned, we see a contradiction to his well-known statement in NB I.10, "all mind and mental activities are self-cognizant" (*sarva-citta-caittānām ātman-saṃvedanam*), which actually suggests that sense perception can also be self-cognizant. How to account for this obvious inconsistency? As I have shown in Chapter 2, the verse in NB is evidently a quotation from a Mahāsāṃghika source and it is confirmed by MV and other sources. Later on, this Mahāsāṃghika statement was fiercely refuted by Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika scholars. Now, in Dharmakīrti, we find that both traditions are conflated. He cites a Mahāsāṃghika statement in NB, but follows a Sautrāntika approach in his other writings. Another example of such a conflation is found in his views on the simultaneity of multiple minds, as I noted previously. Among the followers of Dharmakīrti, different commentators favor different texts. According to Nagatomo (1993: 390), the generalized notion of self-cognition became popular only after Jitāri and Vidyākaraśānti, two eleventh-century commentators who preferred to follow NB instead of PV of Dharmakīrti.

To summarize, in Dignāga's system, self-cognition, as a separate type of perception, is the internal awareness of mental consciousness that is primarily conceptual. But mental consciousness can be devoid of conceptual construction when it directly experiences the sensory object or is in a meditative state. That produces the other two types of perception: mental perception and yogic perception. Sense perception, the primary type of perception, can be self-cognizant if it is understood as accompanied by mental consciousness. But it is not self-cognizant if the mental consciousness arises after it.

Self-cognition and the dual appearance of cognition

Those who deny self-cognition as a separate type of perception also have misunderstood the relationship between self-cognition and the dual appearance (*ābhāsa*) of cognition. Nagatomi (1979: 254–5), for instance, interprets self-cognition as an "aspect" of mental perception. On his understanding, this "self-cognizing aspect", along with the "object-cognizing aspect", constitutes the dual aspect or appearance of cognition that is discussed in the later context of PS. Therefore, self-cognition corresponds to the subjective aspect or the self-appearance (*svābhāsa*) of cognition. He is not the only one who has puzzled over this issue. In her account of the Sautrāntika view of self-cognition as presented by the dGe lugs pa tradition, Klein (1986: 113) also wonders how self-cognition is related to "the subjective apprehension aspect" of cognition. If self-cognition is posited to explain the

self-awareness of consciousness, she asks, is the self-cognition generated in the self-appearance of consciousness? Why should one consciousness or factor of consciousness need to appear to another one? Does the self-cognition have to be known by yet another self-cognition?

Williams (1998: 31, n. 17) remarks that these are the problems that the model of self-cognition as developed by Dignāga, which he calls "self-awareness (i)", is potentially getting into, while they can be avoided in a reflexive model of self-cognition as presented by Śāntarakṣita, which he calls "self-awareness (ii)". Williams's distinction between two models of self-cognition is helpful, but he ignores the fact that the two models can be traced back to the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins respectively, and that Dignāga, in developing the model of "the subjective aspect experiencing the objective aspect", does not deviate from the reflexive model, as both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are evidently indebted to the Mahāsāṃghikas in developing their concepts of self-cognition. The complexity and significance of Dignāga's position lie exactly in the fact that he is not confined to either model. Like the Sautrāntikas, he develops his concept of self-cognition by synthesizing those of the Mahāsāṃghikas, Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas.

The point that Klein finds troublesome has to do with Dignāga's doctrine of the dual appearance of cognition. That the consciousness itself appears as subject and object is a principal doctrine of Yogācāra, as is stated in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.3 and the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.32. In both texts, the dual appearance of consciousness demonstrates the basic Yogācāra tenet that all existents are consciousness-only. In PSV, Dignāga explains the dual appearance of cognition with the following words: "Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance, namely, that of itself [as subject] (*svābhāsa*) and that of the object (*viṣayābhāsa*)".[74] This statement, as Hattori (1968: 106, n. 1.65) remarks, reflects Dignāga's commitment to the Yogācāra idealism.

In Dignāga's system, self-cognition is a third factor apart from the dual appearance of cognition. To most readers of Dignāga, it is especially hard to distinguish self-cognition from the self-appearance of cognition, as Klein wonders whether the former is generated from the latter. Williams (1998: 4–5, n. 5) remarks that the dGe lugs understand self-cognition to be the self-appearance of cognition itself. For it is quite natural to assume that the apperceptive cognition is a secondary product of the subject of cognition, and has nothing to do with the object of cognition. Those who hold this view have committed themselves to a realistic presumption that the object of cognition is the external object independent of the cognition itself.

The way that Dignāga understands the relationship between self-cognition and the self-appearance of cognition, in brief, is that the former possesses the latter but not *vice versa*. The cognition of blue, for instance, has a twofold appearance, namely, the appearance of blue as object and the appearance of the cognition itself as subject. The cognition of this cognition

of blue, i.e., its self-cognition, again, possesses a twofold appearance, namely, "[on the one hand] the appearance of that cognition which is in conformity with the object and [on the other hand] the appearance of itself".[75] A strict distinction between the cognition of an object and the self-cognition of this cognition helps maintain the dual appearance of cognition, as Dignāga says: "That cognition has two forms is [known] from the difference between the cognition of the object and cognition of that [cognition]".[76] Suppose that a cognition only has the object-appearance for its object, the self-cognition would have no choice but to have this object-appearance for its object. This will collapse the distinction between cognition and self-cognition. If, on the other hand, the cognition has only the self-appearance, then both cognition and self-cognition will be marked by the same subjective aspect, and no difference between them can be found.[77]

The threefold structure of cognition that consists of self-cognition, self-appearance and object-appearance is further illustrated in terms of the distinction between the means, the object and the result of cognition. Dignāga stresses that this distinction is only metaphorically valid, because all these factors are devoid of activity (*vyāpāra*) in their ultimate nature. But in his *pramāṇa* theory he still assigns the roles of the means of cognition, object of cognition and result of cognition respectively to the self-appearance, object-appearance and self-cognition, as he expresses in the following famous verse:

> Whatever the form in which it [viz., a cognition] appears, that [form] is [recognized as] the object of cognition (*prameya*). The means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and [the cognition which is] its result (*phala*) are respectively the form of subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another.[78]

This is a classical formulation of the threefold division of cognition. The last point that states the unity of three divisions is especially important on a Yogācāra point of view, because it confirms their idealistic position that all elements, including the object of cognition, are only appearance of consciousness. At this point, Dignāga criticizes the Sautrāntikas for their realistic position. Evidence shows that the Sautrāntikas share the Yogācāra view that self-cognition is the result of cognition, but they consider the external object to be the object of cognition, and the cognition having the image of object to be the means of cognition. This view is reported by Bhaṭṭombeka in his *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā*:

> Those who maintain the Sautrāntika position, that the external object is the object of cognition (*prameya*), the cognition having the image of object is the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), self-cognition is the result (*phala*) of [cognition]. . . . Now in the Yogācāra position

also . . . this is their position: There is no external object, the cognition having the image of object is the object of cognition, the self-form [of cognition] is the means of cognition, and self-cognition is the result of [cognition].[79]

For those who are sympathetic to a realistic or common-sense attitude, the Sautrāntika theory sounds like a better solution. They have the external object as object, the cognition having the image of object as subject, and the self-appearance of cognition as self-cognition. On this view, self-cognition only has to do with the cognition itself, and is identical to the self-appearance of cognition, as pointed out by Hattori (1968: 102–3, n. 1.61): "[S]vābhāsa and sva-saṃvitti are understood by them [i.e., Sautrāntikas] as bearing the same meaning". By doing so, however, they have overlooked the true nature of the cognition, which is to be cognized by itself. This is because "[i]nasmuch as the cognition is held to take an external thing for its object, it is improper to say that sva-saṃvitti is the result of the cognitive process. Since sva-saṃvitti signifies that the cognition itself is the object of cognition".[80] Moreover, as pointed out by Kumārila, a seventh-century Mīmāṃsaka, the Sautrāntika position suffers the problem that cognition and its result have different objects: the former has the external object as its object, while the latter the cognition itself.[81]

Dignāga further proves the dual appearance of cognition and the existence of self-cognition by adopting the memory argument as developed by the Sautrāntikas.[82] He agrees with the Sautrāntikas that memory plays an important role in cognition, as he also is concerned with how the object of preceding cognition is known by the succeeding cognition. This implies that this object of the preceding cognition has disappeared when the succeeding cognition arises. Meanwhile, this object has to be known by the succeeding cognition. Otherwise, cognition is impossible. I have demonstrated this view with the example of cognizing the word devadatta from four separate syllables de-va-da-tta in the last chapter. Dignāga observes that in the memory of a subsequent moment "there occurs [to our mind] the recollection of our cognition as well as the recollection of the object".[83] So it stands that cognition has two appearances. Meanwhile, the recollection of past cognition also proves the existence of self-cognition at an earlier time. Dignāga's memory argument for self-cognition adds nothing new to what we have discussed about the Sautrāntikas in the last chapter. He bases it on the same fact that memory is of things that have been experienced. Therefore, if one recollects an object at a later time, one must have experienced it before. Dignāga seems not to accept the solution offered by Vasubandhu, who sees the object in memory as a manifestation of representational consciousness (vijñapti).[84]

Understanding self-cognition as possessing a twofold appearance does run the risk of making self-cognition a separate cognition; thus, it faces the

difficulty of infinite regress. So the key to understanding Dignāga's view is that self-cognition is an element of the threefold structure of cognition but not a separate cognition. As an element of cognition, self-cognition makes the self-awareness of cognition possible through the power of the cognition itself. If a cognition were not known by itself but by another cognition, there would be an infinite regress and the movement of thought from one object to another would be impossible. If so, no self-cognition would be possible at all. A cognition, therefore, has to be known by itself.

In sum, Dignāga holds that self-cognition is different from the twofold appearance of cognition. These three aspects of cognition, namely, self-cognition, the subjective appearance and objective appearance, constitute the totality of cognition. Dignāga seems to reconcile the Mahāsāṃghika–Sautrāntika controversy about one or multiple minds by proposing a model of one mind with multiple aspects or divisions. In this model, self-cognition can function as a way of the subject experiencing the object, but it is still reflexive because only one mind is involved.

Cognition of self-cognition: Dharmapāla

Dharmapāla's importance comes from the fact that he connects the two sub-schools of Yogācāra, namely, the Sākāravādins and Nirākāravādins, by commenting on works of both Dignāga and Vasubandhu. As for the concept of self-cognition, Dharmapāla extracts this concept from the context of *pramāṇa* theory and develops it as part of the Yogācāra doctrine of eight consciousnesses. In this way, he makes self-cognition a truly "Yogācāra" doctrine. More important, he adds one more layer to self-cognition by developing the concept of the cognition of self-cognition (*svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti*).[85] Though not mentioned in any extant Sanskrit or Tibetan sources, this concept is very important to Yogācāra scholars in East Asia.

I primarily rely on two Chinese texts to explore Dharmapāla's concept of self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition. The first is VMS, a collection of ten major commentaries on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, in which Dharmapāla's view is taken as the most authoritative one. In this work, self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition are discussed as part of the image (*ākāra*) of store (*ālaya*) consciousness, a concept not found in Dignāga's system. The second is BBU, a work by Bandhuprabha and others who were disciples of Dharmapāla. This work discusses self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition in the context of four undefiled awarenesses.

Dharmapāla follows Dignāga closely in formulating the concept of self-cognition, but we can still see some distinctive features in his reception of this concept. First of all, Dharmapāla defines self-cognition as a substance of the two divisions of cognition, namely, the seeing (*darśana*) and the seen (*nimitta*). He says: "The [consciousness] itself (*svabhāva*) that the seeing portion and the seen portion are based on is called a substance (*dravya*), and

this is the division of self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*)".[86] The seeing portion and the seen portion refer to the two divisions of cognition, which, together with self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition, constitute four divisions of cognition in Dharmapāla's system. These two terms are probably derived from Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, where we find *darśana-vijñapti* (*lta ba gyi rnam par rig pa, jian shi* 見識) and *nimitta-vijñapti* (*rgyu mtshan gyi rnam par rig pa, xiang shi* 相識). This pair belongs to the same Yogācāra tradition that divides cognition into the subjective and objective appearances. Therefore, the seeing portion and seen portion correspond to the two appearances of cognition in Dignāga. Although Dignāga understands self-cognition as possessing self-appearance and object-appearance, he does not explicitly take self-cognition as a substance. But Dharmapāla has done so by defining self-cognition as a substantial basis for the subjective and objective aspects of cognition; therefore, self-cognition is also called the division of self-substance (**svabhāvāṅga, zi ti fen* 自體分).

Among various proofs of self-cognition as proposed by Dignāga and his predecessors, Dharmapāla seems to be particularly interested in the memory argument. He restates this argument with the following words: "If this [self-cognition] does not exist, one would not be able to recollect one's own mind or mental activities, just as one cannot remember an object that has not been experienced".[87] Compared to the memory argument as presented by Dignāga and the Sautrāntikas, we find that Dharmapāla reverses the order of the argument. Instead of inferring self-cognition from the phenomenon of memory, he insists that without self-cognition memories of previous mind or mental activities would be impossible. Therefore, self-cognition becomes a precondition of memory.

Besides understanding self-cognition as the substance of the subjective and objective aspects of cognition, and as the factor that makes memory possible, Dharmapāla also holds that self-cognition is the result of cognition. He says: "Because of the difference between the means, the object, and the result of cognition, the seeing portion and seen portion must have a substance to rely on".[88] The substance here refers to the self-cognition that corresponds to the result of cognition. To support his view, Dharmapāla also quotes PS I.10, a verse of Dignāga that we have discussed in the last section. This point, especially, encourages him to develop a further layer of self-cognition, i.e., cognition of self-cognition. He proposes the following reasons for establishing such a concept:

> If this [fourth division] does not exist, what would cognize the third division [i.e., self-cognition]? The [self-cognition], being a division of cognition, must also be cognized the same way as does [the seeing portion]. Also, the division of self-cognition would have no resultant [cognition]. But [self-cognition], being a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), must have a resultant [cognition].[89]

Dharmapāla basically insists on two points. First, self-cognition, as a division of cognition, has to be known. Otherwise, the cognition would not be self-cognizant. Second, when the self-cognition is known, its resultant cognition cannot be the seeing portion, because the latter is sometimes characterized as illogical inference. But the awareness of self-cognition, similar to self-cognition itself, has to be perception, i.e., devoid of conceptual construction. Now, if there is a fourth division of cognition, namely, cognition of self-cognition, it will serve the purpose of cognizing self-cognition on the one hand and being the resultant cognition of this cognition on the other. This cognition of self-cognition ensures the reflexivity of the self-cognition itself.

Looking from Dignāga's perspective, however, Dharmapāla seems to be making a dangerous leap into infinite regress that Dignāga himself tries to avoid. If so, I think it is rooted in Dignāga's system, where self-cognition enjoys a relatively independent status from the two appearances of cognition. Once one understands self-cognition substantially, as an entity that possesses or provides a basis for the subjective and objective aspects of cognition rather than as a form of reflexive awareness, one must explain whether the self-cognition itself is self-cognizant. By refuting the possibility of infinite regress as involved with another separate cognition, Dignāga does not eliminate the possibility of further dividing multiple layers inside the cognition. Dharmapāla himself, however, does not think that one can divide the cognition into an infinite number of divisions and thereby fall into an infinite regress. That is, it is not necessary to establish a fifth division, called, perhaps, the cognition of the cognition of self-cognition, because the reason for establishing the fourth division no longer applies. When the cognition of self-cognition is known, the resultant cognition is self-cognition instead of a fifth division of cognition. Therefore, by dividing cognition into four divisions we have reached the limit.

To conclude, Dharmapāla develops the concept of the cognition of self-cognition in the framework of *pramāṇa* theory. Along with the seeing portion, the seen portion and self-cognition, it makes four divisions of cognition. The doctrine of four divisions of cognition became part of the curriculum for students of Yogācāra in East Asia. As a Japanese proverb says: "Anyone who understands the theories of four divisions of cognition and of three types of objects has already mastered half of the Consciousness-only doctrine".[90]

Later development

Having reached the end of my writing, I find, ironically, that I have only arrived at a beginning. I am not talking about a Hegelian sense of a cyclic system, where the end always suggests a beginning. I actually have in mind a linear sense of history. This exploration of the historical development of the concept of self-cognition will function as a pre-history to many scholars of Indian Buddhism. Lacking access to most of the materials that I have

discussed, these scholars have seen Dignāga as the beginning of the history of self-cognition. This study shows, however, that Dignāga represents a stage of systematization after a long process of development in early Buddhist schools, including the Mahāsāṃghika, Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika. Before concluding this project, it is a good idea to outline the further development of the concept of self-cognition in India and China.

After Dignāga and Dharmapāla the concept of self-cognition went through another cycle of refutation, synthesis and systematization under the influence of the Mādhyamikas, Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas and Sākāravāda Yogācārins. Unlike the first wave of refutation by the Sarvāstivādins, who directed their criticism at the Mahāsāṃghikas, later refutations primarily targeted the doctrine of the Yogācārins. It is generally believed that Bhāvaviveka initiated the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka controversy by criticizing his contemporary Dharmapāla.[91] I do not find, however, that he was familiar with Dharmapāla's concept of self-cognition or cognition of self-cognition. Instead, he refutes self-cognition in a classical Sarvāstivāda manner concerning omniscience. In his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* V.93, Bhāvaviveka says that "omniscience cannot occur in a single moment, because a cognition cannot act on itself, like a sword-blade, and because there can be no self-cognition".[92] This may imply that the Yogācārins also have a concern about omniscience when establishing their concept of self-cognition. Bandhuprabha seems to support this observation when he discusses self-cognition and cognition of self-cognition in the context of the four undefiled awarenesses that are believed to be omniscient in the Yogācāra system. Candrakīrti seems to be particularly upset about the memory argument for self-cognition, which, he reports, was shared by the Yogācārins and Sautrāntikas. In his MA VI.73, Candrakīrti argues that there is no causal relation between memory and self-cognition and that the former can be explained without the latter. In his *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.15–26, Śāntideva summarizes Nāgārjuna's argument against the simile of light and Candrakīrti's counter-argument on memory, then he sets forth his own argument against the way Yogācārins use the example of the fortune-teller (*īkṣaṇikā*) to prove self-cognition and the knowledge of others' minds. This argument is anticipated by Harivarman in his refutation of the same example proposed by the Mahāsāṃghikas.

These three Mādhyamikas (Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti and Śāntideva) share a common agenda to refute self-cognition, even though they represent two sub-groups of Madhyamaka, i.e., Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. A third group of Madhyamaka represented by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla is usually called Yogācāra-Madhyamaka. They hold a distinctive position with respect to the concept of self-cognition. They do not follow their Mādhyamika predecessors' arguments against self-cognition, but they also do not simply accept the Yogācāra concept of self-cognition as formulated by Dignāga. For them, "[h]ence the only right view is that the 'self-cognition' of the cognition is due to its being of the very nature of consciousness".[93] Self-

cognition in this sense, called "self-awareness (ii)" by Williams (1998), is not necessarily involved with the division of the subjective and objective aspects of cognition, as in the case of "self-awareness (i)" of Dignāga. Williams observes that "self-awareness (i)" requires "self-awareness (ii)" as a precondition, but "self-awareness (ii)" does not presuppose "self-awareness (i)". In other words, self-cognition as redefined by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla is a more basic form of self-cognition. Taking into account the pre-Dignāga development of self-cognition, it is not difficult to understand this phenomenon. By rejecting the articulated epistemological formulations, they have returned to a Mahāsāṃghika-like position, according to which self-cognition is more simple, fundamental and soteriologically oriented. The Yogācāra–Mādhyamika synthesis of self-cognition also reaffirms a Nirākāravāda position, shared by the majority of Indian Buddhist schools except the Sautrāntikas and some Yogācārins.

The Sākāravāda position, shared by Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti and their followers, features a Sautrāntika–Yogācāra synthesis from the very beginning. Compared to Dignāga, Dharmakīrti shows a stronger Sautrāntika tendency in articulating the epistemological framework for self-cognition. This tendency continues in Prajñākaragupta, one of Dharmakīrti's main commentators, and reaches its peak in Jñānaśrīmitra, who wrote a series of treatises systematically to expound a Sākāravāda position on various issues. An entire section of his *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* is devoted to self-cognition. To my knowledge, this is the most lengthy Sanskrit material on self-cognition. In this text, Jñānaśrīmitra refutes the Nirākāravāda position of Ratnākaraśānti, a distant follower of Śāntarakṣita, and systematically presents self-cognition as perceived by the Sākāravādins in a far more detailed manner than Dignāga.[94]

While the Indian development of self-cognition reached its end in the twelfth century, the Chinese had been receiving and developing this concept from the sixth century onward. The Chinese reception of self-cognition can be examined individually in three camps of Chinese Yogācāra, namely, the old school of Paramārtha, the new school of Xuanzang and Kuiji, and the contemporary school started at the beginning of the twentieth century. The doxography of the old and new Yogācāra corresponds to that of Nirākāravāda and Sākāravāda in Indian Yogācāra. Paramārtha is believed to follow closely Sthiramati or Nanda, both being Nirākāravādins. These two early commentators of Vasubandhu are reported by Kuiji to hold that cognition has either one or two divisions. The so-called one-division theory actually refers to a classical Nirākāravāda position that consciousness is not subject to any division. If it is self-cognizant, it is not involved with the subjective aspect experiencing the objective aspect. Instead, it is endowed with a reflexive nature. The two-division theory, on the other hand, refers to the twofold appearance of cognition commonly upheld among the Yogācārins. Both Sthiramati and Nanda, being Nirākāravādins, share the

view that the subjective and objective appearances are illusory. This position is well formulated in an apocryphal Chinese Buddhist treatise, the *Awakening of Faith*, one of the most influential texts among Chinese Buddhists. Its commentators of different scholastic schools including Huayan and Tiantai suggest that the concept of karmic appearance (*karmalakṣaṇa*) or karmic consciousness (*karmavijñāna*), from which the subjective and objective appearances arise, is identical to the self-cognition introduced by the new school of Xuanzang and Kuiji.[95]

Xuanzang and Kuiji are strict adherents of the Sākāravāda tradition of Dharmapāla. To examine their reception of self-cognition, one has to go through the vast commentatorial literature built upon VMS, in which Dharmapāla's view is taken as the most authoritative one. This has been elegantly done by Fukihara (1988), who carefully analyses self-cognition and cognition of self-cognition in the framework of the Yogācāra doctrines of consciousness-only, twofold appearance of cognition, eight conscious-nesses, three natures, four conditions, seeds and perception. I would add that we should also examine the parallels and differences between this Sākāravāda tradition of East Asia and the later development of Sākāravāda in India up to the twelfth century.

Yogācāra studies flourish in contemporary China in a series of loosely connected institutions and individual scholars who could be called "Contemporary Chinese Yogācāra School".[96] It would be interesting to consider how this school looks at the issue of self-cognition and cognition of self-cognition through contemporary eyes. As I was educated in this school, I might have taken for granted what this school is saying, but two issues strike me. One is a debate between Xiong Shili, the founder of New Confucianism who once studied under this school, and his critics. One of the issues for them is whether self-cognition and cognition of self-cognition are experiential or analytical. This issue sounds natural today, but it cannot be raised in the traditional Buddhist context without the stimulus of Western analytical thinking. The other issue comes from a recent criticism of Xuanzang's school by Han Jingqing, my former teacher. He formulates his criticism on the basis of a large number of Tibetan Yogācāra texts that he translated into Chinese. On the issue of self-cognition, Han adopts a Nirākāravāda position to criticize the Dharmapāla–Xuanzang tradition on several technical points.

In a word, my study of the early history of the concept of self-cognition helps us fully appreciate the later criticism of self-cognition by the Mādhyamikas, the new way of synthesizing the concept by the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas, and the final systematization of this theory by the Sākāravādins. Meanwhile, the conflict between different Chinese receptions of this concept can also be understood in terms of the competitive models of self-cognition circulated in India.

1 See Ueda 1967.
2 See Katsura 1969: 10.
3 Ui 1947–8 (Vol. 1): 305.
4 For Dignāga's discussion on three natures, see T1518: 913b.
5 A distinctive feature of Yogācāra studies in the English-speaking world is to emphasize such a realistic trend. However, this has recently been criticized by European scholars. See Schmithausen 2000.
6 For the relationship between Sarvāstivāda and early Yogācāra, see Nishi 1975: 219–65, 351–74; Yinshun 1992: 633–42; Deleanu 2000.
7 See T2049: 190c.
8 *de'i phyir de 'dra ba'i rang rig bkag pas rnal 'byor pa so so rang rang gis de kho na nyid rig pa'i rang rig bkag pa dang / jig rten pas ngas nga rang rig ces pa'i tha snyad kyi don gyi rang rig bkag zer ba ni blun po'i gtam mo //* Sungbum 5408: 156a.
9 See Kapstein 2000: 112–13; Sasaki 1994: 82–3.
10 *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* X.568: *svadhār[ā]ṃ hi yathā khaḍgaṃ svāgraṃ vai aṅgulir yathā / na cchindate na spṛśate tathā cittaṃ svadarśane //.*
11 世尊。若彼所行影像即與此心無有異者。云何此心還見此心。善男子。此中無有少法能見少法。然即此心如是生時。即有如是影像顯現。善男子。如依善瑩清淨鏡面。以質為緣還見本質。而謂我今見於影像。及謂離質別有所行影像顯現。如是此心生時相似有異。三摩地所行影像顯現。 T676: 698b.
12 此顯作用於自相違 T1598: 400b.
13 See Z369: 305a.
14 無作用故。 T1598: 400c.
15 *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*, p. 478: *cittam arthābhāsaṃ pravartata[ṃ] ityapi svasaṃvedanam eva nivedayati, vedyavedakayoḥ ekīkaraṇāt /.* He cites the beginning of the passage from the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra* as follows: *na hi maitreya, tatra kaścid dharmaṃ pratyavekṣate, api tu tathā samutpannaṃ taccittaṃ yat tathā khyātīti /.*
16 非謂見分還見見分。故言自見 Z369: 306b.
17 *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* 240: *svasaṃvic-cintā ca pratyekabuddhasyādhikyena vartate /.*
18 Nakamura Zuiryu (1961: 58) points out that Paramārtha composed the first and fourth chapters of this work on the basis of his knowledge of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, while the second and third chapters have their source in the fascicles 61, 73, 74, 75 of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. But I did not find any parallel passages in these works to the ones I shall discuss below.
19 不緣所量境而能量智自成者 T1610: 791a.
20 燈但照他。決不照自。若體有暗。可須自他來照。體既無暗。何勞自他照耶。不如瓶等物體暗不自顯故須燈照。若燈復須照。則應更有別燈來照。而不爾者。定知燈但為能照。非是所照。 T1610: 791b.
21 能緣前境。名為能量。即自智緣。及為他智緣。故名所量。 T1610: 791b.
22 即境者。如眼識為證量。直對前色。不能分別作是青意。若作是青意解。即是意識。是則二心俱起。眼識取色不能自取。意識分別青黃。即是取眼識。不能取自見色境。故但分別。眼識所得者。即是所量。分別眼識即是能量。是故證量由他分別故得成立。 T1610: 791b. To translate this cryptic passage, I follow Sakamoto 1935a: 291 instead of Takemura 1977: 208.
23 For Dignāga, it is actually a puzzling issue whether sense perception (e.g., eye-consciousness) can cognize itself or not. See the following sections for more discussion.
24 為自開悟唯有現量及與比量。彼聲喻等攝在此中。 T1628: 3b.
25 故唯二量。由此能了自共相故。非離此二別有所量為了知彼更立餘量。 T1628: 3b.

26 然許極微略有二種一實二假。其相云何。實謂極成色等自相。於和集位。現量所得。假由分析比量所知。 T1563: 855b.

27 PS I.3c *kalpanāpoḍham.* . . . I shall cite the Sanskrit fragments of PS and PSV as numbered by Hattori (1968) when I do not have a major disagreement with him. Otherwise, I shall quote the Tibetan text.

28 PS I.3d: *nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā /.* Hattori's translation. I shall adopt the English translation of Hattori (1968) whenever possible. If, however, I disagree with him, I shall supply my own translation.

29 NB I.6: *timirāśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādyanāhitavibhramaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam /.*

30 See, for instance, Luo 1998: 217–18.

31 *Yogācārabhūmi: pratyakṣaṃ katamat yad aviparokṣam anabhyūhitam anabhyūhyam avibhrāntañ ca.* The Sanskrit text from Yaita 1999: 442. The Chinese reads: 現量者。謂有三種。一非不現見。二非已思應思。三非錯亂境界 T1579: 357a.

32 See NB I.7–11: *tat caturvidham: indriya-jñānam:* . . . *manovijñānam:* . . . *sarva-citta-caittānām ātman-saṃvedanam:* . . . *yogi-jñānaṃ ceti.*

33 See Hattori 1968: 27, Nagatomi 1979: 254, and Nagatomo 1993: 390. Franco (1993: 295) reports that Schmithausen reached the same view "independently", but I have not seen any of the latter's writings on this issue.

34 Robbins (1992: 243) is another author who claims that there are four types of perception in Dignāga's system, but he provides no evidence.

35 Pak (2000), for instance, lists the views of both Hattori and Wayman, but is convinced that Wayman's interpretation is wrong.

36 意地亦有離諸分別唯證行轉。又於貪等諸自證分。諸修定者離教分別。皆是現量。 T1628: 3b. Hirakawa, Hirai *et al.* 1973–8 (Vol. 2): 16 has *mānasa* for *yi di* 意地, but Tucci 1930: 50 has *manobhūmi.* The part on self-cognition may be translated literally as: "Again, for desire and so forth, their self-cognition, and . . . , are both perception".

37 然離分別略有四類。一五識身。二五俱意。三諸自證。四修定者。 T1840: 139b. See the next section for a discussion on Kuiji's defining mental perception as the mental consciousness that accompanies five consciousnesses.

38 Hattori 1968: 94, n. 1.47. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam* 305.17–18 omits *ca.*

39 Hattori 1968: 27, my emphasis.

40 PS I Db (Kanakavarman's translation): *'dod chags dang zhe sdang dang gti mug dang bde ba dang sdug bsngal la sogs pa ni dbang po la mi ltos pa'i phyir rang rig pa'i mngon sum mo /.* My emphasis. Vasudhararakṣita's translation agrees with this translation except *bltos pa* for *ltos pa.* See Hattori 1968: 181; but I did not follow his modifications. The expression "*svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*" is found in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī* I.10.

41 In his forthcoming article "*On* Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti *6ab again*", Franco argues that this position of Prajñākaragupta is confirmed by Jinendrabuddhi, an early commentator on Dignāga. In a newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript of the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, the following sequence of question and answer is found: *teṣaṃ [rāgādīnāṃ] svasaṃvedanam kathaṃ mānasaṃ pratyakṣam? svasaṃvittisāmānyena tajjātīyatvāt.* ("Why is the self-awareness of [desire, etc.] a mental perception? Because it belongs to that species (i.e., the species of mental perception) owing to the general property of [being] self-awareness.") Franco's emendation and translation. Thanks to Franco for sending me the draft of this paper.

42 Nagatomo (1993: 397–8) and Pak (2000: 919) notice the difference between the Tibetan translations and the Sanskrit text of Prajñākaragupta, but they choose to follow the Sanskrit to interpret Dignāga.

43 Both Tibetan translations render the verse in the same way: *yid kyang don dang chags la sogs / rang rig rtog pa med pa yin*. See Hattori 1968: 180–1. The Sanskrit reads: *mānasaṃ cārtha-rāgādi-sva-saṃvittir akalpikā*. See Hattori 1968: 92, n. 1.45, and *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam* 303.23.

44 See Hattori 1968: 27 and Nagatomi 1979: 254. As Hattori (1968: 92, n. 1.45) remarks, this reading has its origin in Jinendrabuddhi.

45 See Franco 1993: 296–7. It seems to me that Wayman, when inserting the word "sense", has in mind the Yogācāra concept of mental sense (*manas*).

46 See the 1957 edition of the index to *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam*, p. 692, and the 1953 edition of *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam*, p. 305.

47 See, for instance, Hattori 1968: 27, Nagatomi 1979: 254–5, and Pak 2000: 919–917.

48 Those who agree with me include Tillemans (1989: 70) and Funayama (2000b: 106).

49 意地亦有離諸分別唯證行轉。 T1628: 3b. These Chinese words can be restored into Sanskrit as follows: *mānāsam api avikalpakam anubhavākāra-pravṛttam*.

50 PS I Db: *mānasam api rūpādi-viṣayālambanam avikalpakam anubhavākāra-pravṛttam*.

51 謂諸意根所行境界。 T1579: 357b. Here the mental sense (*manas, yi gen* 意根) refers to the seventh consciousness in Yogācāra.

52 See Katō 1989: 216.

53 Kajiyama 1989: 240, n. 119.

54 A similar view on the correlation between six consciousnesses and four types of perception is found in Kamalaśīla. See the recent study of Funayama (2000b), who, despite the virtue of this innovative study, follows uncritically the Sanskrit reconstruction by Hattori (1968) when dealing with Dignāga. Thanks to Funayama for kindly sending me this article along with many of his other works.

55 若於貪等諸自證分亦是現量。何故此中除分別智。不遮此中自證。現量無分別故。但於此中了餘境分不名現量。 T1628: 3b.

56 The *Yogācārabhūmi* (T1579: 357c) also supplies a secondary opinion that identifies worldly perception with pure perception. See Nagasaki 1986: 7, 1991: 223–4.

57 Tosaki (1979: 381–2) takes this position to interpret Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. In so doing, he omits sense perception. So there are still four types of perception in total: mental perception, self-cognition of desire and so forth, yogic perception, and self-cognition of conceptual awareness.

58 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion.

59 PS I Db (Kanakavarman's translation): *'dod chags dang zhe sdang dang gti mug dang bde ba dang sdug bsngal la sogs pa ni dbang po la mi ltos pa'i phyir rang rig pa'i mngon sum mo /*. My emphasis.

60 Matilal 1986: 150. But he is wrong in following Hattori and Nagatomi to say that self-cognition is a kind or aspect of *mental perception*.

61 PS I.5: *dharmiṇo 'neka-rūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ / svasaṃvedyam anirdeśyam rūpam indriya-gocaraḥ //*. Hattori's translation. NM: 有法非一相 根非一切行 唯內證離言 是色根境界 T1628: 3b.

62 PS VI Dc (Kanakavarman's translation): *shes pa'i rang gi bdag nyid bzhin du so so'i bdag nyid rig pa yin no /*; (Vasudhararakṣita's translation) *rang gi snang ba'i shes pa skyes pa de'i bdag nyid so sor rig par kyed de shes pa'i rang gi cha shas bzhin no /*. Hattori's translation.

63 The view that "mental consciousness is self-cognizant" is found in Harivarman. See Chapter 4 for further discussion.

64 However, Franco observes: "This strikes me as an improbable position and to my mind would not be expressed in Sanskrit with *sva*-". (Personal email dated 25 April 2004.)

65 See *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* D4268: 25a; Hattori 1968: 93, n. 1.46.

66 PV III.239: *pūrvānubhūtagrahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā / adṛṣṭagrahaṇe 'ndhāder api syād arthadarśanam //.*

67 NB I.9: *svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam //.*

68 It is a matter of dispute whether Dharmakīrti holds that sense and mental perceptions arise simultaneously or successively when some notions in his *Pramāṇavarttika* are take into account. See Franco 1997: 77–81 and Funayama 2000a: 321–9. But as far as this passage of *Nyāyabindu* is concerned, as pointed out by Stcherbatsky 1930–2 (Vol. 2): 312, Nagatomi 1979: 256, Tillemans 1989: 79–80, n. 2, and Funayama 2000b: 106, Dharmakīrti agrees with the traditional Sautrāntika view that different moments of cognition arise successively. This reflects the complicatedness of the thought of Dharmakīrti, who attempts to synthesize Sautrāntika and Yogācāra.

69 See **Ālambanaparīkṣāvyākhyā*, T1625: 889b4–8.

70 五識起時必有意識能引後念意識令起。何假五識為開導依。 T1585: 21a.

71 集量論等云五識俱時必有意識。即此意識能引第二尋求意識生。即以前念自類意識為無間緣。何假五識。 T1830: 389a.

72 集量論等五俱意識定現量者。必同緣故。 T1830: 420c.

73 若大眾部等。及大乘。諸識雖俱。然五識俱現量意識同於五識。此二現量不分明執。後時意識方分別執謂為外境。 T1830: 493b.

74 PS I G: *dvy-ābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca /.*

75 PS I Ha: *tad arthānurūpajñānābhāsaṃ svābhāsaṃ ca /.* Hattori's translation.

76 PS I.11ab: *viṣaya-jñāna-taj-jñāna-viśeṣāt tu dvi-rūpatā /.* Hattori's translation.

77 See the excellent analysis in Matilal 1986: 152.

78 PS I.10: *yad-ābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat pramāṇa-phalate punaḥ / grāhakākara-saṃvittī trayaṃ nātaḥ pṛthak-kṛtam //.* Hattori's translation.

79 *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā: ye 'pi Sautrāntika-pakṣam evaṃ vyācakṣate – bāhyo 'rthaḥ prameyam, vijñānasya viṣayākāratā pramāṇaṃ sva-saṃvittiḥ phalam iti . . . idānīṃ Yogācāra-pakṣe 'pi . . . teṣāṃ caitad darśanam – bāhyārtho nāsti, vijñānasya viṣayākāratā prameyā, svākāratā pramāṇam, sva-saṃvittiḥ phalam iti.* From Hattori 1968: 102, n. 1.61.

80 Hattori 1968: 105, n. 1.64.

81 See *Ślokavārttika* IV.79ab; Hattori 1968: 106, n. 1.64.

82 For the memory argument of Sautrāntikas, see Harivarman's JP (T1646: 288b, 364b) and Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* VI.73.

83 PS I Hc-1: *viṣaya iva jñāne smṛtir utpadyate. . . .* Hattori's translation.

84 See the *Viṃśatikā* 17ab: *uktaṃ yathā tadābhāsā vijñaptiḥ smaraṇaṃ tataḥ /* (It is held [by the Yogācāra] that memory is of the representational consciousness that appears as that [object]).

85 La Vallée Poussin (1928–9: 133) reconstructs *zheng zi zheng fen* 證自證分 as *svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga*, but Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1935–6: 63) renders it as *saṃvittisva-saṃvitti-bhāga*.

86 相見所依自體名事。即自證分。 T1585: 10b.

87 此若無者應不自憶心心所法。如不曾更境必不能憶故。 T1585: 10b.

88 所量能量量果別故。相見必有所依體故。 T1585: 10b.

89 此若無者誰證第三。心分既同應皆證故。又自證分應無有果。諸能量者必有果故。 T1585: 10b.

90 *Shi-bun san-rui yui-shiki han-gaku* 四分三境唯識半學.

91 Eckel (1985) suggests that this controversy has its earlier sources among the founding masters of Yogācāra.
92 *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* V.93: *svātmanīvāsidhārāyāḥ jñānavṛtter asambhavāt / svasamvittiniṣedhāc ca na syāt sarvajñatā sakṛt //*. Eckel's translation.
93 *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2002ab: *tadasya bodharūpatvād yuktam tāvat svavedanam /.* Jha's translation.
94 See Kajiyama 1989: 389–400.
95 See Yao (2001).
96 See Yao (forthcoming).

6

CONCLUSION

In the previous chapters I have explored the historical development of the Buddhist theory of self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) with an emphasis on its pre-Dignāga development. My central thesis is that this theory originated in a soteriological discussion of omniscience among the Mahāsāṃghikas, an early Buddhist school established right after the first schism of the Buddhist community. The theory then evolved into a topic of epistemological inquiry among the Yogācārins.

Based on the primary sources in Chinese, Pāli, Sanskrit and Tibetan, I trace the origin of self-cognition back to the Mahāsāṃghikas. In their discussion on the omniscience of Srota-āpanna, an initial stage of Buddhist sagehood, they admit that this omniscience and, consequently, the self-cognition of the mind and mental activities occur in a single moment. On their view, the mind is like a lamp: it illuminates other things while it also illuminates itself.

The book then explores the subsequent development of this theory in a series of Buddhist scholars, including Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas and Yogācārins. The Sarvāstivādins set forth a systematic refutation to the Mahāsāṃghika theory in terms of causality, epistemology, soteriology, the relationship of self and other, the distinction between particular and universal, and supportive similes. The Sarvāstivādins also developed a reflective model, in which they saw self-cognition as possible only in multiple moments rather than in a single moment.

The Sautrāntikas developed their theory of self-cognition by synthesizing the views of their predecessors. They discussed self-cognition in a more epistemological context, and especially in a framework of successively arising moments of cognition. They conclude that only mental consciousness is endowed with the capacity of self-cognition.

The early Yogācāra theory of self-cognition bears a strong mark of Sautrāntika influence, although it was modified by contact with the Yogācāra idealism. Dignāga was the first Yogācāra scholar to systematize a theory of self-cognition in his epistemological system. I argue, against several eminent contemporary scholars, that self-cognition is a separate type of perception

for Dignāga. Finally, I introduce Dharmapāla's concept of the cognition of self-cognition, which signifies a further level of reflexivity of the mind.

Since the concept of self-cognition or reflexive awareness in Buddhist philosophy concerns the conditions for a mental state to be conscious, it has a natural connection with the study of consciousness in Western philosophy and cognitive science. Consciousness, on the other hand, is closely related to self-consciousness, one of the central concepts in modern and contemporary Western philosophy. The concept of self-consciousness itself can be understood in two different ways: (1) being conscious of the *consciousness* itself, and (2) being conscious of the *self*. We can find this distinction, for instance, in Kant's works. The former, being a consciousness of the occurrent experience such as perceptions, memories, desires, bodily sensations, etc., is empirical self-consciousness; while the latter, the consciousness of the transcendental subject, is the so-called pure self-consciousness.[1]

Given the basic Buddhist tenet of no-self, we can safely assume that the whole Buddhist tradition is trying to do away with the transcendental subject. This does not mean, however, that Buddhist scholars are not interested in issues such as the continuity of consciousness or personal identity. On the contrary, these issues are among the central concerns of various Buddhist schools. In other words, it actually becomes a challenging issue to construe the continuity of consciousness or personal identity after the negation of substantial self. This concern, however, has virtually nothing to do with what we are discussing in this book. Compared with its Western counterpart, the Buddhist theory of self-cognition enjoys the advantage of not being confused with a consciousness of the self. Instead, it is only concerned with the reflexive nature of consciousness. Therefore, it can be categorized as a type of subjectless self-consciousness, one of the four types in Frank's classification of various theories of self-consciousness in the history of Western philosophy.[2]

As we know, in the West the most important source for the study of reflexive consciousness comes from the Cartesian tradition. It was through Descartes' effort in identifying *cogito* as the most solid and self-evident basis for the first philosophy that self-consciousness gradually became one of the core concepts of modern Western philosophy. However, his assertion on the completeness and infallibility of self-consciousness is challenged by contemporary scholars. In other words, many of them do not think that all mental states imply reflexive consciousness, nor do they believe that self-consciousness is always reliable.[3] A similar phenomenon can be observed in the history of Buddhism when later scholars of various schools such as Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and Madhyamaka criticize the Mahāsāṃghika assertion that "all mind and mental activities are self-cognizant", a foundational position that marks the origin of the Buddhist theory of self-cognition.

Another important source for the study of reflexive consciousness is the phenomenological tradition. Its contributions to the subject have been

recognized by a larger number of scholars in recent years through the systematical presentation of Kern (1989) and Zahavi (1999). This tradition seems to be especially sensitive to the temporal dimension of self-consciousness. This is evident in Brentano's strict distinction between inner perception and inner observation, in Husserl's emphasis on the primary consciousness (*Urbewußtsein*), and also in Sartre's concept of pre-reflective consciousness. They all insist that the primary sense of self-consciousness must be immediate and instantaneous, and any subsequent act of reflection or retrospection is secondary, peripheral, and deviated from the immediate self-consciousness. The so-called Heidelberg school, a group of scholars who are known for their contributions to the study of self-consciousness in contemporary Germany, also carry on this view in their arguments against the reflection model of self-consciousness.

In the Buddhist tradition, the Sarvāstivāda school goes to another extreme by saying that the mind cannot know itself while taking other things as object. The self-knowledge of the mind is only possible when retrospection or reflection takes place in the second moment. They build this theory on the basis of their unique tenet of pan-realism, i.e., all *dharma*s in the past, the present and the future are real existents. The Sarvāstivāda refutation to the reflexive model of self-cognition as held by the Mahāsāṃghikas has a great impact on the later Madhyamaka scholars, who use the same reasoning to argue against the concept of self-cognition as systematically presented by the Yogācāra scholar Dignāga. On the other hand, it is against the backdrop of the Sarvāstivāda refutation that Dignāga establishes his theory of self-cognition. He comes closer to the line of phenomenological tradition when he insists that the immediate reflexive self-cognition is not only possible, but also the very nature of mental consciousness and mental activities such as desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc.

The Buddhist theory of self-cognition shares more common interests with the consciousness studies in the field of cognitive science in terms of its empirical approach, its tendency to neglect transcendental subject, and its commitment to the representational nature of consciousness. In this field, the most important contributions to the study of reflexive consciousness are the research on higher-order consciousness, and the controversy between theories of higher-order perception (HOP) and higher-order thought (HOT). The HOP theory is rooted in the "inner sense" model of self-consciousness, an influential theory propounded by Locke and Kant. According to this theory, self-consciousness is understood to be an immediate non-conceptual perception of internal mental states in the same way as sense organs perceiving external objects. The most prominent contemporary voices upholding this theory include Armstrong (1968, 1984) and Lycan (1987, 1996). Both of them agree that consciousness can be understood as comprising lower and higher orders: the lower-order state is to be aware of external objects, while the higher-order one takes that state as its intentional object. On their

view, the latter must be perception-like; hence their view is labeled as a HOP theory.

In recent years, the HOP theory has been attacked by scholars from various perspectives. Some of them hold a view of first-order representation, and they include Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995). Their main point is that the reflexive consciousness does not have to be explained in terms of the higher-order structure; rather, it is implied in the very state of first-order consciousness, i.e., the consciousness of external objects. This is similar to the view of the Mahāsāṃghikas, as well as that of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka scholar Śāntarakṣita. The more serious criticism of HOP theory comes from the HOT theorists, who include Rosenthal (1986, 1993), Carruthers (1996, 2000) and Dennett (1991). They agree that the reflexive consciousness has to be explained in terms of higher-order representational structure. This higher-order consciousness, on their view, is not a perception; rather, it is of the nature of thought. The higher-order consciousness as a thought does not imply that it is an objectifying, conceptual or inferential reflection. Instead, the higher-order thought is still non-conceptual and immediate.[4]

There are certainly more detailed controversies between the two theories, but what I am concerned with here is which theory the Buddhists would support, or, in other words, whether the Buddhist sense of reflexive consciousness is a perception or a thought. Given the fact that there are serious controversies on the nature of reflexive consciousness among various Buddhist schools, there is no simple answer to the question. In the epistemological system of Dignāga, however, we do find relevant issues being discussed. On his view, self-cognition is a type of perception (*pratyakṣa*), which seems to suggest that he supports the HOP theory. But, as a matter of fact, the Buddhist sense of perception is broader than the "perception" as found among the HOP theorists because perception in Dignāga's system covers not only sensation, the basic type of perception, but also various types of perception that are "mental", which include mental perception, self-cognition and yogic perception. Self-cognition, being of the nature of mental (*mānasa*), is an aspect of mental consciousness, hence it is a non-conceptual thought, but not a perception in the sense of depending upon sensory organs, external or internal. Furthermore, the higher-order structure of reflexive consciousness is elaborated by Dignāga in his theory of three divisions of cognition, which comprise self-cognition, the self-appearance as subject, and the object-appearance as object. Therefore, we can safely assume that Dignāga would support the HOT theory.

In a word, it is equally interesting and important to consider the relationship between the Buddhist theory of self-cognition and the study of consciousness in this rapidly growing field of cognitive science. I think that the Buddhist understanding of self-cognition that features an analysis of its temporal and representational structure can contribute greatly to the scientific

study of consciousness and human mind, but there still exists a large gap between the achievement of modern scientific research and this ancient wisdom. I hope that more scholars will join with me to carry out this significant project.

Notes

1 See Brook 1994: 55–7; Ni 2002: 164–8, 176.
2 See Frank 1991b: 508ff. The other three types are subjective, relational and non-relational self-consciousness.
3 See Lormand 1998.
4 See Rosenthal 2003: 719.

APPENDIX: DATES OF
IMPORTANT AUTHORS

Since this project is primarily a historical study, accurate dates are crucial. In an Indian context, however, chronological accuracy is very difficult. Fortunately, owing to the efforts of contemporary scholars, we have a preliminary assessment of the dates of major Buddhist authors. In the following, I list the Indian Buddhist authors to be discussed with their dates and sectarian affiliations. These dates are based on Tsukamoto *et al.* (1990) unless otherwise noted.

1 Sarvāstivāda

The dates for these Sarvāstivāda scholars are based on Willemen *et al.* (1998) unless otherwise noted.

Kātyāyanīputra (1st century BC)

Vasumitra (1st century BC): No fewer than five Vasumitras are known in the history of Indian Buddhism. Yinshun (1992: 275) assigns Vasumitra a date of around 100 BC. He believes that Vasumitra was immediately after Kātyāyanīputra and is also convinced that Vasumitra as a master in MV was the same person to compose the *Prakaraṇapāda*, *Dhātukāya* and SB. Lamotte (1988a: 520, 529) dates Vasumitra as well as SB to the second century AD. But Willemen *et al.* (1998: xv–xvi, n. 1), following Bareau (1955: 21–5), dates SB as late as the fourth century.

Buddhadeva (1st century BC to 1st century AD): This date is based on an inscription found in Kalawān, northern India. Both Willemen *et al.* (1998: 103) and Yinshun (1992: 271) are unsure whether the Buddhadeva mentioned in the inscription is the same person as Buddhadeva, one of the four masters in MV.

Ghoṣaka (1–2nd centuries): According to Yinshun 1992: 285. Willemen *et al.* (1998) does not give the date of Ghoṣaka, but he agrees with Yinshun

(1992: 290) in distinguishing between two persons in the name of Ghoṣaka. The one that we date here is one of the four masters in MV. The other Ghoṣaka is the author of the *Abhidharmāmṛtarasa*. This way they contradict the opinion of Fukuhara, Frauwallner, Mochizuki, Lin and Kritzer. See Willemen *et al.* 1998: 278, n. 126.

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (2nd century): Willemen *et al.* (1998: 261) cites La Vallée Poussin to support this date, but I did not find any reference to this date in La Vallée Poussin. Yinshun (1992: 268) assigns the Bhadanta an early date of 2nd century BC. Further evidence is required to date this Dharmatrāta, one of the four masters in MV.

Dharmaśreṣṭhin (3rd century): According to Yinshun 1992: 488. He also believes that Dharmaśreṣṭhin was about a century later than the composition of MV. Willemen *et al.* (1998: 256) vaguely places Dharmaśreṣṭhin in 220 BC–AD 220, but he believes that Dharmaśreṣṭhin lived before the composers of MV.

Upaśānta (3rd century)

Dharmatrāta (4th century)

Saṃghabhadra (4–5th centuries)

Yaśomitra (6–7th centuries): According to Yinshun 1992: 715.

2 Theravāda

The dates of these Theravāda scholars are according to Saigusa 1987.

Buddhaghosa (5th century)

Anuruddha (11–12th centuries)

3 Sautrāutika

The dates of the first three Sautrāntika scholars are based on Katō 1989, where he assigns Vasubandhu a date of 350–430 that is also supported by Schmithausen (1992).

Kumāralāta (280–360)

Harivarman (310–90)

Śrīlāta (330–410)

Vasuvarman (5th century): According to Lü 1991: 2387.

4 Yogācāra

Maitreya (350–430)

Asaṅga (395–470)

Vasubandhu (400–80): The dates of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are based on Hirakawa *et al.* 1973–8 (Vol. 1): iii. With regard to the date of Vasubandhu, there are various opinions: 320–400 (Ui), 350–430 (Katō, Schmithausen), and 400–80 (Hikata and Hirakawa). Frauwallner (1951) proposes two persons in the name of Vasubandhu: the elder one lived in 320–400, while the younger one is dated to 400–80. See Tsukamoto *et al.* 1990: 72, n. 53.

Nanda (5–6th centuries)

Sthiramati (475–555)

Dignāga (480–540)

Paramārtha (499–569)

Śaṅkarasvāmin (500–60)

Dharmapāla (530–61)

Bandhuprabha (6th century): The dates of Nanda, Sthiramati, Paramārtha, Dharmapāla and Bandhuprabha are from the *Fo guang da ci dian.*

Dharmakīrti (600–60)

Devendrabuddhi (630–90)

Asvabhāva (7th century)

Jinendrabuddhi (8th century)

Vinītadeva (8th century)

Dharmottara (750–810)

Prajñākaragupta (8–9th centuries)

Jñānaśrīmitra (980–1030)

Mokṣākaragupta (11–12th centuries)

5 Madhyamaka

Nāgārjuna (150–250)

Piṅgala (4th century)

Bhāvaviveka (Bavya) (490–570)

Candrakīrti (600–50)

Śāntideva (685–763)

Śāntarakṣita (725–88)

Kamalaśīla (740–95)

For the convenience of the reader, I also list some important non-Indian authors that I mentioned with their dates below:

An Shigao 安世高 (active 148–78)

Faxian 法顯 (334–422)

Xuanzang 玄奘 (600–64)

Wǒnch'ŭk 圓測 (613–96)

Kuiji 窺基 (632–82)

Puguang 普光 (active 645–64)

Fabao 法寶 (active 654–703)

Lingtai 靈泰 (7th century)

Yijing 義淨 (635–713)

Chūzan 仲算 (899–969)

Chōzen 澄禪 (1227–1307)

Bu-ston (1290–1364)

Tsong kha pa (1357–1419)

Tāranātha (1575–1634)

Mi-pham (1846–1912)

Ouyang Jian 歐陽漸 (1871–1943)

Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968)

Han Jingqing 韓鏡清 (1912–2003)

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