Buddhist Epistemology

Abstract

The present work is an analytical exposition of the theory of knowledge as propounded in the Dirinaga-Dharmaklrti tradition. It expounds the Buddhist theory of knowledge in its totality. Buddhist thinkers unanimously uphold the view that there are two kinds of objects of knowledge, namely, the unique particular (svalaksana) and the generalized image (samanyalaksana). Unique particular is discrete and instantaneous being. It is unique particular in the sense that it is neither identical nor similar to other unique particulars. It is the only objective real (paramartha sat). As distinct from unique particular there are objects that are constructs of our intellect and that are in the form of generalized images. They are subjective in origin but inter subjective in nature. On the basis of the preceding analysis Buddhist thinkers emphatically maintain that since there are only two kinds of objects of knowldege, there are only two kinds of knowledge (pramdtia) namely, perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumdna). The unique particular is amenable to perception only, whereas generalized image is known through inference only. By implication, unique particular can never be known through inference and generalized image can never be known through perception. Thus, each of the two types of knowledge has its own separate and distinct sphere of operation. In the following pages is a discussion of Buddhist theory of knowledge, comparing it with other schools wherever necessary. To make the logical issues more intelligible to readers, a basic text, “Nyaya Pravesa” is given as an appendix of the work. The text of “Nyaya Praves'a” is generally ascribed to Dirinaga, a pioneer thinker in Buddhist theory of Knowledge. Dirinaga provided a solid footing to Buddhist epistemology and logic and gave it a distinctive character. He has been regarded as the father of Buddhist epistemology and logic in particular and of the entire medieval Indian epistemology and logic in general. There are several works composed by him in this area, among which “Pramana Samuccaya” and “Nyaya Praves'a” are most important. “Pramana Samuccaya” is not available in its complete form, even though some of its chapters have been restored from Tibetan and other sources. However “Nyaya Pravesa” is available to us in its full form. An attempt has been made here to translate it in English for the benefit of English language readers. The text is presented here in Roman script with a view to have wider readership. Explanatory notes have also been provided to clarify some knotty points. “Nyaya Praves'a” is a classical work pertaining to the modes of knowing and reasoning in the Buddhist tradition. For centuries it has been studied as a manual of the Buddhist theory of knowledge in India, Tibet, China, and other countries. It provides a foundation to the famous Buddhist art of debate (yada-vidhi) . There are several Tibetan and Chinese commentaries and sub-commentaries on “Nyaya Praves'a” apart from the ones in Sanskrit. This accounts for its significance and popularity among classical scholars. In a cryptic, but succinct, manner “Nyaya Praves'a” presents Dirinaga’s views on the nature of perception and inference and their fallacies. It also elaborately discusses the modes of argumentation and refutation along with their fallacies. We are grateful to Greenwood Publishing Group and its staff and to Dr. Hoffman who introduced this work to Greenwood. Our thanks are also due to Indian Council of Philosophical Research for providing financial assistance for the preparation of the work.