Buddhist logic in two volumes. 1

Abstract

This work claims the consideration of the historian of the culture of Asia, of the Sanscrit philologist and of the general philosopher. It is the last of a series of three works destined to elucidate what is perhaps the most powerful movement of ideas in the history of Asia, a movement which, originating in the VI century BC. in the valley of Hindustan, gradually extended its sway over almost the whole of the continent of Asia, as well as over the islands of Japan and of the Indian archipelago. These works are thus concerned about the history of the ruling ideas of Asia, Central and Eastern.1 It also claims the consideration of the Sanscritist, because it is exclusively founded on original works belonging to the Sästra class; these are Indian scholarly compositions, written in that specific scientific Sanscrit style, where the argument is formulated in a quite special terminology and put in the form of laconic rules; its explanation and development are contained in numerous commentaries and subcommentaries. To elucidate this quite definite and very precise terminology is the aim of a series of analytical translations collected in the second volume.8 1 A systematical review of the fnll extent of that literature which under the general name of the «Law of the Buddha» migrated from India into the northern countries, compiled by the celebrated Tibetan savant Bu-ston Rinpoche, is now made accessible to European scholars in a masterly translation by E. Obermiller, cp. his History of Buddhism by Buston (Heidelberg, 1931). The ruling ideas of all this enormous bulk of learning are 1) a monistic metaphysics and 2) a logic. The metaphysical part will be fully elucidated in a series of works of which the general plan has been indicated in the Introduction to our edition of the AbhisamayiUankSra (Bibi. Buddb. XXXIII). In realization of this plan E. Obermiller has already issued two works, 1) The Sublime Science being a translation of Asanga’s Uttara-tantra (Acta Orient., 1931) and 2)The Doctrine of Prajfià-päramitä according to the Abhisamayälankära and its commentaries (A. 0. 1932). The place which Logic (tshad-ma) occupies in the whole purview of Buddhist literature is indicated by Buston in his History, cp. p. 45—46, vol. I of the translation. * In order to facilitate the verification of our analysis we quote the original term in a note. By utilizing the index of Sanscrit and Tibetan words appended to the second volume the contexts will be found, on which the interpretation of the term is based. In addressing itself to the philosopher this work claims his consideration of a system of logic which is not familiar to him. It is a logic, but it is not Aristotelian. It is epistemological, but not Kantian. There is a widely spread prejudice that positive philosophy is to be found only in Europe. It is also a prejudice that Aristotle’s treatment of logic was final; that having had in this field no predecessor, he also has had no need of a continuator. This last prejudice seems to be on the wane. There is as yet no agreed opinion on what the future logic will be, but there is a general dissatisfaction with what it at present is. We are on the eve of a reform. The consideration at this juncture of the independent and altogether different way in which the problems of logic, formal as well as epistemological, have been tackled by Dignäga and Dharmaklrti will possibly be found of some importance. The philosopher in thus considering and comparing two different logics will perceive that there are such problems which the human mind naturally encounters on his way as soon as he begins to deal with truth and error. Such are, e. g., the problems of the essence of a judgment, of inference and of syllogism; the problems of the categories and of relations; of the synthetical and analytical judj- ments; of infinity, infinite divisibility, of the antinomies and of the dialectical structure of the understanding. From under the cover of an exotic terminology he will discern features which he is accustomed to see differently treated, differently arranged, assigned different places in the system and put into quite different contexts. The philosopher, if he becomes conversant with the style of Sanscrit compositions, will be tempted not only to interpret Indian ideas in European terms, but also to try the converse operation and to interpret European ideas in Indian terms. My main object has been to point out these analogies, but not to produce any estimate of the comparative value of both logics. On this point I would prefer first to hear the opinion of the professional philosopher who in this special department of knowledge has infinitely more experience than I may claim to possess. I would be amply satisfied if I only succeed to arouse his attention and through him to introduce Indian positive philosophers into the community of their European brotherhood.