THƯ VIỆN SỐ
VIỆN TRẦN NHÂN TÔNG
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/925
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Th. Stcherbatsky | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-21T15:36:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-12-21T15:36:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1993 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0-486-20955-5 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tnt.ussh.edu.vn:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/925 | - |
dc.description | Under Buddhist Logic we understand a system of logic and epistemology created in India in the VI—Vllth century A. D. by two great lustres of Buddhist science, the Masters D i g n ä g a and Dharmakirti . The very insufficiently known Buddhist logical literature which prepared their creation and the enormous literature of commentaries which followed it in all northern Buddhist countries must be referred to the same class of writings. It contains, first of all, a doctrine on the forms of syllogism1 and for that reason alone deserves the name of logic. A theory on the essence of judgment, on the import of names and on inference is in India, just as it is in Europe, a natural corollary from the theory of syllogism. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Abbreviations ; Preface ; Introduction ; § 1. Buddhist Logic what ; § 2. The place of Logic in the history of Buddhism ; § 3. First period of Buddhist philosophy ; § 4. Second ; § 5. Third ; § 6. The place of Buddhist Logic in the history of Indian philosophy ; 1) The M aterialists ; 2) Jain ism ; 3) The Sftnkhya System ; 4) The Yoga System ; 5) The Vedanta ; 6) The Mïmâmsa ; 7) The NySya-Vaise?ika System ; § 7. Buddhist Logic before Dignaga ; § 8. The life of Dignaga ; § 9. The » » Dharmakirti ; § 10. The works of Dharmakirti ; § 11. The order of the chapters in Pramana-ynitika ; § 12. The philological school of commentators ; § 13. The Cashmere or philosophic school of commentators ; § 14. The third or religious school of commentators ; § 15. Post-Buddhist Logic and the struggle between Realism and Nominalism in India ; § 16. Buddhist Logic in China and Japan ; § 17. » » » Tibet and Mongolia ; Part I.— Reality and Knowledge (prämänya -väda) ; § 1. Scope and aim of Buddhist Logic ; § 2. A source of knowledge what ; § 3. Cognition and Recognition ; § 4. The test of truth ; § 5. Realistic and Buddhistic view of experience ; § 6. Two realities ; § 7. The double character of a source of knowledge ; § 8. The limits of cognition. Dogmatism and Criticism ; Part II — The Sensible World ; Chapter I. — The theory of Instantaneous Being (ksaçika-vâda) ; § 1. The problem stated ; § 2. Reality is kinetic ; § 3. Argument from ideality of Time and Space ; § 4. Duration and extention are not real ; § 5. Argument from direct perception ; § 6. Recognition does not prove duration ; § 7. Argument from an analysis of the notion of existence ; § 8. Argument from an analysis of the notion of non-existence ; § 9. Santiraksita’s formula ; § 10. Change and annihilation ; § 11. Motion is discontinuous ; § 12. Annihilation certain a priori ; § 18. Momentariness deduced from the lav of Contradiction ; § 14. Is the point-instant a reality? The Differential Calculns ; § 15. History of the doctrine of Momentariness ; § 16. Some European P arallels ; Chapter II. — Causation (pratltya-samutpSda); § 1. Causation as functional dependence ; § 2 The formulas of causation ; § 8. Causation and Reality identical ; § 4. Two kinds of Causality ; § 5. Plurality of causes ; § 6. Infinity of causes ; § 7. Causality and Free Will 121 § 8. The four meanings of Dependent Origination ; § 9. Some European Parallels ; Chapter III. — Sense-perception (pratyakçam); § 1. The definition of sense-perception ; § 2. The experiment of Dharmaklrti ; § 3. Perception and illusion ; § 4. The varieties of intuition ; a) Mental sensation (mânasa-praktyakça) ; b) The intelligible intuition of the Saint (yogi-pratyakga) ; c) Introspection (svasaipvedana) ; § 5. History of the Indian vies on sense-perception ; § 6. Some European Parallels ; Chapter IV. — Ultimate reality (paramartha-sat); § 1. What is ultimately real ; § 2. The Particular is the ultimate reality ; § 3. Reality is unutterable ; § 4. Reality produces a vivid image ; § 5. Ultimate Reality is dynamic ; § 6. The Monad and the A tom ; §7. Reality is Affirmation ; §8. Objections ; §9. The evolution of the views on Reality ; § 10. Some European Parallels ; Part III.— The constructed world ; Chapter I — Judgment ; § 1. Transition from pure sensation to conception ; § 2. The first steps of the Understanding ; § 3. A judgment what ; § 4. Judgment and the synthesis in concepts ; § 5. Judgment and namegiving ; § 6. Categories ; § 7. Judgment viewed as analysis ; § 8. Judgment as objectively valid ; § 9. History of the theory of jud gment ; § 10. Some European Parallels ; Chapter II. — Inference; § 1. Judgment and Inference ; § 2. The three terms ; § 3. The various definitions of inference ; § 4. Inferring and Inference ; § 5. How far Inference is true knowledge ; § 6. The three Aspects of the Reason ; § 7. Dhamakirti’s tract on relations ; § 8. Two lines of dependence ; § 9. Analytic and Synthetic judgments ; § 10. The final table of Categories ; § 11. Are the items of the table mutually exclusive ; § 12. Is the Buddhist table of relations exhaustive ; § 13. Universal and Necessary Judgments ; § 14. The limits of the use of pure Understanding ; § 15. Historical sketch of the views of Inference ; § 16. Some European Parallels ; Chapter III. — Syllogism (pararthanumanam) ; §1. Definition ; § 2. The members of syllogism ; § 3. Syllogism and Induction ; § 4. The figures of Syllogism ; § 5. The value of Syllogism ; § 6. Historical sketch of Syllogism viewed as inference for others ; § 7. European and Buddhist Syllogism ; a) Definition by Aristotle and by the Buddhists ; b) Aristotle’s Syllogism from Example ; c) Inference and Induction ; d) The Buddhist syllogism contains two propositions ; e) Contraposition ; f) Figures ; g) The Causal and Hypothetical Syllogism ; h) Summary ; Chapter IV. — Logical Fallacies; § 1. Classification ; §2. Fallacy against Reality (asiddha-hetv-âbhâsa) ; §3. Fallacy of a Contrary Reason ; §4. Fallacy of an Uncertain Reason ; §5. The Antinomical Fallacy ; § 6. Dharmakirti’s additions ; § 7. History ; a) Manuals of Dialectics ; b) The refutatiye syllogism of the Madhyamikas ; c) The Vaisegika system influenced by the Buddhists ; d) The NySya system influenced by Dignäga ; § 8. European P arallels ; Part IV. — Negation ; Chapter I. — The negative judgment; § 1. The essence of Negation ; § 2. Negation is an Inference ; § 3. The figures of the Negative Syllogism. The figure of Simple Negation ; § 4. The ten remaining figures ; § 5. Importance of Negation ; § 6. Contradiction and Causality only in the. Empirical Sphere ; § 7. Negation of snpersensuous objects ; § 8. Indian developments ; §9. European Parallels; a) Sigwart’s theory ; b) Denied copula and Negative Predicate ; c) Judgment and Re-judgment ; Chapter II. — The Law of Contradiction; § 1. The origin of Contradiction ; § 2. Logical Contradiction ; § 3. Dynamical opposition ; § 4. Law of Otherness ; § 5. Different formulations of the Laws of Contradiction and Otherness ; § 6. Other Indian schools on Contradiction ; § 7. Some European Parallels ; a) The Law of Excluded Middle ; b) The Law of Double Negation ; c) The Law of Id e n tity ; d) Two European L ogics ; e) Heracleitus ; f) Causation and Identity in the fragments of Heracleitus ; g) The Eleatic Law of Contradiction ; h) Plato ; i) Kant and Sigwart ; j) The Aristotelian formula of Contradiction and Dharmakirti’s theory of Relations; Chapter III. — Universale; § 1. The static Universality of Things replaced by similarity of action ; § 2. History of the problem of Universale ; § 3. Some European Parallels ; Chapter IV. — Dialectic; § 1. Digniiga’s Theory of Names ; § 2. Jinendrabuddbi on the Theory of the Negative Meaning of Names ; a) All names are negative ; b) The origin of Universale ; c) Controversy with the Realist ; d) The experience of individuals becomes the agreed experience of the Human Mind ; e) Conclusion ; § 3. Santiraksita and Kamalaslla on the negative meaning of words ; § 4. Historical sketch of the devolopment of the Buddhist Dialectical Method ; § 5. European Parallels; a) Kant and Hegel ; b) J. S. Mill and A. Bain ; c) Sigwart ; d) Affirmation what ; e) Ulrici and Lotze ; Part V.— Reality of the External World ; § 1. What is Real ; § 2. What is External ; § 3. The three worlds ; § 4. Critical Realism ; § 5. Ultimate Monism ; § 6. Idealism ; § 7. Digniiga’s tract on the Unreality of the External World ; § 8. Dharmakirti’s tract on the Repudiation of Solipsism ; § 9. History of the problem of tbe Reality of the External World ; § 10. Some European Parallels ; § 11. Indo-European Symposion on the Reality of tbe External World ; Conclusion ; Indices ; Appendix ; Addenda ; | en_US |
dc.description.tableofcontents | Abbreviations X Preface XI Introduction 1—58 § 1. Buddhist Logic what 1 § 2. The place of Logic in the history of Buddhism 3 § 3. First period of Buddhist philosophy 3 § 4. Second 7 § 5. Third 11 § 6. The place of Buddhist Logic in the history of Indian philosophy 15 1) The M aterialists 15 2) Jain ism 16 3) The Sftnkhya System 17 4) The Yoga System 20 5) The Vedanta 21 6) The Mïmâmsa 22 7) The NySya-Vaise?ika System 24 § 7. Buddhist Logic before Dignaga 27 § 8. The life of Dignaga 31 § 9. The » » Dharmakirti 34 § 10. The works of Dharmakirti 37 § 11. The order of the chapters in Pramana-ynitika 38 § 12. The philological school of commentators 39 § 13. The Cashmere or philosophic school of commentators 40 § 14. The third or religious school of commentators 42 § 15. Post-Buddhist Logic and the struggle between Realism and Nominalism in India 47 § 16. Buddhist Logic in China and Japan 52 § 17. » » » Tibet and Mongolia 55 Part I.— Reality and Knowledge (prämänya -väda) 59—78 § 1. Scope and aim of Buddhist Logic 59 § 2. A source of knowledge what 62 § 3. Cognition and Recognition 64 § 4. The test of truth 65 § 5. Realistic and Buddhistic view of experience 67 § 6. Two realities 69 § 7. The double character of a source of knowledge 71 § 8. The limits of cognition. Dogmatism and Criticism 74 Part II — The Sensible World .79— 118 Chapter I. — The theory of Instantaneous Being (ksaçika-vâda) § 1. The problem stated 79 § 2. Reality is kinetic 81 § 3. Argument from ideality of Time and Space 84 § 4. Duration and extention are not real 86 § 5. Argument from direct perception 87 § 6. Recognition does not prove duration 88 § 7. Argument from an analysis of the notion of existence 89 § 8. Argument from an analysis of the notion of non-existence 91 § 9. Santiraksita’s formula 95 § 10. Change and annihilation 96 § 11. Motion is discontinuous 98 § 12. Annihilation certain a priori 102 § 18. Momentariness deduced from the lav of Contradiction 103 § 14. Is the point-instant a reality? The Differential Calculns 106 § 15. History of the doctrine of Momentariness 108 § 16. Some European P arallels 114 Chapter II. — Causation (pratltya-samutpSda) § 1. Causation as functional dependence 119 § 2 The formulas of causation 121 § 8. Causation and Reality identical 124 § 4. Two kinds of Causality 126 § 5. Plurality of causes 127 § 6. Infinity of causes 129 § 7. Causality and Free Will 131 § 8. The four meanings of Dependent Origination 134 § 9. Some European Parallels 141 Chapter III. — Sense-perception (pratyakçam) § 1. The definition of sense-perception 146 § 2. The experiment of Dharmaklrti 150 § 3. Perception and illusion 153 § 4. The varieties of intuition 161 a) Mental sensation (mânasa-praktyakça) 161 b) The intelligible intuition of the Saint (yogi-pratyakga) 162 c) Introspection (svasaipvedana) 163 § 5. History of the Indian vies on sense-perception 169 § 6. Some European Parallels 175 Chapter IV. — Ultimate reality (paramartha-sat) § 1. What is ultimately real 181 § 2. The Particular is the ultimate reality 183 § 3. Reality is unutterable 185 § 4. Reality produces a vivid image 186 § 5. Ultimate Reality is dynamic 189 § 6. The Monad and the A tom 190 §7. Reality is Affirmation 192 §8. Objections 198 §9. The evolution of the views on Reality 195 § 10. Some European Parallels 198 Part III.— The constructed world 204— 362 Chapter I — Judgment § 1. Transition from pure sensation to conception 204 § 2. The first steps of the Understanding 209 § 3. A judgment what 211 § 4. Judgment and the synthesis in concepts 213 § 5. Judgment and namegiving 214 § 6. Categories 216 § 7. Judgment viewed as analysis 219 § 8. Judgment as objectively valid 220 § 9. History of the theory of jud gment 228 § 10. Some European Parallels 226 Chapter II. — Inference. § 1. Judgment and Inference 231 § 2. The three te rm s 238 § 3. The various definitions of inference 236 § 4. Inferring and Inference 238 § 5. How far Inference is true knowledge 239 § 6. The three Aspects of the Reason 242 § 7. Dhamakirti’s tract on relations 245 § 8. Two lines of dependence 248 § 9. Analytic and Synthetic judgm ents 250 § 10. The final table of Categories 252 § 11. Are the items of the table mutually exclusive 264 § 12. Is the Buddhist table of relations exhaustive 256 § 13. Universal and Necessary Judgments 260 § 14. The limits of the use of pure Understanding 262 § 15. Historical sketch of the views of Inference 264 § 16. Some European Parallels 269 Chapter III. — Syllogism (pararthanumanam) §1. Definition 275 § 2. The members of syllogism 279 § 3. Syllogism and Induction 281 § 4. The figures of Syllogism 283 § 5. The value of Syllogism 287 § 6. Historical sketch of Syllogism viewed as inference for others 290 § 7. European and Buddhist Syllogism 295 a) Definition by Aristotle and by the Buddhists 296 b) Aristotle’s Syllogism from Example 297 c) Inference and Induction 298 d) The Buddhist syllogism contains two propositions 301 e) Contraposition 301 f) Figures 303 g) The Causal and Hypothetical Syllogism 309 h) Summary 316 Chapter IV. — Logical Fallacies. § 1. Classification 320 §2. Fallacy against Reality (asiddha-hetv-âbhâsa) 327 §3. Fallacy of a Contrary Reason 330 §4. Fallacy of an Uncertain Reason 332 §5. The Antinomical Fallacy 336 § 6. Dharmakirti’s additions 337 § 7. History 340 a) Manuals of Dialectics 340 b) The refutatiye syllogism of the Madhyamikas 343 c) The Vaisegika system influenced by the Buddhists 346 d) The NySya system influenced by Dignäga 349 § 8. European P arallels 353 Part IV. — Negation 363—606 Chapter I. — The negative judgment. § 1. The essence of Negation 363 § 2. Negation is an Inference 366 § 3. The figures of the Negative Syllogism. The figure of Simple Negation 370 § 4. The ten remaining figures 375 § 5. Importance of Negation 381 § 6. Contradiction and Causality only in the. Empirical Sphere 388 § 7. Negation of snpersensuous objects 384 § 8. Indian developments 387 §9. European Parallels: a) Sigwart’s theory 390 b) Denied copula and Negative Predicate 394 c) Judgment and Re-judgment 397 Chapter II. — The Law of Contradiction. § 1. The origin of Contradiction 400 § 2. Logical Contradiction 402 § 3. Dynamical opposition 404 § 4. Law of Otherness 409 § 5. Different formulations of the Laws of Contradiction and Otherness 410 § 6. Other Indian schools on Contradiction 413 § 7. Some European Parallels 416 a) The Law of Excluded Middle 416 b) The Law of Double Negation. 417 c) The Law of Id e n tity 419 d) Two European L ogics 424 e) Heracleitus 426 f) Causation and Identity in the fragments of Heracleitus 428 g) The Eleatic Law of Contradiction 430 h) Plato 432 i) Kant and Sigwart 436 j) The Aristotelian formula of Contradiction and Dharmakirti’s theory of Relations. 439 Chapter III. — Universale. § 1. The static Universality of Things replaced by similarity of action 444 § 2. History of the problem of Universale 448 § 3. Some European Parallels 451 Chapter IV. — Dialectic. § 1. Digniiga’s Theory of Names 457 § 2. Jinendrabuddbi on the Theory of the Negative Meaning of Names 461 a) All names are negative 461 b) The origin of Universale 464 c) Controversy with the Realist 467 d) The experience of individuals becomes the agreed experience of the Human Mind 470 e) Conclusion 470 § 3. Santiraksita and Kamalaslla on the negative meaning of words 471 § 4. Historical sketch of the devolopment of the Buddhist Dialectical Method 477 § 5. European Parallels. a) Kant and Hegel 482 b) J. S. Mill and A. Bain 486 c) Sigwart 489 d) Affirmation what 495 e) Ulrici and Lotze 501 Part V.— Reality of the External World 506—545 § 1. What is Real 506 § 2. What is External 508 § 3. The three worlds 509 § 4. Critical Realism 510 § 5. Ultimate Monism 512 § 6. Idealism 518 § 7. Digniiga’s tract on the Unreality of the External World 518 § 8. Dharmakirti’s tract on the Repudiation of Solipsism 521 § 9. History of the problem of tbe Reality of the External World 524 § 10. Some European Parallels 529 § 11. Indo-European Symposion on the Reality of tbe External World 586 Conclusion 545 Indices 547 Appendix 558 Addenda 559 | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Dover Publications, Inc. | en_US |
dc.subject | Kinh điển và triết học phật giáo | en_US |
dc.subject | Lịch sử và văn hóa phật giáo | en_US |
dc.title | Buddhist Logic. Vol. I | en_US |
dc.type | Book | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | CSDL Phật giáo |
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Th. Stcherbatsky (1993) Buddhist Logic. Vol. I.pdf ???org.dspace.app.webui.jsptag.ItemTag.accessRestricted??? | 14.89 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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